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Referring to simultaneous competition and cooperation between firms, coopetition is 
emerging in practice as a promising source of value creation. However, the scholarly 
literature is dominated by a widespread assumption that opportunism, a core behavioral 
assumption of transaction cost economics, hinders value creation and requires formal 
safeguards in coopetition. The assumption of heightened opportunism in coopetition is at 
odds with rising adoption in practice, which often proceeds without formal safeguards. 
This raises concerns about the utility of existing theory for explaining coopetition 
dynamics and their implications for value creation. 
Building from theories of competitive dynamics and the resource-based view, my research 
challenges the dominant assumption of heightened opportunism and develops an 
alternative explanation to better explain coopetition dynamics. I identify and test informal 
market-based safeguards which reduce opportunism in coopetition. This provides 
theoretical resolution for conflicting findings in the literature and develops a nuanced 
understanding of the factors affecting opportunism in coopetition at multiple levels. It 
addresses the failure of extant research to explain coopetition dynamics and establishes 
foundations for systematic analysis of coopetition benefits and costs in future research. 
For managers, my findings move beyond simplistic perceptions that have emphasized 
instability, knowledge leakage, and the resultant need for formal safeguards in 
coopetition. Instead, I identify an efficient and effective alternative for constraining 
opportunism. This indicates that establishing, maintaining, and ultimately achieving value 
creation in coopetition relationships may be less challenging and costly than the literature 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Background 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The focus of this dissertation is on expanding knowledge of coopetition dynamics and 
explaining their role in determining value creation in coopetition. Coopetition refers to 
the phenomenon of simultaneous competition and cooperation between firms (Bengtsson 
& Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2009: 2011). The study of coopetition has emerged 
from the interplay of the literatures on inter-firm competition (Barney, 1991; Chen, Smith, 
& Grimm, 1992; Porter, 1980), with roots in industrial organization economics (Bain, 
1956; Mason, 1939) and Austrian economics (Kirzner, 1973; Mises, 1949), and inter-firm 
cooperation (Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Hamel, 1991), originating 
in sociology (Granovetter, 1985; Macaulay, 1963). Coopetition is receiving an increasing 
level of scrutiny in the academic literature (Ansari, Garud, & Kumaraswamy, 2016; 
Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004), but in its current state there 
are important limitations that must be addressed.  
With its basis in transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), a 
widespread assumption in the coopetition literature is that heightened opportunism leads 
to significant costs and challenges (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Park & Russo, 
1996; Park & Ungson, 2001). Acknowledging this dominant view, my research seeks to 
expand on knowledge of opportunism in light of increasing pursuit of coopetition in 
industry (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Harbison & Pekar, 1998), which often proceeds without 
formal safeguards to constrain opportunism (Ryu & Reuer, 2016). In addition, by 
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connecting opportunism to firm value creation in coopetition, I intend to clarify how firms 
achieve widely reported benefits from coopetition (Ansari et al., 2016; Bengtsson & Kock, 
2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2011) given the perceived challenges of opportunism. 
My dissertation will address the limitations in the literature by explicating the role of 
market commonality in coopetition — a core determinant of opportunism —, unpacking 
its effect on opportunism in coopetition, and examining the subsequent influence on firm 
value creation. The overarching contribution of my research is to clarify the nature of 
opportunism in coopetition. This advances theoretical development by challenging the 
dominant assumption in the literature, illuminating previously unreported informal 
market-based safeguards against opportunism in coopetition, and reconciling conflicting 
findings. 
1.2  Research process  
To formulate this contribution to knowledge, my dissertation relies on both theory and 
data. Figure 1.1 lays out the framework employed to manage the relationship between 
theory and data (Rose, 1982). It illuminates a deductive approach, starting with theory 
before moving to data and then returning to theory. I will now outline the research process 




Figure 1.1: Research process 
 
*adapted from Rose (1982) 
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My research is grounded in a critical review of extant theory. It began with a synthesis of 
the broad theoretical background, which moves from the evolution of strategic 
management research to the role of inter-firm competition and cooperation, to the 
interplay of both firm behaviors. The interplay of competition and cooperation leads to 
the emergence of coopetition, a phenomenon that has received increasing but fragmented 
scrutiny in the literature. From an extensive analysis, I isolated three defining 
characteristics of coopetition and explicated several implications of coopetition that 
enable value creation benefits for firms. I then unpacked two important research gaps in 
the literature: failure of extant theory to explain opportunism in coopetition and, as a 
result, constrained theoretical development regarding value creation in coopetition. These 
led me to develop two specific objectives for the dissertation, which map onto two 
research questions. To answer the research questions, I advanced five hypothesis which 
built on theory from competitive dynamics (Chen, 1996; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; 
Gimeno & Woo, 1996a) and the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 2006). With 
careful reflection regarding the opportunities and challenges associated with moving from 
theory to data, I identified critical rationalism as a suitable methodology for the specified 
objectives. The decision regarding methodology bore important implications for research 
method and, after consideration, I identified a quasi-experimental design employing 
archival data from the global semiconductor industry as an appropriate method. The 
conceptual model was operationalized and the resultant empirical model was tested. The 
estimates from the empirical model were then used for hypothesis testing. Next, returning 
to theory, I reflected on the outcomes of hypothesis testing in terms of the empirical 
design, theoretical development, focal theory, and theoretical background. This led to 
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three core contributions, broader advancements of the coopetition literature, and 
extensions of underpinning theories. In addition, I identified practical implications, and a 
number of limitations and future opportunities arising from my research. 
1.3  Dissertation structure  
In the remainder of Chapter 1, I explain personal motivations and aims for this research. 
I then review how the strategic management literature has evolved to examine the 
phenomenon of coopetition, which is the focus of my dissertation. I begin with the 
positioning school of strategic management research (Porter, 1980), which is informed by 
industrial organization economics (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939). As the field developed, and 
to address limitations of the positioning school in dynamic environments, emphasis 
shifted to analysis of the firm’s internal resources (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) and 
capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). This ultimately led to recognition that firms 
may not be able to satisfy resource and capability requirements internally, and that the 
firm may access critical resources from its external relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Lavie, 2006). Two conflicting behaviors are observed in this evolution of strategic 
management: inter-firm competition and inter-firm cooperation. I explain how the 
competitive dynamics literature (Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen et al., 1992) builds from 
Austrian economics (Jacobsen, 1992; Mises, 1949) to explain firm competitive behavior. 
Inter-firm competition is understood through the concept of market commonality: the 
proportion of the firm’s markets in which it encounters a given competitor (Chen, 1996). 
Inter-firm cooperation has its roots in sociology (Granovetter, 1985; Macauley, 1963), 
where firms may access resources and capabilities through their relationships with one 
another (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Gulati, 1998). I conclude by reviewing three 
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different views on the interplay between inter-firm competition and cooperation: the 
networks view, the contextual view, and the dyadic view. The networks view emphasizes 
competitors who are connected by cooperative relationships in a network (Andrevski & 
Ferrier, forthcoming; Gnyawali, He, & Madhavan, 2006; Sanou, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 
2016). The contextual view studies how the firm may benefit from maintaining some 
competitive relations and some cooperative relations (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; 
Bresser, 1988; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). The dyadic view is the focus of this 
dissertation and emphasizes simultaneous competition and cooperation between the same 
two firms (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2009: 2011).  
Chapter 2 focuses on the dyadic view of the interplay between competition and 
cooperation, from which the phenomenon of coopetition emerges. Coopetition is 
receiving increased scrutiny in the literature (Ketchen et al., 2004), which generates 
intriguing opportunities but also raises challenges regarding the boundaries of coopetition 
and factors that enable value creation in coopetition (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016; 
Gnyawali & Song, 2016; Ketchen et al., 2004). To explain the opportunities and address 
some of the challenges, Chapter 2 reports the findings of a critical review and synthesis 
of the focal literature on coopetition. I begin by the organizing the literature through four 
lenses that have been utilized to study coopetition: actor-centric, interaction-centric, 
cognition-centric, and context-centric. Each lens has a unique take on the phenomenon 
and, in combination, they provide a holistic overview of how coopetition has been studied. 
To address ambiguity regarding the boundaries and definition of coopetition, I next 
develop three defining characteristics that characterize the phenomenon under study and 
distinguish it from related phenomena. These characteristics, simultaneity of competition 
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and cooperation, the paradoxical interdependence of competition and cooperation, and 
value creation intent in coopetition, offer much needed clarity concerning how coopetition 
is understood and examined. Building on Chapter 1, I then explicate core implications of 
inter-firm competition and cooperation. Inter-firm competition leads to pursuit of 
excellence and resource potential between firms, whereas inter-firm cooperation 
generates relational mechanisms and resource commitments. These implications each 
offer benefits and challenges, but I explain that under certain conditions they may be 
complementary when they co-exist simultaneously. When competition and cooperation 
are balanced and moderately strong, I explain how the synergies generated between these 
sets of implications may enable value creation in coopetition. 
In Chapter 3, I explain the current state of the literature and the underpinning theory that 
leads to the two research gaps that my dissertation will address. Though Chapter 2 
portrays quite a promising view of value creation in coopetition, the widespread view in 
the literature is significantly more skeptical, dominated by an assumption of heightened 
opportunism. The concept of opportunism, referring to self-interest seeking with guile 
(e.g., lying, cheating, stealing, or evading obligations), originates from transaction cost 
economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). I explain why opportunism is assumed to be 
heightened in coopetition (Dussauge et al., 2000; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 
2001) because firms are (1) motivated to behave opportunistically, (2) capable of 
behaving opportunistically, while (3) simultaneous inter-firm competition and 
cooperation also introduces additional uncertainty to the relationship, which is conducive 
to opportunism. However, I note how this view is at odds with rising pursuit of coopetition 
(Harbison & Pekar, 1998; Gnyawali & Park, 2009), which often proceeds without formal 
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safeguards to constrain opportunism (Ryu & Reuer, 2016). This raises concerns about the 
usefulness of existing theory for explaining the dynamics of coopetition. As a result, two 
research gaps emerge. The first gap is the failure of extant research to explain coopetition 
dynamics, which leads to the second gap, constrained theoretical development regarding 
value creation in coopetition. These gaps motivate two research objectives: (1) to develop 
better theory regarding opportunism and (2) to explore the implications of opportunism in 
coopetition for value creation in coopetition. The research objectives map onto two 
research questions that this dissertation will address. 
Chapter 4 begins the process of answering the research questions by advancing a 
conceptual model regarding opportunism and value creation in coopetition. This chapter 
builds on two theories, competitive dynamics (Chen et al., 1992; Baum & Korn, 1996; 
Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992) and the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 
2006), which are central to inter-firm competition and cooperation but have been largely 
overlooked to explain coopetition dynamics. I begin by explaining the concepts of 
competitive action and response in competitive dynamics and how the potential 
competitive response determines the likelihood that a competitive action will proceed 
(Chen et al., 1992; Chen & MacMillan, 1992). This logic may be applied to scope for 
partner retaliation to opportunism, which I argue can reduce opportunism in coopetition. 
I explain why market commonality in coopetition increases scope for partner retaliation, 
which reduces opportunism in coopetition. Market commonality establishes a base level 
of awareness of opportunism and motivation to retaliate, while it increases capability to 
retaliate.  This suggests a negative effect of market commonality on opportunism but, 
extending the conceptual development to the resource-based view, I propose that this 
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effect will reverse at high levels of market commonality. When market commonality is 
high firms must appropriate value from many of the same markets, which reduces the 
rarity of jointly developed resources and increases rewards from behaving 
opportunistically. Consequently, I hypothesize a curvilinear, U-shaped effect of market 
commonality on opportunism, where low and moderate levels of market commonality are 
negatively associated with firm opportunism but this reverses at higher levels of market 
commonality. I next consider the effect on value creation, which I predict is negatively 
affected by opportunism. This motivates a hypothesized inverted U-shaped relationship 
between market commonality and value creation. To validate the logic underlying these 
predictions and enable fine-grained analysis, I also introduce two additional constructs, 
market rivalry and repeated cooperation, which are predicted to have important negative 
moderating effects on the main relationship. 
In Chapter 5, I outline important methodological decisions made in relation to ontology, 
epistemology, and approach to reasoning. These decisions cumulatively set the research 
in the context of a critical rationalist worldview, consisting of a realist ontology, 
falsificationist epistemology, and deductive approach to reasoning. I begin by explaining 
why philosophy is an important consideration and the burden of responsibility to adopt 
and express a methodological stance. This is followed by a discussion of ontology, which 
outlines the prominent standpoints of objectivism and subjectivism in the literature, before 
explaining the suitability of a cautious realist position for the current research. Cautious 
realism acknowledges that an external, concrete reality does exist, but recognizes that 
sensual limitations and the interpretive nature of observation impedes our ability to know 
it directly (Blaikie, 2007). I proceed to outline epistemological considerations, where 
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prominent assumptions associated with positivism and interpretivism are discussed, and 
the suitability of a falsificationist position is explained. Falsificationism recognizes that 
the interpretive nature of observation makes ‘proof’ or ‘truth’ unachievable, so the goal is 
to challenge and falsify hypotheses and arrive at a point where theory is ‘less bad’ (Popper, 
1959: 1972). The final methodological decision is approach to reasoning, where I outline 
traditional deductive and inductive approaches, and explain why deductivism is aligned 
with my ontological and epistemological choices. The central assumptions of a critical 
rationalist worldview are then discussed, before I reflect on the implications of research 
methodology for the subsequent choice of method. 
Chapter 6 outlines the details of my research method. Though an experimental approach 
is most appropriate for the type of positivistic worldview adopted, practical and ethical 
conditions lead me to rely on a quasi-experimental design employing third-party archival 
data. The global semiconductor industry is a highly suitable empirical context because of 
its dynamic inter-firm competition and cooperation. Data was collected from firms 
involved in dyadic cooperative R&D agreements from 1995-2010 from SDC Platinum, 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, Compustat, SEC filings, 
Factiva, and Lexis Nexis. I then outline the decisions made during the collection process, 
generating a final sample of 464 firm observations. I proceed to explain the empirical 
measures that are derived to measure the core constructs: Value Creation, Market 
Commonality, Opportunism, Market Rivalry, and Repeated Cooperation. I then highlight 
the control variables that are relevant for opportunism and value creation, before 
concluding with a reflection on the outcomes of the pilot study. 
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In Chapter 7, I describe the processes and outcomes from testing the empirical model. I 
begin by reporting descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations, before discussing the 
results of the event study method to measure value creation. From the results of the event 
study, I observe an overall positive effect of coopetition on value creation. However, 
moving to the results of the Value Creation model, I find insufficient to support the 
hypothesized negative effect of opportunism on value creation and, by extension, the 
hypothesized inverted U-shaped effect of market commonality on value creation. Turning 
to the Opportunism model, I find evidence to support all three hypothesized effects: the 
curvilinear U-shaped effect of market commonality on opportunism, the negative 
moderating effect of market rivalry, and the negative moderating effect of repeated 
cooperation. These findings uphold a curvilinear U-shaped effect of market commonality 
on opportunism in coopetition which is weakened by market rivalry and repeated 
cooperation. Through a variety of postestimation procedures, I find that my results are 
resistant to common sources of bias.  
Chapter 8 moves from data back to theory and considers the empirical findings in light of 
existing research. I begin by summarizing the results with respect to the research 
questions. Although coopetition has a broadly positive effect on value creation, the 
hypothesized effects of opportunism and market commonality on value creation are not 
supported. I then turn to the effects on opportunism where all three hypotheses are 
supported. This leads to three core contributions. First, I identify and test informal-market 
based safeguards against opportunism. This challenges a widespread assumption that 
opportunism is heightened in coopetition and advances theory about the dynamics of 
coopetition. Second, I provide theoretical resolution for the conflicting findings in the 
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literature regarding market commonality and opportunism. By establishing both a 
negative and positive effect as part of the curvilinear relationship, I explain both 
conflicting perspectives in the literature within a rounded theoretical analysis. Third, my 
clarification of key moderators provides a more nuanced understanding of the main 
relationship and affirms the underlying logic whereby increased scope for partner 
retaliation is the basis for informal market-based safeguards in coopetition. I proceed to 
explain how my research advances the wider coopetition literature by establishing 
conceptual boundaries for coopetition, identifying limitations of the event study method 
for measuring value creation, and enhancing understanding of how value creation occurs 
in coopetition. I also identify promising extensions arising from my research for both 
theories at the heart of coopetition, competitive dynamics and the resource-based view. I 
emphasize the important practical implications for firm participation in coopetition, 
associated societal benefits, and managerial decisions regarding governance and partner 
selection. The dissertation concludes by highlighting limitations of the research and 
avenues for future research. 
1.4  Motivations 
I found the opportunity to pursue a PhD compelling for two reasons. One was the 
satisfaction I had achieved from my experience of academic research to date. I saw the 
PhD as a chance to pursue research at a much deeper level and anticipated that the process, 
as well as the outcome, could be a source of satisfaction. The other reason was the sheer 
scale of the challenge arising from the long and arduous path that a PhD requires. As I 
endeavored to find the limits of my field, I anticipated that I may also find the limits of 
myself, which could generate many opportunities for skill development and growth. 
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My first exposure to independent research came as a final year Bachelors student 
(Business Administration: Equine) at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth in 
2013/14. The research-orientated nature of the final year curriculum was highly 
complementary to my own personal desire to perform well, and together they enabled a 
stimulating and highly productive year. As the pace of the program began to accelerate, 
the emphasis shifted from structured lectures to student-led discussions based on primary 
research. This coincided with a change in my own circumstances: money saved during a 
one-year international work placement in 2012/13 relieved me of the need to work full-
time during my final year and enabled me to focus entirely on my studies. As the year 
progressed, I found a natural curiosity for research and an inclination towards deeper 
understanding of firm behavior and strategy. The opportunity to pursue such inclinations 
on a full-time basis was not lost on me and I tried to achieve as much from this time as I 
could. I might have expected the associated hard work to be accompanied by a degree of 
stress or anguish but, to the contrary, I found the process quite enjoyable. Each day offered 
a chance to peel back another layer of a particular problem and deepen my understanding 
of the discipline. A self-perpetuating cycle emerged – better research efforts led to new 
insights while new insights incentivized better research efforts.  
My final year culminated with a Capstone Research Project, where much of the second 
semester was dedicated to academic research. My project applied microeconomic 
principles to Irish Thoroughbred racehorse owners – a core stakeholder group in the 
equine industry. Highlighting the importance of owners’ prospects for the industry’s 
survival and growth, I identified a number of promising opportunities for owners to 
improve their collective positioning. It was the first time I was responsible for delivering 
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a literature review, formulating research questions, collecting and analyzing data, and 
articulating contributions. I found great satisfaction in the iterative, messy, and ‘back-n-
forth’ nature of research design and execution. At the same time, I observed how my 
research might make an impact when my thesis generated two peer-reviewed conference 
papers and a national newspaper feature.  
These experiences from my Bachelors degree motivated my decision to pursue a PhD 
because I felt I could generate the same enjoyment and satisfaction from the research 
process, but at a deeper level. The scale and rigor required for a PhD research is 
undoubtedly greater than any undergraduate equivalent, but the processes are similar. 
(Quite rightly) I did not anticipate the PhD experience to be entirely without stress, but on 
the whole, the stimulation and consistent challenge of independent research was 
something I expected to enjoy. Thus, one reason I chose to pursue a PhD was because I 
expected to find the process of research satisfying and enjoyable – and not just the 
outcomes. 
In addition, I recognized that a PhD offered opportunities for broadly applicable skill 
development. I do not recall a clear post-PhD ‘career plan’ at the time, but I do remember 
identifying many transferrable skills that I would hone in the process. These included 
communication, solving difficult problems, and deconstructing and reconstructing 
arguments as new information was presented. Such skills are highly valued within and 
beyond academia. I hoped that the skills acquired through the PhD would stand to me in 
whatever career direction I ultimately chose to pursue. 
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I was also motivated by the sheer scale of the PhD, which I viewed as a source of growth. 
Accounts from those who had gone before – both in success and failure – were united in 
agreement that a PhD is an extremely difficult goal. Becoming an expert and ultimately 
developing a new contribution requires much trial and error, unforeseen challenges, and 
setbacks. An expert is sometimes described as somebody who has made all the mistakes 
that can be made in a very narrow field and, although stumbling from mistake to mistake 
is not easy, much growth occurs in the process. As Marcus Aurelius noted in Meditations: 
“The impediment to action advances action. 
What stands in the way becomes the way.” 
I believed the tests presented by a PhD would be a source of improvement that could make 
the journey rewarding, as well as the outcomes. I felt that a difficult goal, like a PhD, and 
the process of trying, failing, and trying again, would, by itself, help me to grow and 
become a better researcher and person.  
The first seeds of my dissertation topic were sewn during a one-year work placement for 
the third year of my Bachelors degree, where I was first exposed to benefits of 
simultaneous competition and cooperation. I achieved a highly sought-after placement at 
Lane’s End Farm in Lexington, Kentucky, one of the largest Thoroughbred stud farms in 
the world. Lexington is often labelled ‘the horse capital of the world’ and the surrounding 




During my placement, I observed how Lane’s End sustained a large number of mutually 
beneficial collaborations with smaller farms in the area. While the farms competed 
ferociously for boarding contracts and stallion nominations, they frequently cooperated to 
sell their horses under the Lane’s End brand. Lane’s End was synonymous with top quality 
stock and I saw first-hand the success of this approach when leading the team looking 
after two of the top four lots from the 2013 Keeneland November Breeding Stock Sale: 
Awesome Maria (sold for $4m) and Broadways Alibi  (sold for $2.1m).  
The relationship between the smaller farms and Lane’s End was mutually beneficial 
because it offered the smaller farms a greater level of status and visibility for their stock, 
while the quality of the stock enhanced Lane’s End’s reputation and the farm appropriated 
commissions in each case. Through sponsorship and the donation of land and other 
resources, Lane’s End fortified these bonds by embedding themselves in many local 
activities. This simultaneous competition and cooperation between the farms was a source 
of their survival and growth, enabling them to secure a key source of employment in a 
rural area. Though I did not know it as ‘coopetition’ at the time, these observations in 
Kentucky were my first exposure to the potential benefits of this intriguing phenomenon 
of simultaneous competition and cooperation. 
This dissertation focuses on the dynamics of simultaneous competition and cooperation. 
This emerged as a key issue during my initial analysis of the literature which led to the 
formulation of a PhD proposal. As I reviewed extant research, it quickly became clear that 
simultaneous competition and cooperation had received some attention in the strategy 
literature. Often labelled ‘coopetition’, some research highlighted certain benefits that had 
been achieved. Yet there was limited explanation of how such benefits were achieved. I 
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will demonstrate in the following chapters that such explanation is fundamental to how 
the wider phenomenon is theorized. This led me to use my PhD to address this important 
topic by attempting to shed new light on the dynamics that enable firms to achieve benefits 
in coopetition. 
1.5  Aims of the research 
A natural narrowing of focus occurs in the early stages of most PhDs. Mine was no 
different and, having begun with a decision to focus on how firms achieve benefits in 
coopetition, it quickly became clear that further depth was required. Within any question 
about how firms achieve benefits in coopetition is an implicit assumption that firms do 
achieve benefits in coopetition. However, as I moved to more critical review of the 
literature, there was reason to call this assumption into question. 
Although benefits of coopetition were reported in the literature, including technological 
development (Gnyawali & Park, 2011), disruption (Ansari et al., 2016), and expansion 
(Garrette, Castañer, & Dussauge, 2009), it was unclear how they were generated. 
Theoretical explanation was lacking regarding intermediary mechanisms that enabled 
such benefits. Instead, the literature was dominated by caveats, with their basis in 
transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), that asserted that the 
underlying dynamics of coopetition generated additional risks and costs from heightened 
opportunism (Dussauge et al., 2000; Lavie, 2007; Park & Ungson, 2001; Rai, 2016).  
This meant that, at a high level, the literature was rather incoherent. The dynamics of 
coopetition were reported to be risky, costly, and highly challenging, but, at the same time, 
the outcomes were reported to be largely beneficial. It raised an important question: how 
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do firms achieve beneficial outcomes in coopetition if the dynamics are so challenging? 
My research aimed to address this question by examining coopetition dynamics from a 
broader theoretical base than transaction cost economics and clarifying how they relate to 
value creation. 
1.6  Contribution 
My research contributes to literature on coopetition (Ansari et al., 2016; Gnyawali & Park, 
2011; Rai, 2016) by challenging the widespread assumption that opportunism is 
heightened in coopetition (Dussauge et al., 2000; Park & Ungson, 2001). This establishes 
a foundation for better understanding of coopetition benefits and costs in future research. 
I provide a nuanced explanation of informal market-based safeguards which, up to a point, 
reduce opportunism in coopetition, and I explain why this effect reverses when market 
commonality is high. This clarifies the nature of opportunism in coopetition and explains 
conflicting findings in the extant literature (Park & Russo, 1996; Shipilov, 2009). My 
research also illuminates key moderators of opportunism in coopetition and highlights 
important advancements for the coopetition literature and the underpinning theories of 
competitive dynamics and the resource-based view. 
For managers contemplating coopetition, my research offers evidence that the negative 
effects of opportunism are not as universal as the extant literature has assumed. This 
moves us beyond simplistic perceptions that have emphasized instability, knowledge 
leakage, and formal safeguards in coopetition. Instead, I identify an efficient and effective 
alternative for constraining opportunism. This indicates that establishing, maintaining, 
and ultimately achieving value creation in coopetition relationships may be less 
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challenging and costly than the literature assumes. Given the potential benefits of 
coopetition for participants (Ansari et al., 2016; Garrette et al., 2009) and wider society 
(Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Jorde & Teece, 1990), there are important firm and economy 
level implications. 
1.7  Evolution of strategic management research 
Theory regarding simultaneous competition and cooperation has its roots in the strategic 
management literature. Broadly speaking, strategic management is concerned with 
determinants of firm performance (Nag, Hambrick & Chen, 2007; Rumelt, Schendel, & 
Teece, 1994), with early literature treating performance as something that the firm 
achieved individually (Barney, 1991; Porter, 1980). However, environmental and 
economic forces, such as globalization and the increasing speed of technological 
development, have meant that firm boundaries have become increasingly blurred and firm 
performance is often achieved through inter-firm relationships.  
Much of the strategic management literature can be traced back to industrial organization 
economics (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939). In particular, the focus of industrial organization 
on finding ways to make markets more competitive is a key precursor to the emergence 
of the positioning school in strategic management. As industrial organization researchers 
searched for economic forces that obstructed market competition, such as barriers to entry 
(Bain, 1956), the positioning school emerged from efforts to turn these insights on their 
head. In Competitive Strategy, Porter’s (1980) central insight is to flip these arguments: 
instead of obstacles of market-level competition, they became sources of firm-level 
performance in a market. Porter employs industrial organization logic to highlight five 
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forces, the threat of new entrants, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of 
suppliers, substitutes, and rivalry among incumbents, that can help a firm find a position 
in an industry that is most beneficial to performance. This positioning approach to firm 
performance represented a major breakthrough at the time and remains valuable for 
performance within stable and sustainable market structures. However, in dynamic 
markets, or those characterized by rapid technological change, market structures evolve 
rapidly and therefore become less relevant for performance. Instead, researchers look 
towards internal heterogeneities that persist over time to explain firm performance (Teece 
et al., 1997).  
The shift in emphasis towards internal heterogeneities led to the emergence of the 
resource-based view (RBV) of firm performance (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). While 
the positioning school assumes that firms are homogenous entities, the RBV asserts that 
firms are heterogeneous in terms of their internal resource endowments. Through their 
role in value creation for the firm, the RBV suggests that internal heterogeneities, rather 
than market positions, are the basis for firm performance. Resource endowments are 
somewhat ‘sticky’ (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997), in that firms are assumed to be 
stuck with the resources they have and may not easily create or acquire those which they 
lack. Value creation is achieved when firms control valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable resources (Barney, 1991) that are heterogeneously distributed and not easily 
tradeable (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984). However, the RBV offers a rather 
static view of internal heterogeneities. It overlooks the dynamism of evolving market 
demands (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007) and the creativity required to organize 
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resources in ways that can optimize their market value (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; 
Barney, 2001). 
Scholars have addressed limitations of the RBV by explicating the role of firm 
capabilities. A capability is a set of activities to organizes firm resources for a particular 
use (Teece, 2014; Winter, 2003). Two classes of capabilities exist: ordinary and dynamic 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). Ordinary capabilities are task-based: they 
enable operational, governance, administrative, and technical functions (Teece, 2007). 
Dynamic capabilities involve higher-level activities that can orchestrate and adapt the 
firm’s resources to address rapidly evolving market requirements (Teece, 2014). Dynamic 
capabilities move beyond learning from experience (Winter, 2003) and bring the 
imaginative and creative skills of the firm into play, both in the identification of new 
opportunities and the reorganization of resource endowments. This makes them 
particularly relevant in markets that are uncertain, non-linear, or discontinuous 
(Ambrosini, Bowman, & Collier, 2009).  Dynamic capabilities “can be harnessed to 
continuously create, extend, upgrade, protect, and keep relevant the enterprise’s unique 
asset base” (Teece, 2007: 1319) in rapidly changing environments. This is achieved 
through sensing changing requirements, reconfiguring capabilities, and the transformation 
of resources and routines based on experience.  
Over time, globalization, increasing sophisticated consumer tastes, and rapid 
technological advancements, have challenged the view that a firm may only achieve 
performance from resources and capabilities it controls internally. As these forces have 
increased demands on firm’s resource endowments, situations arise where the firm may 
not be able to satisfy its resource requirements from its internal endowments (Garrette et 
22 
 
al., 2009). To fill this void and explain firm performance in light of increasing resource 
demands, researchers have presented an external resource-based view of the firm (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). The external RBV suggests that, instead of internal control, 
some critical resources and capabilities may span firm boundaries and extend to the firm’s 
external relationships (Cassiman, di Guardo, & Valentini, 2009; Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Garrette et al., 2009). Though resources remain sticky, resource access, in addition to 
resource control, becomes a potential source of value creation and superior performance. 
Thus, an effective approach may not always be to protect internal endowments, but to 
share them and possibly be willing to accept some spillover where it is less than the 
anticipated inflows (Dyer & Singh, 1998). This offers mainstream theoretical explanation 
for the plethora of inter-firm relationships that can be observed in the literature, such as 
dyads (Hamel, 1991), groups (Gomes-Casseres, 1996), clusters (Giblin & Ryan, 2012) or 
networks (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). An external resource-based view highlights 
how resources and capabilities accessed by multiple firms may still satisfy the pre-
conditions for value creation (valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable) within 
their wider market context (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Rai, 2016). 
1.8  Evolution of conflicting firm behaviors 
Two conflicting firm behaviors are evident in these explanations of firm performance: 
competition and cooperation. Competition is observed within the positioning school 
(Porter, 1980), and the traditional RBV and dynamic capability perspectives (Barney, 
1991; Teece et al., 1997), where firms are assumed to be independent entities and 
engagements among them occur purely for competitive purposes. Cooperation is observed 
through the external RBV (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006), where firms are unable to 
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satisfy resource requirements on their own and may participate in cooperative 
relationships to access critical resources. In the following subsections, I review important 
insights on inter-firm competition and cooperation, which are two conflicting behaviors 
that, until recently, have evolved largely independently in mainstream literature. 
1.8.1  Inter-firm competition 
Competition occurs where a firm and a competitor strive for superiority through mutually 
incompatible market positions (Porter, 1980). Mutually incompatible positions mean that 
two firms cannot achieve the same type of superiority in the same area; for example, 
pursuing transactions with the same customers (c.f., Porter, 1985). Competition may also 
occur through resources (e.g., Markman, Gionidis, & Buscholtz, 2009), but as resources 
are developed to meet market requirements (Day, 1981; Peteraf, 1993), incompatible 
market positions are the most fundamental aspect of competition (Chen, 1996; Gimeno & 
Woo, 1996a). “Without examining a firm’s strategic attributes in the market(s) where it 
actually interacts with others, one has little idea against whom it competes…” (Chen, 
1996: 102). 
Pursuit of incompatible market positions fuels head-to-head rivalry among firms and “an 
incessant race to get or to keep ahead of one another” (Kirzner, 1973: 20). Such rivalry is 
addressed within literature on competitive dynamics (Baum & Korn, 1996; Smith et al., 
1992), which explains the nature of interactions when the firm competes with specific 
rivals (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992; Chen, 1996). Competitive dynamics literature 
moves away from industrial organization and aligns with Austrian economics (Jacobson, 
1992; Mises, 1949; Young, Smith & Grimm, 1996), whereby the markets in which 
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competition occurs are dynamic, participant-driven entities. The focus on market 
participants leads scholars to view competition as something that is fundamentally 
determined by firms and therefore to study their interactions as the basis for competitive 
dynamics. Through the study of firm actions and responses, competitive dynamics lends 
itself to precise and concrete analysis of firm competitive behavior. 
An important divergence between competitive dynamics and the positioning view in 
strategic management is that competitive dynamics acknowledges firm heterogeneities 
and the inherently relative nature of inter-firm competition. This illustrates the asymmetric 
nature of competitive relations, where the competitive outlook is different depending on 
which side of the dyad is treated as the focal firm (Chen, 1996). Dyadic interactions are 
employed as the building blocks of competition and these may then be aggregated to 
understand all of the firm’s competitive relationships (Baum & Korn, 1996: Gimeno & 
Woo, 1996a), competition within markets, or competition among multiple firms (Ferrier, 
2001; Prince & Simon, 2009). 
The extent of competition between the firm and a competitor is captured by their level of 
common markets. Market commonality, the proportion of the firm’s markets in which it 
encounters a given competitor, reflects the degree of competition experienced by the firm 
with regard to that competitor (Chen, 1996). High market commonality occurs where the 
firm shares a large proportion of markets with the competitor, whereas low market 
commonality describes a small degree of overlap. As noted, market commonality differs 
depending on which firm-level perspective is considered – whether A has high market 
commonality relative to B says nothing about B’s level of market commonality relative 
to A (Chen, 1996).  
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1.8.2  Inter-firm cooperation 
Inter-firm cooperation refers to “voluntary arrangements between firms involving 
exchange, sharing, or codevelopment of products, technologies, or services” (Gulati, 
1998: 293). Inter-firm cooperation occurs for a variety of purposes, including 
technological development (Gnyawali & Park, 2011), commercialization (Diestre & 
Rajagopolan, 2012), and learning (Hamel, 1991). Research on inter-firm cooperation 
emphasizes networked, interdependent relationships for the purpose of meeting critical 
resource and capability requirements that the firm cannot satisfy alone (Contractor & 
Lorange, 1988; Jarillo, 1988; Dyer & Singh, 1998). These, in turn, satisfy their market 
ambitions (Chen, 1996; Peteraf, 1993).  
Theory on cooperative relationships has its roots in sociology (Granovetter, 1985; 
Macaulay, 1963), where the social structure of networks of economic relationships 
influences economic outcomes. A network consists of actors (nodes) and relationships 
(ties) among them (Burt, 1983; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The dominant perspective on 
networks is a structuralist view where the focus is the nature of the ties (Burt, 1992; 
Kilduff & Tsai, 2003; Mayhew, 1980), rather than a social capital perspective where the 
emphasis is the capital that may accumulate in the node itself (Lin, 2001; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998).  
A cooperative inter-firm network emerges when multiple firms are connected through 
cooperative relationships with one another (Gulati, 1998; Jarillo, 1988). Network ties act 
as conduits and facilitate the flows of resources and capabilities (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001) that are the core focus of network theory (Gimeno, 2004; Gulati, 1999; Jarillo, 
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1988) and bear significant implications for firm behavior and performance. The intensity 
of cooperation within these ties varies from strong cooperation and special relationships’, 
to weak cooperation and purely economic agreements (Uzzi, 1997). 
Strong cooperation is established and sustained by focusing on mutual interests and 
building trust and reciprocity. It involves deep connections and social attachments leading 
to reciprocal norms and stability (Uzzi, 1999). For example, in dyadic relationships such 
as R&D agreements or joint-ventures with significant resource commitments, strong 
cooperation facilitates the pursuit of long term, ambitious goals through learning 
(Lazerson, 1995), fine-grained information transfer, and joint problem-solving 
arrangements (Uzzi, 1997). Weak cooperation describes arms-length type engagements, 
such as simple marketing or production contracts with limited human or social contact. 
Weak cooperation preserves autonomy and limits spillovers (Burt, 1992; Hamel, 1991; 
Lavie, 2006), but involves a narrow economic focus. The ‘one-off’ nature of such 
engagements often inhibits the emergence of reciprocity among partners, so weak 
cooperation may forego the deep connections and resource exchanges necessary for the 
achievement of complex mutual goals and meaningful joint development. 
1.9  Interplay of inter-firm competition and cooperation 
While the competitive dynamics literature has focused on actions and reactions that enable 
firms to achieve superior performance at the expense of one another, research on inter-
firm cooperation has studied how firms work together to achieve superior performance. 
Despite the largely independent evolution of the competition and cooperation literatures, 
some research has examined the interplay between these conflicting behaviors. Three 
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streams of research have emerged in this area: the networks view, the contextual view, 
and the dyadic view.  
The networks view of the interplay between inter-firm competition and cooperation 
emphasizes competitors who are connected by cooperative relationships in a network 
(Andrevski & Ferrier, forthcoming; Gnyawali et al., 2006; Sanou et al., 2016). This stream 
juxtaposes theory on competitive dynamics against that of cooperative networks to shed 
light on how the firm’s position in the cooperative network influences its competitive 
behavior. Network theory highlights how advantageous network positions are those that 
are central (large number of connections) and structurally autonomous (many non-
redundant ties) (Burt, 1992; Gimeno, 2004; Gulati, 1999; Jarillo, 1988). The network view 
of competition and cooperation illustrates how the advantages that firms derive from these 
positions make them more likely to initiate a competitive action and less likely to 
experience a response (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Network centrality is positively 
related to both volume (Gnyawali et al., 2006) and diversity (Sanou et al., 2016) of 
competitive actions, while autonomy is positively related to diversity (Gnyawali et al., 
2006). In shaping firm competitive behavior, this view shows how cooperative network 
patterns become a critical determinant of performance (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer 2000; 
Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). For instance, by fueling an increased volume and 
diversity of actions, a large number of cooperative relationships in a network of 
competitors can enhance performance (Sanou et al., 2016), especially in dense networks 
(Andrevski & Ferrier, forthcoming). 
The contextual view of the interplay between inter-firm competition and cooperation 
emphasizes how the firm may benefit from maintaining some competitive relations and 
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some cooperative relations (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Bresser, 1988; Lado et al., 
1997). This enables the firm to maintain a high degree of flexibility by holding a variety 
of strategic options (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Kogut, 1991; Lado et al., 1997). 
With its roots in game theory (Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 1986) where the outcome of the firm’s 
action depends on the actions of others, research in the contextual view challenges a 
common presupposition that all firms should initially be viewed as a competitive threat. 
If the firm is not limited to observing engagements through such a competitive lens, the 
possibility to grow the market (e.g., Frey & Schlosser, 1993; Hahn, Kim, & Kim, 1986) 
through cooperative ‘win-win’ relationships becomes apparent. Thus, the firm may 
cooperate with an important complementor to grow the overall size of the market and then 
compete with direct competitors to divide it up (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). The 
contextual view studies this choice of between cooperation or competition from the 
perspective of the firm. 
The dyadic view of the interplay emphasizes simultaneous competition and cooperation 
between firms (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2009: 2011). Where the firm 
looks to external cooperative relationships to satisfy resource requirements, it is more 
likely to focus on resources and capabilities that are strategically relevant (Das & Teng, 
2000; Gulati, Lavie, & Madhavan 2011). The resources and capabilities of greatest 
relevance are often held by competitors because they target similar customers and 
confront similar challenges (Dussauge et al., 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2009: 2011; Ritala 
& Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Thus, simultaneous competition and cooperation 
emerges. Engaging in simultaneous competition and cooperation with another firm can 
provide access to relevant and complementary resources (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & 
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Wincent, 2010), and reduce the time and costs associated with internal development 
(Gnyawali & Park, 2009). Competitors may also cooperate to combine homogenous 
resources and advance major projects that are risky to pursue alone (Garrette et al., 2009), 
achieve economies of scale, or pursue other cost-sharing objectives. If firms compete 
based on homogeneous resources, cooperation can protect them from other competitors 
or serve as a means by which the combined resource pool can be grown (Ingram & 
Qingyuan, 2008). Simultaneous competition and cooperation is associated with benefits 
that firms may not achieve alone, including technological development (Gnyawali & Park, 
2011), disruption (Ansari et al., 2016), and expansion (Garrette et al., 2009). The dyadic 
view also highlights potential societal benefits associated with advanced technological 
development available at competitive prices (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Jorde & Teece, 
1990). 
The focus of my research is the dyadic view on the interplay of inter-firm competition and 
cooperation. This view studies the phenomenon of simultaneous competition and 
cooperation, which is often labelled ‘coopetition’ in the literature. Coopetition is the focus 
of the remainder of this dissertation.  
1.10  Chapter summary 
My research aims to clarify the nature of coopetition dynamics, specifically opportunism 
in coopetition, and its influence on value creation in coopetition. A burgeoning body of 
literature on coopetition is characterized by the assumption that heightened opportunism 
leads to significant costs and challenges (Dussauge et al., 2000; Park & Russo, 1996; Park 
& Ungson, 2001). In light of this dominant assumption, my research intends to explain 
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why pursuit of coopetition continues to rise (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Harbison & Pekar, 
1998) and often proceeds without formal safeguards to constrain opportunism (Ryu & 
Reuer, 2016). Further, by connecting opportunism to firm value creation in coopetition, I 
intend to clarify how widely reported benefits from are achieved despite the assumption 
of opportunism. 
In Chapter 1, I have provided an outline of the research process and structure and 
explained the theoretical background for my research. My contributions are intended for 
the field of strategic management, which has evolved from a focus on strategic positioning 
(Porter, 1980), and internal resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997), 
to a recognition that firms may derive performance from their external relationships (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). Two conflicting firm behaviors are observed in this 
evolution: inter-firm competition (Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen et al., 1992), which is 
understood through the concept of market commonality (Chen, 1996) and inter-firm 
cooperation (Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Hamel, 1991), observed through cooperative 
ties (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Gulati, 1998). These behaviors have been studied 
largely independently, but three streams of research have examined their interplay. My 
research is aligned with the dyadic view of the interplay between competition and 
cooperation, where the focus is simultaneous competition and cooperation between firms 
(henceforth coopetition). 
In Chapter 2, I present a critical review and synthesis of the literature on coopetition, and 
some necessary conceptual development to clarify the phenomenon’s core properties.   
31 
 
Chapter 2: Critical Review and Synthesis 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The rising importance of the phenomenon of coopetition noted by Ketchen and colleagues 
(2004) is underscored by the growth in the volume of research that is emerging, including 
several special issues in journals such as Industrial Marketing Management (Bengtsson 
& Kock, 2014; Bengtsson, Kock, Lundgren-Henriksson, & Näsholm, 2016; Le Roy & 
Czakon, 2016). Special Issues of Strategic Management Journal and Long Range 
Planning are also underway. This growth has led to interesting opportunities and 
challenges as exploration by researchers with different perspectives offers opportunities 
to build on the concept’s diversity and develop a more holistic and integrated 
understanding. At the same time, this diversity, as well as a lack of attention to key 
defining properties, have led to ambiguity concerning the boundaries and definition of 
coopetition, as well as the factors that enable value creation in coopetition (Bengtsson & 
Raza-Ullah, 2016; Gnyawali & Song, 2016; Ketchen et al., 2004). In order to proceed 
with the central aims of this research, I first undertake a critical review and synthesis of 
the literature to address these challenges. 
I begin by the reviewing the literature through four lenses that have been utilized to study 
coopetition: actor-centric, interaction-centric, cognition-centric, and context-centric 
(Section 2.2). To address ambiguity regarding the boundaries and definition of 
coopetition, I next develop three defining characteristics of coopetition that characterize 
the phenomenon under study and distinguish it from related phenomena (Section 2.3). I 
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then explicate core implications of inter-firm competition and cooperation (Section 2.4) 
and juxtapose them to develop unique implications of coopetition that enable value 
creation (Section 2.5). This critical review is the product of a systematic literature search, 
the method for which is outlined in Appendix I. 
2.2  Four lenses of coopetition research 
To organize the literature on coopetition, I begin by highlighting four distinct lenses that 
have been used to examine the phenomenon: actor-centric, interaction-centric, cognition-
centric, and context-centric. Each lens has a unique take on the phenomenon and, in 
combination, they provide a holistic overview of how the coopetition phenomenon has 
been studied. The temporal evolution of research papers employing these different lenses 
is depicted in Figure 2.1. The variation in the research focus is apparent in the transition 
from one lens to another, with each offering unique perspectives on simultaneous 
competition and cooperation between firms. For example, a cognition-centric lens helps 
illustrates the mental models required to embrace coopetition and manage the cognitive 
strain that emerges from the coopetition paradox. Meanwhile, the actor-centric lens 




Figure 2.1: Evolution of four coopetition research lenses 
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2.2.1  Actor-centric lens 
 An actor-centric lens adopts a firm-level focus to analyze firm characteristics that 
influence coopetition, such as who collaborates with whom, for what purpose, and what 
benefits and challenges arise as a result. This lens is helpful to understand how particular 
firm characteristics shape the drivers, formation, nature, and outcomes of the coopetition 
(Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Shipilov, 2009) and the fit or 'alignment' between partners 
(Choi, Wu, Ellram, & Koka, 2002). Research in this lens has addresses questions such as: 
What are the key partner characteristics to generate superior performance? Is coopetition 
more important for certain types of firms? How do particular competitive interests shape 
the coopetition relationship? A diverse range of firm-level characteristics have been 
examined including partner resource and capabilities (Garrette et al., 2009; Gnyawali & 
Park, 2009: 2011; Ritala, Golnam, & Wegmann, 2014), market commonality (Park & 
Russo, 1996; Park et al., 2014b), collaborative experience (Garrette et al., 2009; Park, 
Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2014a), and congruence and divergences of partners’ interests 
(Parkhe, 1993; Hamel, 1991). 
Adopting this actor-centric lens, Choi and colleagues (2002) find that, where synergies in 
resources and intentions exist, coopetition can positively affect performance. Similarly, 
Shipilov (2009) finds that market commonality between coopetition partners is associated 
with increased financial performance, while Park and colleagues (2014b) find that, up 
until a point, market commonality has a positive influence on innovation performance but 
benefits decline when market commonality between firms becomes very high. Gnyawali 
& Park (2009) suggest that coopetition may be more beneficial for smaller firms rather 
than large because SMEs can overcome liabilities of smallness (lack of an influential 
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voice, resource constraints, presence of large competitors) by cooperating with one 
another. The pair also suggest that actors’ market commonality, technological 
complementarity, and perceived vulnerability drive formation of coopetition relationships 
between firms. 
2.2.2  Interaction-centric lens  
The interaction-centric lens focuses on nature of interactions and the areas in the value 
chain where interactions take place (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Mitchell, Dussauge, & 
Garrette, 2002; Yami & Nemeh, 2014). It is related to the actor-centric perspective in that 
firm characteristics influence resulting interactions. Scholars employing an interaction-
centric lens emphasize the competitive or cooperative element of the interaction, and some 
have emphasized both. Interactions can occur within the same aspect of value chain (such 
as competition and cooperation in R&D) or different aspects of the value chain (such as 
cooperation in R&D and competition in product development). This lens advances 
research questions such as: How does the locus of coopetition in the value chain influence 
the nature and dynamics of the coopetition engagement? What are the best managerial 
practices to achieve superior performance through coopetition? How can the firm protect 
itself against competitive aggression and spillovers? The types of interactions that have 
been considered include the balance between competition and cooperation within the 
relationship (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000) and firm (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2009), governance decisions (Mitchell et al., 2002), and the toolkits necessary to achieve 
competitive advantages through coopetition (Chen & Miller, 2015). 
The interaction-centric lens contributes a number of important insights to coopetition 
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research. Dussauge and colleagues (2000) find that both takeovers and significant 
reorganizations occur more frequently when competitors share heterogeneous resources. 
This is similar to Hamel (1991), and Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco (2004), who 
suggest that cooperative interactions involving heterogeneous capabilities can be used as 
vehicles to 'outlearn' the other partner. It may be, therefore, that spillovers between 
competitors who are cooperating for R&D have a less positive impact than between non-
competitors (Belderbos et al., 2004). However, Chen and Miller (2015) suggest that firm 
will be more concerned with advancing their own performance, rather than disadvantaging 
their partners.  
2.2.3  Cognition-centric lens 
The cognition-centric lens emphasizes the unique mindset required to simultaneously 
comprehend the conflicting logics of competition and cooperation (Bengtsson & Kock, 
2000). This creates a paradox (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011) that creates tension in 
the relationship which must be understood and managed (Fernandez, Le Roy, & 
Gnyawali, 2014; Gnyawali, He, Madhavan, & Bengtsson, 2016). One important aspect of 
the cognition-centric lens lies in its ability to analyze the cognitive frames of executives 
and others at the intersection of the alliance (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Raza-Ullah & 
Bengtsson, 2014). Questions this lens seeks to address include the following: How does 
the paradoxical inter-relationship between simultaneous competition and cooperation 
manifest as cognitive challenges for executives? How do managers and individuals cope 
with the cognitive strain associated with balancing these conflicting logics? How should 
firms organize competition and cooperation to maintain paradoxical tensions?  
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The types of contributions offered by this lens fall into two groups. One is extensive 
analysis of the challenges associated with managing two conflicting logics of interaction, 
and how managers may cope. This lens suggests that tensions are an inherent part of the 
relationship (Fernandez et al., 2014; Park et al., 2014b) and should be managed – rather 
than minimized or eliminated (Gnyawali et al. 2016). The other builds from these insights 
to explore the coopetition ‘mindset’ – a unique cognitive capability for achieving superior 
performance through coopetition (Bengtsson, Raza-Ullah, & Vanyushyn, 2016; Gnyawali 
et al., 2016). Coopetition mindset is a holistic mindset, rather than an either-or balance, 
where competition and cooperation may to be viewed as two tightly interrelated elements 
of a unified whole (Chen, 2008).  
2.2.4  Context-centric lens 
The context-centric lens focuses on the relationship between coopetition and its wider 
context. Researchers focus on two important aspects: (1) the environmental and 
technological conditions shaping coopetition (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Gnyawali & 
Park, 2009:2011; Ritala, 2012) and (2) the reciprocal impacts of coopetition on the 
relevant industry and wider societal welfare (e.g. Ingram & Qingyuan, 2008; Jorde & 
Teece, 1990; Tong & Reuer, 2010). Prominent questions include: How does a firm's 
position in the network shape the firm’s opportunities and ability to engage in coopetition? 
What environmental characteristics drive coopetition formation and/or success? How can 
a firm use coopetition to re-shape its environment to its advantage? How does coopetition 
among key firms in an industry shape subsequent coopetition in the industry?  This lens 
highlights how influence of coopetition on performance is enabled by a number of 
contextual factors, such as competitive intensity, network externalities (Ritala, 2012), and 
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network density (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). 
A core focus in this lens is the importance of coopetition in technologically intensive 
areas. Gnyawali & Park (2009: 2011) suggest that this is enabled by industry-level forces 
including short product life cycles, high R&D costs, and rapid innovation cycles. Other 
industry factors that are examined include dynamism, technological intensity (Bengtsson 
& Johansson, 2014; Pellegrin-Boucher, Le Roy, & Gurău, 2013), and market uncertainty 
(Ritala, 2012). An agglomeration of findings appear to support the importance of 
coopetition in these contexts. Garrette and colleagues (2009) find that relationships 
between competing aerospace manufacturers were established to pursue expansion 
projects that are beyond the technological capabilities of a single manufacturer, while 
Ritala (2012) finds that coopetition was associated with increased innovation performance 
with a multi-industry sample. In addition, Ansari and colleagues’ (2016) study of TiVo’s 
efforts to disrupt how television is experienced, finds that coopetitive relations with 
incumbents were critical for establishing TiVo as the dominant Digital Video Recorder 
(DVR) standard.  
The other key focus of the context-centric lens is the influence of coopetition on the 
surrounding environment. While a traditional economic viewpoint perceives competitor-
cooperation as welfare-destructing (Smith, 1776), Ingram & Qingyuan (2008) argue that 
the welfare effects of competitor-cooperation are context bound and will be perceived 
differently in different environments (such as national vs international arenas), and by 
different stakeholders. This reinforces Jorde & Teece’s (1990) position that coopetition 
can be a key driver of technological innovation and economic growth. Similarly, in a case 
analysis of long-term joint venture between Sony and Samsung, Gnyawali and Park 
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(2011) report that coopetition leads to accelerated technological development by 
motivating other competitors to respond both individually and jointly, which drives 
advanced R&D and intense competition across the industry. When combined with the 
economies of scale that competitors achieved by working together, coopetition facilitates 
sophisticated technologies introduced at affordable prices for consumers.  
2.3  Defining characteristics of coopetition 
As noted, coopetition refers to simultaneous competition and cooperation between firms. 
However, identifying a common focus in the literature was rather difficult because 
researchers have employed differing boundaries and offered a wide variety of definitions 
for coopetition. Consequently, substantial ambiguity exists concerning what coopetition 
is and is not (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Gnyawali & Song, 2016; Ketchen et al., 
2004).  
To provide clarity regarding the definition of coopetition and distinguish it from related 
phenomena, I now advance three defining characteristics of coopetition: simultaneity of 
competition and cooperation, the paradoxical interdependence of competition and 
cooperation, and value creation intent in coopetition.  
2.3.1  Simultaneity of competition and cooperation 
The simultaneity of inter-firm competition and cooperation is the most fundamental 
defining characteristic of coopetition. Temporal overlap between competition and 
cooperation makes coopetition a unique phenomenon that requires reaching beyond 
conventional literatures of competition and cooperation (Bengtsson et al., 2010). While 
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competitors entering into cooperation is more common (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000), 
collaborating partners may also begin competing with each other over time (Ansari et al., 
2016). Significantly, however, not all coopetition engagements are the same nor have 
similar implications. Therefore, temporal overlap is just the starting point for analyzing 
the simultaneity of competition and cooperation.  
Figure 2.2: An illustration of simultaneity, intensity, and balance in coopetition 
 
Simultaneity in coopetition varies in two critical ways: intensity of competition and 
cooperation, and balance between competition and cooperation (Luo, Bu, & Gnyawali, 
2016). Intensity refers to the magnitude of competition and cooperation, which is captured 
by the x and y axis in Figure 2.1 respectively. As the intensity of competition or 
cooperation varies, so too do the implications arising from the engagement. Balance refers 
to evenness between competition and cooperation. This is indicated by the diagonal line 
41 
 
splitting the axes in Figure 2.1. In coopetition, balance between competition and 
cooperation creates stability by offsetting potential challenges and keeping opposing 
forces in check (Das & Teng, 2000; Lado et al., 1997; Park et al., 2014b). Competition 
and cooperation are rarely balanced perfectly in practice, which is reflected by the wider 
area around the diagonal line in Figure 2.1, highlighting a level of oscillation where 
tradeoffs may still be achieved.  
The framework of simultaneity, intensity, and balance offers a means for more systematic 
understanding of simultaneity in coopetition. Basic temporal overlap between competition 
and cooperation (represented by the entire area shaded in light grey) is treated as largely 
homogenous in certain parts of the literature, but this is not the case. On one hand, 
engagements where competition and cooperation are both weak (bottom left of Figure 
2.1) are less challenging to understand and manage with limited costs and benefits. On 
the other hand, engagements where competition and cooperation are stronger will be more 
challenging, costly, and beneficial because of the simultaneous and strong pressures from 
competition and cooperation. This illustrates how, within the notion of broad temporal 
overlap between competition and cooperation, the nature of simultaneity can be further 
unpacked. 
I will return to intensity and balance of competition and cooperation later in the chapter 
when I illuminate unique implications of coopetition that enable value creation. In 
addition to their utility as standalone concepts, intensity and balance facilitate 
conceptualization of coopetition intensity, which is a combination of the magnitude of 
competition and cooperation, and the level of balance between them. Coopetition intensity 
rises in line with balanced increases in intensity of competition and cooperation. Distinct 
42 
 
from intensity of competition and cooperation individually, coopetition intensity 
generates complex interdependencies between competition and cooperation, leading to 
paradoxical tensions, and unique benefits and costs (Gnyawali et al., 2016). 
2.3.2  The paradoxical interdependence of competition and cooperation 
The paradoxical interdependence of competition and cooperation is a second defining 
characteristic of coopetition. Paradox “denotes contradictory yet inter-related elements... 
that seem logical in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously” 
(Lewis, 2000: 760). A paradox arises when contradictory yet interrelated elements, such 
as competition and cooperation, exist simultaneously and persist over time (Smith & 
Lewis, 2011). The logics of interaction for competition and cooperation are conflicting 
and yet they represent the two interdependent elements of the coopetition ‘whole’ (Chen, 
2008; Gnyawali et al., 2016) – where both elements are interrelated and interdependent 
(Peng, Pike, Yang, & Roos, 2012). Chen notes: “as the traditional yin-yang symbol 
suggests, opposites define and are defined by each other, so that it becomes impossible to 
conceptualize an idea without considering and incorporating its inverse.” (2008: 198). For 
example, competitors may work together to create mutual benefits but, in doing so, they 
are also helping each other to become stronger competitors, who will also compete to 
create their own value in common markets.  
The coopetition paradox manifests through incongruities at the alliance and firm levels. 
At the alliance level, dualities involve the simultaneous pursuit of seemingly opposite 
ends (e.g., separation and integration). At the firm level, there are contradictions which 
stem from differences in partners’ priorities (e.g., the economic interests of the firm versus 
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those of the coopetition partner) (Gnyawali et al., 2016). Both contradictions and dualities 
lead to tensions which must be managed (Fernandez et al., 2014). Early coopetition 
research suggests that individuals cannot simultaneously balance two conflicting logics 
and so competition and cooperation need to be separated rather than integrated (Bengtsson 
& Kock, 2000). The separation approach is a predominantly Western attitude to avoid or 
sometimes confront paradox where the totality of the paradox becomes the sum of the 
parts. This contrasts with a more holistic Eastern approach, where a shift occurs from 
avoidance (separation) or confrontation (trade-off) to integration. Integration means that 
the totality of the paradox is not linearly determined by its components, which creates 
potential for the holism of the paradox to be understood and harnessed (Chen, 2008).  
The paradoxical tension arising from this defining characteristic of coopetition may be 
leveraged through a suite of unique coopetition capabilities (Bengtsson et al., 2016; 
Gnyawali et al., 2016). Three critical capabilities have been identified in the literature: 
analytical capability, executional capability (Gnyawali et al., 2016), and emotional 
capability (Raza-Ullah, 2017). Analytical capability facilitates an accurate and holistic 
understanding of the sources of tension and their interdependencies, while executional 
capability describes the development, implementation, and utilization of routines, and 
determines how productively the tension in a coopetition relationship can be managed 
(Gnyawali et al, 2016). Emotional capability refers to an ability to accept, understand, and 
regulate ambivalent emotions, and their effects, stemming from opposing forces of 




2.3.3  Value creation intent in coopetition 
A final defining characteristic of coopetition is firms’ intent to create value. Value creation 
refers to the generation of additional benefits from a particular set of activities (Lavie, 
2006; Rai, 2016; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukanen, 2009). Firms commit strategically 
important and specialized resources to coopetition relationships in anticipation of 
strengthening their market positioning by creating value which would not otherwise be 
possible. In aerospace, for example, cooperative relationships between competing 
manufacturers are established to pursue expansion projects that are beyond the capabilities 
of a single manufacturer (Garrette et al., 2009).  
In coopetition, two distinct aspects of value are critical: creation of mutual benefits 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2011) and creation of firms-specific benefits 
(Park and Russo, 1996). Mutual benefits refer to the total pie available to partners, 
whereas firm benefits are those that accrue specifically to one side of the dyad (Lavie, 
2006; Rai, 2016). In combination, mutual and firm benefits determine overall value 
creation in coopetition (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Rai, 2016). Mutual value 
creation is accomplished by combining complementary and scarce resources to generate 
new technologies, pooling homogeneous resources to increase their common value 
(Ingram & Qingyuan, 2008), developing capabilities and routines for sharing codified 
knowledge, and leveraging increased resource specialization and reduced transaction 
costs (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Firm-specific value is created when a focal firm combines its 
own portion of the mutual value with its own internal resources and capabilities (Gnyawali 
& Park, 2011), applies the knowledge and skills accessed through the alliance for pursuits 
outside the coopetition relationship (Hamel, 1991; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Rai, 2016), 
45 
 
and uses knowledge gained to create future value in other areas. 
Intent to create value in coopetition is illustrated by the S-LCD joint-venture, initiated by 
fierce global competitors Sony and Samsung to develop the underlying LCD (liquid 
crystal display) panel technology for LCD-TVs (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Firm-specific 
value was enabled by the success of the joint R&D efforts, which helped both firms to 
launch their own range of LCD-TVs (Sony introduced its ‘Bravia’ range in 2005, while 
Samsung unveiled ‘Bordeaux’ in 2006). Competition between the two also helped to 
establish Sony and Samsung as global leaders in LCD-TVs and their promotion of the 
same underlying technology generated mutual value by establishing LCD as the dominant 
standards in digital TV (at the expense of PDP technology; led by Panasonic and LG). 
This propelled Sony and Samsung to global leadership in the wider TV market and their 
combined market share more than doubled across final four-years of the joint-venture. At 
the industry-level, the S-LCD venture led to accelerated technological development by 
motivating other competitors to respond both individually and jointly (e.g., the IPS Alpha 
venture among Panasonic, Hitachi, & Toshiba). These dynamics drove advanced R&D 
and intense competition across the industry. When combined with the economies of scale 
that competitors achieved by working together, it led to sophisticated technologies that 
were introduced at affordable prices for consumers. 
The intent to create value in coopetition is the key difference between coopetition and 
collusion (Peng et al. 2012; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). In coopetition, value 
creation is the primary ambition (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Jorde & Teece, 1990) whereas, 
in collusion, value capture is the main motivation (e.g., Dobbin & Dowd, 1997; Harris, 
2012). Contrasting with the societal costs of collusion, there may be important societal 
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benefits from coopetition. First, coopetition facilitates unique products, new markets, and 
rapid technological innovation (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Jorde & Teece, 1990), in forms 
that are “not only benign but procompetitive” (Federal Trade Commission & U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2000: 1). Second, simultaneous market competitions mean that 
coopetition outputs are subject to price competition. Consumers benefit from increased 
bargaining power (Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996) and advanced technologies at reduced 
prices where multiple firms are aiming to create value from the same underlying joint 
technology (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Third, complementary capabilities mean that 
coopetition may facilitate specialization and division of labor within the industry. This 
cause the dyad to become more competitive than each partner in isolation (Gomes-
Casseres, 2006) and motivates other firms to keep up by creating value through their own 
collaborations (Gimeno, 2004; Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Some possibility of collusive 
coordination undoubtedly remains within coopetition (Fusfeld, 1958; U.S. Department of 
Justice & Federal Trade Commission, 2000) because rational firms are unlikely to forego 
anticompetitive benefits, but for these reasons there is high likelihood of overall 
procompetitive outcomes from coopetition where value creation is the primary intent. 
2.4  Implications of inter-firm competition and cooperation 
Intent to create value in coopetition is matched by widely observed value creation 
outcomes in the literature (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Ritala, 
2012). However, the underlying implications that enable such value creation have not 
been explained. The remainder of this chapter is given over to addressing this deficit. 
Since coopetition entails simultaneous competition and cooperation, a logical starting 
point for the analysis is the individual implications of these two constituent elements. The 
47 
 
following subsections unpack implications of inter-firm competition and cooperation 
individually and these are then juxtaposed to develop unique implications of coopetition 
that enable value creation.  
2.4.1  Implications of inter-firm competition 
Competition occurs where a firm and a competitor strive for superiority through mutually 
incompatible market positions (Porter, 1980). Inter-firm competition leads to two central 
implications: pursuit of excellence and resource potential.  
Pursuit of excellence emerges from competition in the course of the competitive ‘race’ to 
achieve incompatible market positions (Kirzner, 1973). Competitors with high market 
commonality are motivated to relentlessly seek and pursue new opportunities to maintain 
and enhance their positions (Schumpter, 1950), and deploy resources to their most 
productive uses (Lado et al., 1997). Superiority in common markets is bestowed on those 
who can employ resources more efficiently and innovate at a faster rate than their 
competitors (Hamel, Doz & Prahalad, 1989). Thus, the race for superiority motivates 
pursuit of excellence. This may accelerate innovation and technological development, 
while creating a force “through which resources 'gravitate' toward their most productive 
uses” (Lado et al., 1997: 119). However, at excessive levels, pursuit of excellence may 
also lead to aggressiveness between firms that incites hostility and causes competition for 
competition’s sake (Chen & Miller, 2015). 
Resource potential is a second implication emerging from inter-firm competition. 
Resource potential refers to competitors’ complementary stocks of knowledge, skills, 
capabilities, and assets that are useful to one another (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Dussauge 
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et al., 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2009). It arises where competitors who are attempting to 
secure incompatible market positions face many of the same opportunities and challenges 
(Baum & Mezias, 1992; Ingram & Qingyuan, 2008). Therefore, the resources developed 
to address them may be highly complementary (Gnyawali & Park, 2009). This cultivates 
synergies between competitors’ resources and capabilities (Ingram & Qingyuan, 2008), 
but it also means that competitors are also disproportionately well-equipped to identify, 
assimilate, and apply each other's new and valuable knowledge (Dussauge et al., 2000; 
Gnyawali & Park, 2009). As a result, they are capable of capitalizing on any resource 
leakage to directly undermining each other’s competitive positioning, which may also 
generate fear, suspicion, and mistrust between competitors. 
Pursuit of excellence and resource potential are two core implications of inter-firm 
competition. In the next section, I outline important implications of inter-firm 
cooperation, before leveraging both sets of implications to develop the unique 
implications of coopetition that enable value creation. 
2.4.2  Implications of inter-firm cooperation 
Inter-firm cooperation refers to “voluntary arrangements between firms involving 
exchange, sharing, or codevelopment of products, technologies, or services” (Gulati, 
1998: 293). Two core implications emerge from inter-firm cooperation: relational 
mechanisms and resource commitment.  
As firms cooperate, they develop relational mechanisms, which stem from trust, shared 
norms, and social relations (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Dyer 
& Singh, 1998; Macneil, 1980). Relational mechanisms manifest through cohesive ties, 
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and concrete and enduring strategic relationships (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001: 432). 
“…[O]ver time parties develop, test, observe, and confirm the existence of trust and other 
requisite norms for cooperative relationship, and… parties with such a social history 
increasingly rely on relational norms to govern their exchange.” (Poppo & Zenger, 2002: 
722). Relational mechanisms can facilitate long-term, complex problem-solving through 
stability, deep understanding, and tacit knowledge transfer (von Hippel, 1989). However, 
deep cooperation with a few firms can lead to constraints and diminish the firm’s 
knowledge diversity (Burt, 1992). Innovation can be adversely affected where stability 
creates comfortable arrangements and long-term reliance on a single partner (Hamel et 
al., 1989; Lado et al., 1997).  
Cooperation is also accompanied by resource commitments to the relationship. 
Partnerships are initiated to provide access to resources (Cassiman et al., 2009; Dyer & 
Singh, 1998) and promote resource flows (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Strong 
cooperation, such as R&D alliances and joint ventures, involves large resource 
commitments while weak cooperation, for example, distribution and procurement 
agreements, involves lesser commitments (Contractor & Lorange, 1988). Resource 
commitments offer opportunities for joint development (Garrette et al., 2009), internal 
innovation (Rai, 2016), and learning (Hamel, 1991) that extend beyond those accessible 
to a single firm (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). For instance, radical technological 
breakthroughs and similar ambitious projects require high volume and specialization of 
shared resources. However, resource commitments increase the risks of misappropriation 
(Khanna et al., 1998; Lavie, 2006) and specialization opens the firm to potential holdup 
(Goldberg, 1976; Williamson, 1985). Increased commitments also raise concerns of 
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optimal allocation and resource slack, where additional commitments to the same 
relationship may accrue diminished returns. 
2.5  Implications of coopetition that enable value creation 
In coopetition, these implications of inter-firm competition and cooperation co-exist 
simultaneously. Together they generate unique implications that may enable value 
creation. The existence of such mechanisms are implied by the value creation outcomes 
reported in the literature but, as of yet, they have not been systematically developed. I now 
juxtapose these two sets of individual implications and incorporate the concepts of 
simultaneity, intensity, and balance, to illuminate implications of coopetition. I follow this 
by explaining how these may enable value creation in coopetition. 
2.5.1  Implications of simultaneous competition and cooperation 
Where competition and cooperation can be maintained at moderately strong levels, it may 
be possible to balance the benefits of each with the challenges of the other. With respect 
to competition, the pursuit of excellence and resource potential promote innovation and 
enable complementarities. Yet they may also fuel suspicion, hostility, and fear of resource 
loss. In terms of cooperation, relational mechanisms and resource commitments enable 
complex problem-solving and radical technological breakthroughs. But they can also 
expose the firm to spillovers and may limit incentives to innovate. Figure 2.3 summarizes 
how the individual implications of competition and cooperation generate potential for 
unique coopetition implications when they occur simultaneously. The arrows connecting 
the implications indicate the interplay and the text associated with each arrow indicates 
synergies when both aspects are moderately strong and balanced. The interplay between 
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each competitive and cooperative implication (i.e., each arrow) is now discussed in further 
detail. 
Figure 2.3: Implications of simultaneous competition and cooperation 
 
First, potential opportunities in coopetition from the interplay of the pursuit of excellence 
(competition) and relational mechanisms (cooperation) are reflected in the arrow labeled 
‘excellence without destruction’ in Figure 2.3. Pursuit of excellence motivates a constant 
push for optimal resource allocation and new opportunity identification while relational 
mechanisms cultivates close and enduring relationships between firms (Lado et al., 1997; 
Uzzi, 1999). When both are present and strong, the proactive pursuit of self-interested 
excellence is aligned with an understanding and appreciation of joint dependencies. When 
both are balanced, firms have impetus to relentlessly pursue superiority while the informal 
norms offered by relational mechanisms create a safeguard against mutually destructive 
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behaviors. To a point, this effect is greater with increased intensity. However, where 
coopetition intensity becomes too high, relational mechanisms can limit flexibility and 
knowledge diversity (Burt, 1992) which generates negative synergies with strong pursuit 
of excellence. Where competition becomes dominant, pursuit of excellence incentivizes a 
level of self-interest that generates instability and sabotages mutual outcomes (e.g., Park 
& Russo, 1996). Where cooperation dominates and relational mechanisms prevail, 
excessively close relationships may blunt firms’ competitive edge and diminish their push 
for productivity and innovation (e.g., Burgelman, 2002). 
Second, simultaneous pursuit of excellence and resource commitments leads to optimal 
commitment or allocation of resources. Where competitors’ pursuit of excellence is 
balanced with resource commitments from inter-firm cooperation, access to valuable 
knowledge and resources is complemented by strong impetus to optimize their productive 
utility. Pursuit of excellence drives firms to maximize the new opportunities (e.g., learning 
and skill development; Hamel et al., 1989) available through inter-firm cooperation. This 
suggests that balanced intensity of competition and cooperation is desirable but, as 
coopetition intensity becomes too high, negative synergies may arise as excessive 
resource commitments constrict the resources remaining for firm-specific benefits. 
Relatedly, where the pursuit of excellence outstrips resource commitments, firms depend 
on tit-for-tat gains and minor improvements. On the flipside, very high resource 
commitments can lead to slack resources which may be better utilized elsewhere and 
motivate reduced managerial commitment to the relationship.  
Third, simultaneous resource potential and relational mechanisms creates opportunities 
for the informal norms arising from relational mechanisms to offset some challenges 
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associated with resource potential. Resource potential exists because competitors rely on 
similar foundational resources, but these may also be employed to cannibalize the sources 
of each other’s superiority. This fuels mistrust, suspicion, and fear of loss (Das & Teng, 
2000) and, as a result, greater monitoring and protection mechanisms are often required 
(Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1989). Where resource potential is balanced with relational 
mechanisms, however, these informal cooperative norms can serve as a self-enforcing 
safeguard against aggression and spillovers (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998). Thus, partners 
may be able to share high potential resources without fear of loss. Where coopetition 
intensity becomes too high, these positive implications may be reversed as deep 
cooperation leads to strategic inflexibility and a potential ‘lock-in’ effect (e.g., 
Burgelman, 2002). Similarly, challenges may emerge where the implications of either 
competition of cooperation are dominant. If resource potential outstrips relational 
mechanisms, the threat of spillovers is greater, requiring intricate safeguards to pre-empt 
knowledge costs. Alternatively, when relational mechanisms exceeds resource potential, 
it may lead to stable but mediocre relationships with limited opportunities for superiority 
(e.g., Lado et al. 1997).  
Fourth, simultaneity of resource potential and resource commitment generates prospects 
for enhanced access to high quality resources. Resource potential cultivates 
complementarities among resources and capabilities, while the extent of 
complementarities is determined by the level of resource commitment. As the volume and 
specialization with which high potential resources are committed increases, both mutual 
and firm opportunities are enhanced. This balance may generate positive effects to a point, 
however, where coopetition intensity becomes too high, these may reverse as the firms’ 
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to which firms’ high potential resources are committed to the relationship means that 
individual differentiation becomes challenging. Instability follows as competitive racing 
and aggression are incentivized (Khanna et al., 1998). Similarly, where resource potential 
outstrips resource commitment, it generates frustration from limited opportunities and 
may motivate firms to look elsewhere for resources. In contrast, if resource commitments 
exceeds resource potential, restricted scope for complementarities may not yield rewards 
proportional to the cognitive strain of coopetition.  
Based on the interplay of these dimensions, I suggest that beneficial outcomes accrue to 
coopetition partners where competition and cooperation are moderately strong and 
balanced (e.g., Park et al., 2014b). These enable both mutual and firm value creation in 
coopetition. I now explain how the implications of moderately strong and balanced 
competition and cooperation enables value creation in coopetition.  
2.5.2  Implications for value creation 
Mutual value creation is enhanced through the pursuit of large-scale opportunities that a 
single firm could not achieve alone (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). Moderately strong 
competition preserves firms’ impetus to tackle ambitious and complex problems, and 
moderately strong cooperation provides stability and deep social connections required to 
resolve them (Uzzi, 1999). Pursuit of excellence uncovers new value creation 
opportunities and helps to ensure that slack is minimized and that resources are optimally 
allocated within the dyad (e.g., Schumpter, 1934; Vickers 1995). Meanwhile, relational 
mechanisms provide the glue that enable partners to realize them together and promotes 
resource sharing without fear of loss (Dyer, 1997). When competition and cooperation are 
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balanced, resources are contributed with a volume, specialization, and complementarity, 
that is conducive to value creation. Such contributions can be combined in novel ways to 
generate synergies that create more value than the sum of their parts in isolation (e.g., 
Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2011).  
Firm value creation is enhanced through rapid internal innovation when competition and 
cooperation are balanced and moderately strong. Competition generates a race with a 
competitor partner who is accessing the same jointly developed technology, while 
cooperation offers opportunities to derive individual benefits from valuable external 
resources and learning opportunities. Although firms are driven to pursue the best 
individual outcomes, relational mechanisms may help firms to find an optimal balance 
between mutual interests and self-interest (e.g., Das, 2005). This reduces the need for 
intricate safeguards against aggression and spillovers, which preserves firm resources for 
value creating purposes (Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Over time, the transformation 
and improvement of resources, and an enhanced reputation for coopetition ‘success’, also 
creates value by making the firm more attractive to future partners (Hamel, 1991; Hill, 
1990). 
2.6  Chapter summary 
As the coopetition literature is quite fragmented, Chapter 2 addressed some core 
challenges that enable me to proceed to the central research gaps for this study. I began 
the chapter by organizing the literature in terms of four lenses that have been used to study 
coopetition. An actor-centric lens emphasizes firm-level characteristics of coopetition and 
is helpful for understanding how these characteristics mold the nature of the interaction. 
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An interaction-centric lens studies the interaction itself, highlighting practices that may 
achieve superior performance through coopetition. A cognition-centric lens emphasizes 
the unique mindset required to harness paradoxical tension in the relationship. The fourth 
lens, context-centric, studies the context surrounding coopetition, and the environmental 
and technological conditions that shape the interaction.  
I then explained how the definition and boundaries of coopetition are quite ambiguous, 
with numerous perspectives regarding what coopetition is and is not (Bengtsson et al., 
2016; Gnyawali & Song, 2016; Ketchen et al., 2004). I sought to address this ambiguity 
by developing three defining characteristics of coopetition: simultaneity of competition 
and cooperation, the paradoxical interdependence of competition and cooperation, and 
value creation intent in coopetition. In combination, these defining characteristics 
characterize the phenomenon of coopetition and distinguish it from related phenomena.  
The final section of the chapter highlighted core implications arising from inter-firm 
competition and cooperation and the implications when they coexisted simultaneously. 
Competition engenders pursuit of excellence and resource potential, whereas cooperation 
leads to relational mechanisms and resource commitment. When competition and 
cooperation are balanced and moderately strong, I outlined how the synergies generated 
between these sets of implications may enable value creation in coopetition. 
Through the development of unique implications that enable value creation in coopetition, 
I have presented a nuanced but quite positive view of coopetition. As I will demonstrate 
in the next chapter, however, the dominant view in the literature is significantly more 
skeptical, particularly in regard to opportunism in coopetition. This assumption regarding 
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Chapter 3: Research Gaps 
 
3.1  Chapter introduction 
Having examined the broader literature on strategic management in Chapter 1, and the 
emergence of coopetition as a significant field of study in Chapter 2, I now bring greater 
focus to my analysis. In this chapter, I explain challenges in the literature leading to the 
two research gaps that this dissertation will address.  
The core issue is that the extant literature is dominated by an assumption of heightened 
opportunism in coopetition (Dussauge et al., 2000; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 
2001) despite the phenomenon’s value creation promise. This assumption is at odds with 
rising pursuit of coopetition in practice (Harbison & Pekar, 1998; Gnyawali & Park, 
2009), which often proceeds without formal safeguards to constrain opportunism (Ryu & 
Reuer, 2016). Consequently, there are concerns about the capacity of existing theory for 
explaining coopetition dynamics and the implications for value creation in coopetition. 
The chapter begins by reviewing the important aspects of transaction cost economics 
theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), from which the study of opportunism originates 
(Section 3.2). I then define opportunism and explain how it emerges in inter-firm 
exchanges (Section 3.3). Opportunism, referring to self-interest seeking with guile (e.g., 
lying, cheating, stealing, or evading obligations), is detrimental to inter-firm cooperation 
because it raises transaction costs and impedes value creation. My analysis of the literature 
finds that opportunism is assumed to be heightened in coopetition for three reasons: (1) 
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firms are motivated to behave opportunistically, (2) capable of behaving 
opportunistically, while (3) simultaneous inter-firm competition and cooperation 
introduces additional uncertainty to the relationship, which is conducive to opportunism 
(Section 3.4). This dominant assumption generates two research gaps (Section 3.5). The 
first gap is the failure of extant research to explain coopetition dynamics, which leads to 
the second gap, constrained theoretical development regarding value creation in 
coopetition. These gaps motivate the research objectives and research questions (Section 
3.6) that this dissertation will address. 
3.2  Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) focuses on minimizing exchange costs by identifying 
the most efficient mode of organizing resources (Williamson, 1975: 1985). By analyzing 
how transaction dimensions influence costs, TCE facilitates distinctions (‘discriminating 
alignment’) between activities that are most efficiently conducted within firm boundaries 
and those which are not (Teece, 1985). 
TCE began with the concept of market frictions (Coase, 1937) which refers to the costs 
of using the price mechanism in free markets (e.g., negotiating, bargaining, due diligence). 
TCE views such ‘transaction costs’ as the reason why firms exist: certain costs may be 
minimized when resources are organized within firm boundaries. TCE has evolved to 
consider other such transaction costs (e.g., partner search, contracting), which are 
employed as the basis for evaluating and discriminating between modes of organizing 
resources. Traditionally, TCE has emphasized two modes of organization: markets and 
hierarchies (Williamson, 1975: 1985). 
60 
 
Williamson’s assertion that “any problem that can be formulated, directly, or indirectly, 
as a contracting problem can be investigated to advantage in transaction cost terms.” 
(1985: ix) is largely borne out in the literature. TCE is popularly applied to explain vertical 
integration (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Masten, Meehan, & Snyder, 1989; 
Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1985), where firms face decisions regarding 
forward and backward integration as an alternative to market transactions. It is also 
applied to cooperative inter-firm relationships (Heide & John, 1980: 1982; Hennart, 1990; 
Kogut, 1991; Parkhe, 1993) and, more recently, inter-firm coopetition relationships (Park 
& Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 2001).  
TCE views the transaction as the basic unit of analysis, which enables scrutiny of the 
critical dimensions along which transactions differ. Though there are many relevant 
dimensions (e.g., frequency; Williamson, 1979), TCE views two dimensions as meriting 
attention above others: resource specificity and uncertainty (Williamson, 1975: 1985: 
1991: 1996). On the basis of the potential to minimize transaction costs, these dimensions 
are employed to evaluate modes of organization (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005; Teece, 1985; 
Williamson, 1975: 1985). 
Resource specificity refers to the degree to which a resource is specialized for a given 
transaction (Williamson, 1975). This is reflected in the additional productive value it 
generates within the transaction versus its next best use. Resource specificity creates 
dependency in inter-firm transactions because a partner who invests in specialized 
resources stands to lose if the firm reneges on their commitment. “Inasmuch as the value 
of this capital in other uses is, by definition, much smaller than the specialized use for 
which it has been intended, the supplier [exchange partner] is effectively "locked into" the 
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transaction to a significant degree” (Williamson, 1979: 240). Six types of resource 
specificity are reported: site specificity, physical specificity, human specificity, brand 
name specificity, investment specificity, and temporal specificity (Williamson, 1991). 
Uncertainty refers to partners’ limited ability to predict environmental changes and one 
another’s behavior under unforeseen circumstances (Williamson, 1985). There are two 
aspects of uncertainty: volatility and ambiguity (Carson et al., 2006). Volatility refers to 
the rate of change and the unpredictability with which the environment evolves, which 
creates uncertainty about future environmental conditions. Ambiguity refers to the level 
of uncertainty regarding perceptions of the environmental state: the level to which firms 
may differ in their perceptions of the same environment (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). 
Uncertainty interacts with bounded rationality, a key TCE assumption regarding human 
behavior. Bounded rationality refers to the limits on manager’s cognitive abilities that 
prevent them from anticipating all eventualities and acting in a wholly rational manner 
(Simon, 1957). In uncertain environments, bounded rationality increases the likelihood 
that exchange partners will need to adapt their agreement as the exchange evolves 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). 
TCE has traditionally emphasized markets and hierarchies as two modes of organization 
but resources may also be organized in hybrid forms. Hybrids are situated between the 
traditional structures of markets and hierarchies (Joskow, 1987; Williamson, 1991). Inter-
firm cooperation is an example of a hybrid form. Hybrids balance the benefits of 
coordination offered by hierarchies with the greater incentive intensity offered by markets, 
while compromising the costs of bureaucracy (hierarchies) with those of controlling self-
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interest (markets) (Williamson, 1991). Hybrids, such as inter-firm cooperation, extend the 
traditional TCE dichotomy of ‘make or buy’ to ‘make, buy, or ally’. 
3.3  Opportunism  
Enabled by the transaction characteristics of resource specificity and uncertainty, 
opportunism is a central concern in TCE (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Madhok, 2002; 
Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1975: 1979: 1985: 1991). Opportunism refers to 
“self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1979: 234) and is a stronger form of the 
self-interest assumption that is widespread in economic theory. Self-interest in economic 
theory is generally superseded by firms’ obedience and faithfulness to rules and promises. 
Thus, self-interest ends where rules and promises begin. Opportunism, however, is not 
constrained by rules and promises. It allows for “strategic behavior” such as “the making 
of false or empty… threats or promises in the expectation that individual advantage will 
thereby be realized (Williamson, 1975: 26). TCE assumes that, given the opportunity, 
firms will behave opportunistically (Williamson, 1975: 1985). Therefore, even where the 
firm recognizes joint benefits from working with an exchange partner, strategic self-
interest motivates the firm to pursue every incremental gain available from the exchange 
with the aim of appropriating as much as possible (Williamson, 1979: 242).  
Examples of opportunistic behaviors include concealing resources, withholding full effort 
or open cooperation, absorbing skills, and making calculated efforts to confuse, 
manipulate or incompletely disclose information (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Khanna et al., 
1998; Luo, 2006b; Williamson, 1979). In the course of cooperation with U.S. and 
European manufacturing firms, for example, Hamel (1991) observed efforts by a number 
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of Japanese firms to ‘digest’ the skills of their partners in areas beyond the scope of their 
partnerships (Hamel, 1991). More severe opportunistic behaviors may also be observed 
(Lumineau & Quélin, 2012; Luo, 2006a), such as stealing joint assets, evading 
obligations, terminating agreements without notice, or expropriating critical technologies 
(Luo, 2006b). For instance, following a semiconductor joint venture between Integrated 
Process Equipment and MEMC Electronic Materials, a Canadian civil court found that 
that Integrated Process Equipment had shirked their cooperative responsibilities and sold 
jointly developed research to a third party (St. Louis Post-Dispatch; 17 October 2001). 
The role of resource specificity and uncertainty in facilitating opportunism is a key driver 
of both concepts’ prominence within TCE. Opportunism is enabled by resource specificity 
because it increases opportunities for the firm to take advantage of the partner. Where the 
partner has invested in transaction-specific resources, it creates a bilateral dependency 
with the firm. This exposes them to opportunism through ‘holdup’ (Goldberg, 1976), 
which occurs where the partner is coerced into ceding additional benefits to the firm to 
avoid losing the productive value of specialized resources. For instance, a partner who 
invests in specialized resources for joint R&D will earn no rewards for their investments 
if the joint pursuit of R&D does not proceed. The firm may exploit this to their advantage 
by threatening to terminate unless the partner agrees to offer additional concessions.  
Opportunism is also enabled by uncertainty (Walker & Weber, 1984; Williamson, 1985), 
through both volatility and ambiguity (Carson et al., 2006). Volatility in the environment 
increases the need to adapt the terms of exchanges to align with changing conditions 
(Pilling, Crosby, & Jackson, 1994; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Each adaption, involving 
bargaining and renegotiation, offers opportunities for firms to behave opportunistically 
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(Williamson, 1985). Ambiguity reduces the likelihood that opportunistic firms will be 
detected (Ouchi, 1980), because when behavioral perceptions are ambiguous, more 
opportunistic behaviors will go unnoticed. On the flipside, ambiguity also means that 
some non-opportunistic behaviors may be incorrectly perceived and punished as 
opportunism (Carson et al., 2006). This reduces incentives for firms to abstain from 
opportunism. 
Opportunism presents a number of problems for hybrids and markets, which are not 
experienced when resources organized internally (Anderson & Oliver, 1987; Eisenhardt, 
1985). Of most interest in TCE theory is the additional costs that opportunism introduces. 
To attenuate opportunism and safeguard specialized investments, partners employ formal 
contracts (Williamson, 1979). Contracts increase transaction costs because time and 
resources must be dedicated to specifying eventualities ex ante, as well as their 
coordination, monitoring and enforcement (Williamson, 1975: 1979: 1985). At the same 
time, bounded rationality means that firms cannot anticipate all eventualities, so contracts 
are inherently incomplete and cannot fully safeguard against opportunism (Cao & 
Lumineau, 2015; Cavusgil, Deligonul, & Zhang, 2004; Deakin & Wilkinson,1998; Hart, 
1988; Williamson, 1979).  
In addition to increased costs, opportunism also obstructs value creation (Barthélemy, 
2008; Das & Rahman, 2010; Gassenheimer, Bacus, & Bacus, 1996; John, 1984; Lumineau 
& Quélin, 2012; Luo, 2006a: 2006b; Luo, 2007; Williamson, 1985: 1991). Joint resource 
development requires substantial up-front costs and investments in specialized assets 
(e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Fernandez et al., 2014; Gnyawali & Park, 2011), but the 
partner’s opportunity to recuperate these costs is jeopardized when the firm 
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opportunistically attempts to pursue more benefits than they are entitled to. This occurs in 
four ways. One is the risk of holdup, where a partner who has invested in specialized 
assets may be strong-armed into ceding some additional benefits by an opportunistic 
partner. Another is the role of opportunism in inhibiting trust, impeding reciprocity, and 
limiting managerial attention available for value creation. This increases the probability 
that the cooperative agreement will lead to failure, dissolution, or termination (Luo, 
2006a: 2006b: 2007; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 2001). A third, related way is 
that opportunism constricts the freedom and confidence with which resources are shared 
(Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Heide & Miner, 1992; Skarmeas, Katsikeas, & 
Schlegelmilch, 2002). A fourth is that, opportunism constrains the resources available for 
value creation because, instead of being utilized for productive purposes, they must be 
deployed to safeguard against opportunism (Luo, 2006a: 2006b: 2007).  
Through its influence on both costs and benefits, opportunism impedes the harmonious 
and efficient organization of resources through inter-firm cooperation and deters firms 
from cooperating with each other. “But, for opportunism, most forms of complex 
contracting and hierarchy vanish” (Williamson, 1993: 97). Consequently, TCE views 
opportunism as “the ultimate cause for the failure of markets [and hybrids] and the 
existence of organizations” (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996: 17).  
3.4  Opportunism in coopetition 
The literature on coopetition is characterized by a widespread assumption that 
opportunism is heightened. Analysis suggests that three factors are driving this 
assumption. One is firms’ motivation to behave opportunistically in coopetition, while a 
66 
 
second is firms’ capability for opportunism. A third factor is that simultaneous 
competition introduces additional uncertainty within inter-firm cooperation which, as 
outlined, is conducive to opportunism. 
A basic explanation for the role of motivation and capability in influencing behavior is 
found in motivation theory (Atkinson, 1964; Rotter, 1954; House, 1971). The expectancy-
valence framework emphasizes two factors underlying behavior: the subjective value 
(‘valence’) associated with successful execution of behavior and the probability 
(‘expectancy’) of successful execution (Vroom, 1964). These factors map onto firm 
motivation and capability. Motivation refers the subjective value of successful execution, 
while capability refers to the probability of successful execution (Chen & Miller, 1994; 
Chen, 1996).  
First, firms have increased motivation to behave opportunistically in coopetition. 
Competitors pursue incompatible market positions, which mean they cannot achieve the 
same type of market superiority. Thus, in addition to increasing their share of benefits, an 
opportunistic firm may bolster their own market superiority by undermining or dislodging 
a market competitor. This may occur, for example, by internalizing their skills or stealing 
technology (e.g., Hamel et al., 1989; Hamel, 1991). The opportunity in coopetition to gain 
an edge over a direct competitor through opportunism generates increased motivation. 
Second, resource potential among competitors increases their capability to behave 
opportunistically. Competitors with market commonality face many of the same 
opportunities and challenges, which leads to overlapping dominant logics and deep 
understandings of each other’s priorities, strengths, and weaknesses (Dussauge et al., 
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2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Ingram & Qingyuan, 2008). These may be applied to 
opportunistic ends, such as deception, evasion, or confusion. Overlapping knowledge 
bases also expedites learning among competitors, making them disproportionately well-
equipped to identify, assimilate, and apply each other's tacit knowledge and skills (e.g., 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Therefore, resource potential 
increases capabilities for opportunism in coopetition.  
In addition, and returning to TCE logic, opportunism is enabled by increased uncertainty 
in coopetition. Uncertainty has two constituent elements: volatility and ambiguity (Carson 
et al., 2006). In coopetition, coexistence of market competitions alongside inter-firm 
cooperation leads to greater volatility because the relationship must evolve in line with 
both competitive and cooperative developments (Lavie, 2007; Padula & Dagnino, 2007). 
This increases the regularity with which agreements must be adapted and each adaption 
creates new opportunities for opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Through the complex, 
long-term nature of benefits in coopetition (e.g., Ansari et al., 2016; Gnyawali & Park, 
2011), ambiguity (i.e., the level of uncertainty in perceptions) is also greater. This 
increases the potential for opportunism to go unnoticed or for non-opportunistic behaviors 
to be incorrectly sanctioned (Ouchi, 1980). 
3.4.1  Widespread assumption that opportunism is heightened in coopetition 
The dominant assumption that opportunism is heightened in coopetition is illustrated by 




Table 3.1: Assumption of heightened opportunism in the coopetition literature 
“… [in coopetition] the incentives to act opportunistically appear to motivate actions 
that threaten and frequently undermine joint ventures” (Park & Russo, 1996: 887) 
“An alliance portfolio featuring a high proportion of the firm’s competitors is 
characterized by opportunistic [behavior]…, disputes, and considerable risk of 
undesirable leakage of resources…” (Lavie, 2007: 1194)  
“Opportunistic hazards are inevitable in strategic alliances because of this competitive 
rivalry between partners” (Park & Ungson, 2001: 43) 
“Alliances between competitors can lead to the loss of critical proprietary knowledge, 
to increased dependence of one partner vis-a`-vis the other, and even to the takeover of 
one partner by the other” (Dussauge et al., 2000: 100). 
“[A] downside of co-opetition is technological risks. If a firm is not quite careful or 
happens to get an opportunistic partner, it could lose its secret and proprietary 
knowledge to the competitor-partner.  (Gnyawali & Park, 2009: 322-323) 
 “…firms in horizontal partnerships also face greater risks of leakage of proprietary 
knowledge” (Belderbos et al., 2004: 1256) 
 “…conflicting demands [arise in coopetition between] the need to work together in 
order to create value and the temptation to be opportunistic in order to appropriate a 
greater share of the created value” (Park et al., 2014b: 211) 
“… risks of transfer of confidential information and the risks of technological imitation 
[in coopetition]. Partners… need to protect their core competencies because they remain 
strong competitors…” (Fernandez et al., 2014: 223) 
“…depending on… the extent of opportunism among the partners, a given firm might 
or might not obtain the expected share of the overall value created …” (Garrette et al., 
2009: 888)  
“[c]o-opetitive relationships thus involve a high degree of interdependence with each 
other and are full of conflict, and yet the potential for payoff is also high” (Gnyawali & 
Park, 2011: 651).  
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The ten papers in Table 3.1 are but a small fraction of the literature that assumes 
opportunism is heightened in coopetition. For instance, Lavie relies on the ‘motivation for 
opportunism’ argument to explain why firms may capture less value when their partners 
are competitors. Opportunism is assumed to be greater because coopetition partners have 
“[greater] motivation to increase their share of relational rents” (2007: 1194). Similarly, 
Gnyawali & Park (2009) highlight opportunism as a significant cost of coopetition, 
arguing that partners’ capability for opportunism is a dilemma arising from resource 
potential in coopetition. Park & Ungson focus on traditional TCE logic and argue that 
uncertainty “causes a high level of transaction costs as partners adopt various contractual 
stipulations to avoid opportunistic hazards” (2001: 42). These three papers, emphasizing 
motivation, capability, and uncertainty respectively, are illustrative of a much larger body 
of literature that assumes heightened opportunism in coopetition. 
3.4.2  Conflicting findings regarding opportunism in coopetition 
Those that have directly investigated the issue of opportunism in coopetition have arrived 
at conflicting findings. Some provide rationale for heightened opportunism in coopetition, 
while others develop arguments for reduced opportunism. Drawing from TCE, Park & 
Russo (1996) argue their finding of higher joint venture failure rates among coopetition 
partners occurs due to heightened opportunism in coopetition. They suggest that the 
simultaneous presence of competition alongside cooperation creates “incentives to act 
opportunistically [that] appear to motivate actions that threaten and frequently undermine 
joint ventures” (Park & Russo, 1996: 887). 
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This finding directly conflicts with other research suggesting that opportunism is reduced 
in coopetition. Shipilov (2009) relies on multipoint competition logic, which itself 
incorporates aspects of competitive dynamics, to argue that increased performance in 
coopetition is facilitated by reductions in opportunism. The basis for this argument is that 
market commonality facilitates opportunism-reducing mechanisms through informal 
routines and reciprocity in coopetition (e.g., ‘live and let live’; Edwards, 1955). Another 
finding that market commonality between cooperative partners leads to lower adoption 
rates for formal safeguards against opportunism also supports this perspective (Ryu & 
Reuer, 2016).  
3.5  Research gaps 
The widespread assumption in the literature that opportunism is heightened in coopetition, 
as well as the conflicting findings that exist, expose two research gaps. The first gap is the 
failure of extant research to explain coopetition dynamics, which leads to the second gap, 
constrained theoretical development regarding value creation in coopetition.  
3.5.1  Failure to explain coopetition dynamics 
In its current state, the coopetition literature is unable to explain coopetition dynamics as 
they are observed in practice. Coopetition has emerged as a broadly popular approach in 
practice and pursuit of coopetition is rising in industries including semiconductors 
(Hagedoorn, 1993; Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011; Stuart, 2000), biotechnology 
(Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2004), and communications (Ansari et al., 2016; 
Fernandez et al., 2014; Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2013). These relationships frequently 
proceed without the formal safeguards that TCE suggests are necessary to constrain 
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opportunism (Ryu & Reuer, 2016). This raises doubts about the validity of existing 
literature regarding opportunism and raises a fundamental question: Why is pursuit of 
coopetition rising without formal safeguards if opportunism is heightened in coopetition 
as the literature widely assumes?  
Industry observations offer strong evidence that existing theory — dominated by the 
assumption of opportunism outlined — has significant limitations for explaining 
coopetition dynamics. “Theory is the answer to queries of why” (Sutton & Staw, 1995: 
378) and a hallmark of good theory is that it facilitates explanation as to why a 
phenomenon occurs as it does (Whetten, 2009). Good theory is important because it 
facilitates explanation and represents a field’s “core knowledge capital” (Whetten, 2009: 
218). In the coopetition literature with regard to opportunism, ‘good theory’ is clearly 
lacking. To the contrary, a largely unchallenged assumption about opportunism has 
created a blinkered field of vision and constrained theoretical development. The 
development of (good) theory in an emerging area like coopetition is critical because it 
helps to build understanding of a new and complex phenomenon about which relatively 
little is known. 
This critical gap is compounded by conflicting findings offered by the few studies directly 
examining opportunism in coopetition. These studies employ TCE and multipoint 
competition theory respectively to explain heightened opportunism (Park & Russo, 1996) 
and reduced opportunism (Ryu & Reuer, 2016; Shipilov, 2009) in coopetition. Yet key 
theories underpinning coopetition, competitive dynamics (inter-firm competition) and the 
RBV (inter-firm cooperation) are largely overlooked. As I seek to address this gap in the 
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following chapter, I will show how both these theories are central to explaining 
coopetition dynamics.  
In the current literature, conflicting findings aggravate the constraint on theoretical 
development because researchers have tended to align with one view (mostly the 
‘heightened opportunism’ view) without any consideration the other and often without 
acknowledging this choice. This takes attention away from resolving the conflict and 
explaining underlying reasons why both sides of this conflict exist.  
3.5.2  Constrained theoretical development regarding value creation in coopetition 
Second, and despite the potential for value creation outlined in Chapter 2, it is not possible 
to achieve a systematic understanding of value creation in coopetition without good theory 
regarding opportunism in coopetition. Opportunism impedes value creation by driving 
holdup risks, inhibiting antecedents of value creation, limiting inter-partner resource-
sharing, and reducing the resources available for value creation (Dyer, 1997; Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Heide & Miner, 1992; Skarmeas et al., 2002). Therefore, until opportunism 
in coopetition is adequately understood, the constraint on theoretical development 
regarding value creation will persist. 
3.6  Objectives and research questions 
These gaps motivate the two research objectives that my dissertation addresses. Each 
research objective maps onto a specific research question.  
First, I set out to develop better theory regarding opportunism in coopetition. This includes 
explanations for the basis of conflicting findings in the literature. It is achieved by 
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examining the effect on opportunism when inter-firm competition and inter-firm 
cooperation occur simultaneously between firms. Opportunism has emerged as a seminal 
issue within inter-firm cooperation (Heide & John, 1992: 1982; Hennart, 1990; Kogut, 
1991; Parkhe, 1993), so this research will probe the causal effects of introducing inter-
firm competition, indicated by market commonality, into the relationship. This leads to 
my first research question: 
1. What is the effect of market commonality on opportunism in coopetition? 
Second, and building from my first objective, I explore the implications of opportunism 
in coopetition for value creation in coopetition. Although the conceptual development in 
Chapter 2, as well as a mass of emerging research (Ansari et al., 2016; Garrette et al., 
2009; Gnyawali & Park, 2011), suggest that coopetition has significant value creation 
promise, this is at odds with the widespread assumption of heightened opportunism in the 
literature. Therefore, having clarified opportunism in coopetition, an important next step 
is to examine the subsequent effect on value creation. This leads to my second research 
question: 
2. What influence does the effect of market commonality on opportunism have on firm 
value creation from coopetition? 
3.7  Chapter summary 
In Chapter 3, I have explained the two research gaps that my dissertation will address. 
These are (1) failure to explain coopetition dynamics and (2) constrained theoretical 
development regarding value creation in coopetition. 
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I begin by reviewing the important aspects of transaction cost economics theory, from 
which the concept of opportunism originates. Opportunism is damaging to inter-firm 
cooperation because it raises transaction costs while obstructing value creation. In the 
coopetition literature, I explain that opportunism is widely assumed to be heightened for 
three reasons: firms are motivated to behave opportunistically, capable of behaving 
opportunistically, and simultaneous inter-firm competition and cooperation introduces 
additional uncertainty to the relationship. The few studies examining this issue directly 
have reported conflicting finding, but researchers have tended to adopt the assumption of 
heightened opportunism at the expense of exploring reasons for this conflict.  
The first research gap arises because the dominant assumption of heightened opportunism 
in coopetition is at odds with industry evidence. Pursuit of coopetition is rising in practice 
(Harbison & Pekar, 1998; Gnyawali & Park, 2009) and often proceeding without formal 
safeguards to constrain opportunism (Ryu & Reuer, 2016). This suggests that existing 
theory, espousing heightened opportunism, has significant limitations for explaining 
coopetition dynamics. Relatedly, as a result of the implications of opportunism for value 
creation, it is not possible to develop a systematic understanding of value creation without 
clarifying opportunism. This leads to the second research gap. The chapter concludes by 
outlining the objectives and research questions that emerge from these gaps. 
Two theories, competitive dynamics (Chen et al., 1992; Baum & Korn, 1996; Smith et al., 
1992) and the RBV (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 2006) are at the heart of how inter-firm 
competition and cooperation are understood but have been largely overlooked to address 
this issue. Given that these explain the two constituent elements of coopetition, it is 
unsurprising that they are enlightening with regard to coopetition dynamics. In Chapter 4, 
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I build from these theories to develop five hypotheses that are capable of answering the 




Chapter 4: Conceptual Development 
 
4.1  Chapter introduction 
The previous chapter identified two research gaps that require further development. The 
first gap is the absence of good theory to explain coopetition dynamics, which leads to the 
second gap, limited theoretical development regarding value creation in coopetition. I 
identified two research objectives to address these gaps and then articulated two research 
questions. In this chapter, with the purpose of satisfying the objectives by answering the 
research questions, a conceptual model is developed and five hypotheses are advanced. 
The chapter begins by unpacking the concept of action-response dyads in competitive 
dynamics (Baum & Korn, 1999; Caves, 1984; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 
1994; Chen, 1996) (Section 4.2). I explain how response — depending on awareness of 
an action, motivation to respond, and capability of responding —  determines the 
attractiveness of the action (Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994). Applying this logic to 
opportunism, I argue that scope for partner retaliation determines opportunism in 
coopetition. Through awareness, motivation, and capability, I explain why market 
commonality increases scope for partner retaliation, which reduces opportunism in 
coopetition (Section 4.3).  
This suggests a negative effect of market commonality on opportunism, but extending the 
analysis to the RBV (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 2006), I propose that the effect reverses at high 
levels of market commonality. When market commonality is high, firms must appropriate 
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value from many of the same markets, which reduces the rarity of jointly developed 
resources. Opportunism helps the firm to preserve the rarity of jointly developed 
resources, which increases rewards from behaving opportunistically. Consequently, I 
hypothesize a curvilinear, U-shaped effect of market commonality on opportunism, where 
low and moderate levels of market commonality are negatively associated with firm 
opportunism but this reverses at higher levels of market commonality.  
Extending this effect to consider the influence on value creation, I hypothesize that 
opportunism has a negative effect on firm value creation from coopetition (value creation 
will increase in line with reductions in opportunism and vice versa). This produces an 
inverted U-shaped effect of market commonality on value creation. To validate the logic 
underlying these predictions and enable fine-grained analysis, I also introduce two 
additional constructs, market rivalry and repeated cooperation, which have important 
negative moderating effects on the main relationship (Section 4.4). 
In the next section, I begin developing the conceptual model by explaining the action-
response dyad and its central role in competitive dynamics. 
4.2  The action-response dyad in competitive dynamics 
Action-response dyads shed light on the role of potential competitive responses and their 
influence on competitive actions (Baum & Korn, 1999; Caves, 1984; Chen & MacMillan, 
1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, 1996). An action is a specific and detectible 
competitive move while a response is a specific and detectible countermove prompted by 
an initial action (Baum & Korn, 1999; Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Chen & MacMillan, 
1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen & Miller, 2012). Actions and responses are “the level 
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that actual competitive engagement occurs…” and therefore represent the building blocks 
of competitive dynamics (Chen & MacMillan, 1992: 541). Action-response is a basic and 
concrete level micro-analysis of competitive interaction that complements the economic 
forces type ‘macro analysis’ of competitive actions (e.g. Porter, 1980). 
The study of action and responses has its basis in game theory, which offers a framework 
for rationalizing observed behavior when multiple actors have interdependent outcomes 
(Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 1986). Often focused on short-term ‘tit for tat’ interactions, game 
theory illustrates how the fates of individual actors are intertwined because, where the 
behavior of one actor affects the outcomes or opportunities available to other actors, there 
are incentives for other actors to respond – either in support or opposition (Brandenburger 
& Nalebuff, 1996).  
At the firm level, game theory is applied to understand how payoffs for one firm’s action 
depend on the responses of other firms. These can be framed through well-specified 
economic models, such as repeated iterations of a Prisoner’s Dilemma (e.g., Axelrod, 
1984). Where responses are capable of altering the payoffs available from a given action, 
a firm is forced to consider a potential action in terms of the responses it could invite (Hill, 
1990; Parkhe, 1993). The application of this game theoretic logic to the current research 
context (i.e., engagements between for-profit firms) occurs has evolved within the 
literature on competitive dynamics (e.g., Chen & Miller, 1994). The core insight of the 
action-response literature is that actions must be considered in terms of the potential 
responses they may invite. Responses are important because they negate the intended 
benefits of an action and invite costly conflict, thereby limiting the ultimate effectiveness 
of the initial action (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994). As long as 
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responses are lacking, the firm will find it easier to achieve the intended benefits from its 
actions (Chen & Miller, 1994; MacMillan, McCaffery, & Van Wijk, 1985). However, as 
responses increase, the firm will face more and more obstacles to achieve its intended 
benefits (Chen & Miller, 1994). 
Responses may not only nullify an action and impede the intended benefits, they may also 
create the need for counter-responses (Chen & Miller, 1994; Lamberg, Tikkanen, 
Nokelainen, & Suur‐Inkeroinen, 2009). Counter-responses are accompanied by costs 
because they absorb resources that may otherwise be employed to pursue benefits in other 
areas. Consequently, a potent response may leave the firm worse off than they were before 
their initial action (Chen & Miller, 1994; Porter, 1980). Thus, the attraction of an action 
becomes less as the likelihood of response increases (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 1992; Chen 
& MacMillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; MacMillan et al., 1985; Porter, 1980; Smith et 
al., 1992) and an attacker is less likely to attack a rival who is more likely to respond 
(Baum and Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994).  
To explain the likelihood of competitive response, the behavior of the defending firm is 
paramount (Chen & Miller, 1994). The defender’s behavior, and thus the likelihood of 
competitive response, is determined by three behavioral drivers: awareness of the initial 
action, motivation to respond, and capability of responding (Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 
1994). The awareness – motivation – capability (AMC) framework was formalized by 
Chen & Miller (1994). Building on Vroom’s (1964) expectancy-valance framework, the 
pair sought to develop a model that minimized the likelihood of response to competitive 
actions. They argued that likelihood of response depended on the subjective value placed 
on successfully executing a response (motivation), the probability that a successful 
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response could be achieved (capability), and the visibility of the initial action (awareness). 
A defender will not be able to respond to a competitive action unless it is aware of the 
action, motivated to respond, and capable of responding (Chen, 1996). On the flipside, 
likelihood of response increases in line with increases in awareness, motivation or 
capability. 
The first driver of competitive response, awareness refers to whether a competitive action 
is detected by another firm (Chen 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994). A rival who is unaware of 
a competitive action will not be able to respond. Action visibility, leading to awareness, 
is a tacit precondition to the expectancy-valence framework (Chen & Miller, 1994) and a 
pre-requisite for any response (Chen, 1996).  
The second driver of response, motivation refers to the subjective value (‘valence’) 
associated with successful execution of behavior. Motivation to respond is greatest when 
the threat is significant: when the defender perceives that something important is at stake 
(Chen & Miller, 1994; Vroom, 1964). In such situations, the ‘valence’ of a response is the 
anticipated reward from nullifying an action. The more potent the action, the greater the 
valence. 
The third driver, capability, refers to the probability of successful execution (Vroom, 
1964; Chen & Miller, 1994). Successful execution is determined by two factors: the firm’s 
competency to act and the firm’s opportunity to act (Chen & Miller, 1994; Prince & 
Simon, 2009). Irrespective of awareness or motivation, likelihood of a response is low 
unless the responder is capable of executing. 
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AMC is widely applied in the literature to understand and predict a range of competitive 
properties, such as subjective perceptions of competition (Kilduff, Crossland, Tsai, & 
Krackhardt, 2010), counter-responses (Lamberg et al., 2009), broad competitive 
repertoires (Ferrier, 2001), and competitive tension (Chen, Tsu, & Tsai, 2007). In the next 
section, I extend its utility to build insights regarding opportunism in coopetition. 
4.2.1    Implications for firm opportunism  
At present, potential responses are not considered as a determinant of opportunism in 
coopetition. In Chapter 3, I explained that opportunism is assumed to be heightened in 
coopetition due to firm motivation, firm capability, and uncertainty in the environment. 
This emphasizes the ‘action’ side of the dyad. But potential responses are critical because 
they negate the intended benefits of opportunism. Where potential responses are 
significant, the firm is less likely to behave opportunistically because the likelihood of 
achieving the intended benefits from opportunism are less and the potential costs are 
greater (e.g., Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 1992; Chen & MacMillan, 
1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; MacMillan et al., 1985; Porter, 1980; Smith et al., 1992). To 
date, responses to opportunism are overlooked in the literature. 
Much of my conceptual development is dedicated to remedying this deficit. I unpack 
potential responses against opportunism and argue that, insofar as partner responses are 
significant (henceforth scope for partner retaliation), opportunism in coopetition will be 
reduced. Partner’s scope for retaliation to opportunism depends on three factors: 
awareness of the opportunistic behavior, motivation to retaliate, and capability to retaliate 
(e.g., Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994; Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 2000). The 
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partner will not be able to retaliate to opportunism unless it is aware of the opportunistic 
behavior, motivated, and capable of retaliating. As awareness, motivation, and capability 
rise, so too does the scope for partner retaliation to opportunism (e.g., Chen, 1996; Chen 
& Miller, 2012).  
4.3  Market commonality and opportunism 
Opportunism is a seminal issue within inter-firm cooperation (Heide & John, 1992: 1982; 
Hennart, 1990; Kogut, 1991; Parkhe, 1993), so to explain scope for partner retaliation to 
opportunism, I will probe the causal effects of introducing inter-firm competition, 
indicated by market commonality, into the relationship. I draw from two theories to 
explain the effect of market commonality on opportunism: competitive dynamics (Baum 
& Korn, 1999; Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, 1996) and the RBV (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 
2006). I begin with competitive dynamics, specifically the AMC framework (Chen & 
Miller, 1994), to illustrate how market commonality increases partner scope for 
retaliation, which reduces opportunism. I expect this negative effect to occur at low and 
moderate levels of market commonality. Proceeding to the RBV, I explain how high 
market commonality reduces the rarity of jointly developed resources, which increases 
the rewards of opportunism.  As a result, I anticipate that high market commonality will 
have a positive effect on opportunism. This leads me to hypothesize a curvilinear U-
shaped effect of market commonality on opportunism.  
For conceptual and empirical precision, I focus on firm opportunism within a dyadic 
coopetition relationship in a ‘for-profit’ context (e.g., Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Gnyawali 
& Park, 2011; Ketchen et al., 2004). Market commonality, arising from inter-firm 
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competition, is a firm-level construct referring to the proportion of the firm’s markets in 
which it encounters a given competitor (Chen, 1996).  Opportunism is defined as “self-
interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1979: 234), including lying, cheating, stealing, 
deception, and evading obligations (Lumineau & Quélin, 2012; Luo, 2006a: 2006b). 
4.3.1  Competitive dynamics 
Drawing from competitive dynamics, I now explain why low and moderate levels of 
market commonality are hypothesized to reduce opportunism in coopetition. Opportunism 
depends on scope for partner retaliation, which itself is determined by partner awareness 
of opportunism, motivation to retaliate, and capability to retaliate. I argue that market 
commonality establishes a base level of awareness and motivation, while it increases 
capability to retaliate. Therefore, I propose that, up to a point, market commonality will 
reduce opportunism.  The mechanisms underlying this proposed effect are laid out in 
Figure 4.1. I will now unpack the expected influence of market commonality on each 
dimension of the AMC framework.  
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Figure 4.1: Effect on opportunism when market commonality is low/moderate 
 
Awareness refers to whether firm opportunism is detected by the partner (Chen 1996; 
Chen & Miller, 1994). Market commonality establishes a base level of awareness because 
the partner has clear incentives to monitor the firm’s behavior to detect opportunism 
(Amir, Lavie, & Hashai, 2017; Yu & Cannella, 2007). As the firm is present in at least 
some of the partner’s markets, the firm’s behavior directly affects the partner’s superiority 
(c.f., Porter, 1985). Therefore, the partner will pay greater attention to the firm’s behavior 
(Baum & Korn, 1999; Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999) and so is more likely 
to detect opportunism. In addition, market commonality leads to overlapping dominant 
logics between the firm and the partner. Through their common markets, the partner 
develops deep understanding of the firm’s competitive behavior and priorities (Boeker, 
Stephan, & Murmann, 1997; Dussauge et al., 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Stephan & 
Boeker, 2001). This makes the firms actions more visible to the partner and makes it easier 
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for the partner to detect opportunism. Consequently, market commonality establishes a 
base level of partner awareness of opportunism. 
Motivation refers to the subjective value associated with successful retaliation to 
opportunism (Chen & Miller, 1994). The value of retaliation is the anticipated reward 
from nullifying opportunism, so the partner has high motivation to retaliate when the 
subjective cost of opportunism will be great. Motivation to retaliate is a function of the 
centrality of attack (Chen & Miller, 1994) – the extent to which it affects the firm’s overall 
interests. Market commonality establishes a base level of partner motivation to retaliate 
because the partner’s superiority depends on the firm’s behavior (Baum & Korn, 1999; 
Chen, 1996; Gimeno & Woo, 1996a). A firm who uses opportunism to advance their own 
market interests does so at the expense of the partner, who is pursuing an incompatible 
position. The costs of opportunism for the partner include damage to their position in 
common markets. Consequently, partners with market commonality are motivated to 
vigorously defend their advantages by retaliating with speed and aggressiveness (e.g., 
Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 2000; Yu & Cannella, 2007).  
Capability refers to the probability of successful retaliation (Chen & Miller, 1994; Vroom, 
1964). Probability of successful retaliation is determined by two factors: the firm’s 
competency to retaliate and opportunity to retaliate (Chen & Miller, 1994; Prince & 
Simon, 2009). Both these factors are increased by market commonality. 
Competency to retaliate is increased because market commonality increases partner 
understanding of the firm’s behaviors and priorities (Boeker et al., 1997; Yu & Cannella, 
2013). Market commonality increases the partner’s underlying resource potential relative 
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to the firm (Dussauge et al., 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2009), which increases the speed of 
partner retaliation and facilitates more potent retaliations (Gimeno, 1999; Prince & Simon, 
2009; Yu & Cannella, 2007). As a result, the partner is equipped to retaliate in a way that 
maximizes negative consequences for the firm (McGrath, Chen, & MacMillan, 1998). 
Opportunity to retaliate also increase with market commonality. In market environments, 
market commonality leads firms to ‘forbear’ from aggressive behavior because 
opportunities for a victim to retaliate are extensive (Gimeno & Woo, 1996a; Prince & 
Simon, 2009; van Reeven & Pennings, 2016; Yu & Cannella, 2013). Retaliation may take 
place in the focal market, but also in any other markets that the victim shares with the 
firm. Thus, the more common markets (i.e., market commonality), the greater the scope 
for partner retaliation. Similarly, in coopetition, a partner who suffers firm opportunism 
may retaliate through competitive escalation in any, or all, of the firm’s common markets.  
As a result, the partner’s opportunity to retaliate increases in line with the firm’s market 
commonality.  
Thus far I have argued that the firm’s market commonality increases scope for partner 
retaliation, which reduces opportunism in coopetition. This occurs because firm market 
commonality establishes a base level of partner awareness of opportunism and a base level 
of motivation to retaliate, while increasing capability to retaliate. The mechanisms 
underlying this effect are summarized in Table 4.1. 
I expect this negative effect will hold at low and moderate levels of market commonality. 
At high levels of market commonality however, I expect the effect to reverse and market 
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commonality to have a positive effect on opportunism. I will now draw from the RBV to 
explain the rationale behind the positive effect of high market commonality. 
Table 4.1: Role of market commonality in partner’s awareness, motivation and 
capability 
Awareness of opportunism Motivation to retaliate Capability to retaliate 
Base level established by: 
• impetus to monitor 
opportunism 
• deep understanding 
of the firm’s 
behavior 








• competence to 
retaliate to 
opportunism 




4.3.2  The resource-based view 
Coopetition is a unique type of competitive relationship in that value creation, such as 
technological development (Ansari et al., 2016; Garrette et al., 2009; Gnyawali & Park, 
2011), is fundamental to the engagement. Yet competitive dynamics is characterized an 
underlying zero-sum logic, whereby gains for one firm occur at the expense of another 
and inter-firm engagements are not perceived as a source of value creation. The RBV 
enables systematic analysis of the value creation dimension of coopetition relationships 
and the potential effects it may introduce regarding opportunism. 
The RBV views rare, valuable, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources (Barney, 1991) 
that are heterogeneously distributed and not easily tradeable (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Wernerfelt, 1984) as the source of value creation. The external RBV (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
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Lavie, 2006) suggests that some critical resources and capabilities may span firm 
boundaries and extend to the firm’s external relationships (Cassiman et al., 2009; Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Garrette et al., 2009). Though they are accessed by multiple firms, these 
resources and capabilities may still satisfy the pre-conditions for value creation (valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable) within their wider industry context (e.g., Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Rai, 2016). 
I draw from the RBV to argue that high market commonality has a positive effect on 
opportunism because it reduces the rarity of jointly developed resources. This increases 
the rewards of using opportunism to ‘get ahead’ of the partner and preserve the rarity of 
jointly developed resources in common markets. As a result, where market commonality 
is high, opportunism is expected to be increased. These arguments, summarized in Figure 
4.2, are now unpacked. 
Figure 4.2: Effect on opportunism when market commonality is high 
Any degree of market commonality has some negative consequences for the rarity of 
jointly developed resources but such consequences become acute when market 
commonality is high. High market commonality reduces the rarity of jointly developed 
resources because the firm encounters the partner most or all of its markets. This means 
89 
 
that its efforts to appropriate value from jointly developed resources frequently occur in 
markets where the partner is also active. In markets where the firm and the partner are 
active, both rely on the same jointly developed resources, which makes them less rare 
(they may be accessed by two market participants instead of one). Consequently, from the 
perspective of each firm, the opportunity to create firm-specific value is less because 
consumers also have the option of a closely related substitute (e.g., Wassmer & Dussauge, 
2012).  
When the rarity of jointly developed resources is reduced in this manner, rewards of 
opportunism increase. This occurs because opportunistic behaviors may allow the firm to 
get a first-mover advantage over the partner (e.g., Chuang, Dahlin, Thomson, Lai, & 
Yang, 2015; Yang, Zeng, & Zaheer, 2015). A first mover advantage refers to the 
competitive edge gained by a firm who enters a market first (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1988). In this case, by introducing jointly developed resources to the market before the 
partner, a first mover advantage allows the firm to maintain the rarity of jointly developed 
resources, at least for a period. Opportunism, such as strategically evading obligations to 
the partner, or making empty promises (Williamson, 1975), enables a firm to gain a first 
mover advantage. This increases its ability to create value from jointly developed 
resources. For example, where a firm can achieve their resource-based goals from the 
relationship before the partner, they may then evade their obligations by terminating the 
relationship and inhibiting the partner’s achievement of their goals (Khanna et al., 1998). 
This obstructs the partner’s speed to market, which enables the firm to gain a first mover 
advantage, maintaining the rarity of jointly developed resources and enabling the firm to 
create more value.  
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Greater rewards of opportunism are expected to drive increased opportunism. Therefore, 
in contrast to the negative effect of low and moderate levels of market commonality, high 
market commonality is predicted to increase opportunism. This produces a curvilinear U-
shaped effect of market commonality on opportunism, where low and moderate levels of 
market commonality reduce firm opportunism but this effect reverses at high levels.  
In the next section, I explain how market commonality is expected to influence value 
creation through its effect on opportunism. 
4.3.3  Implications for value creation  
Value creation is defined as the generation of additional benefits for the firm from a 
particular set of activities (Lavie, 2006; Rai, 2016; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukanen, 2009). 
Opportunism is anticipated to negatively affect value creation for the firm (e.g., 
Barthélemy, 2008; Das & Rahman, 2010; Gassenheimer et al., 1996; John, 1984; 
Lumineau & Quélin, 2012; Luo, 2006a: 2006b; Luo, 2007; Williamson, 1985: 1991). The 
negative effect of opportunism on value creation occurs because opportunism inhibits 
important antecedents of inter-firm value creation (Luo, 2006a: 2006b: 2007; Park & 
Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 2001). Factors such as trust, reciprocity, and managerial 
attention are diminished by opportunism in coopetition. These are critical sources of value 
creation, especially where objectives ambitious and complex (Uzzi, 1999). Opportunism 
also requires that resources are deployed to design, monitor, and enforce formal 
safeguards, instead of being utilized for more productive purpose (Luo, 2006a: 2006b: 
2007). As formal contracts are fundamentally incomplete and can never entirely pre-empt 
opportunism (Deakin & Wilkinson,1998; Hart, 1988; Williamson, 1979), the freedom and 
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confidence with which resources are shared is less when opportunism is present (Dyer, 
1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Heide & Miner, 1992; Skarmeas et al., 2002).  
By destabilizing inter-firm cooperation, opportunism reduces value creation through 
additional safeguarding (Williamson, 1991) and diminished resource sharing (Hill, 1990; 
Park & Russo, 1996). Consequently, a negative effect of opportunism on value creation 
is hypothesized. 
4.3.4  Hypothesis 1, 2a, and 2b 
Insofar as low and moderate levels of market commonality reduce opportunism, I expect 
it to generate increases in firm value creation. In contrast, under conditions of high market 
commonality where the effect is reversed and opportunism is increased, I expect value 
creation to be reduced. Therefore, I advance the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. In coopetition, market commonality is curvilinearly related 
(taking an inverted U-shape) to firm value creation. Low and moderate 
levels of market commonality are positively associated with value creation 
and high market commonality is negatively associated with value creation.  
Hypothesis 2a. In coopetition, market commonality is curvilinearly related 
(taking a U-shape) to opportunism. Low and moderate levels of market 
commonality are negatively associated with opportunism and high market 
commonality is positively associated with opportunism. 
Hypothesis 2b. Opportunism is negatively associated with value creation. 
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4..4  Moderators 
The core mechanism for the hypothesized negative effect of market commonality on 
opportunism is increased scope for partner retaliation. To validate this mechanism and 
add further nuance to my analysis, I introduce two moderating constructs that are expected 
to negatively affect the relationship between market commonality on opportunism. The 
first moderator, market rivalry, is expected to dampen the effect of market commonality 
on opportunism (e.g., Huber, Fischer, Dibbern, & Hirschheim, 2013). The second, 
repeated cooperation, is anticipated replace the effect on opportunism. Thus, through two 
different mechanisms, I expect these constructs to negatively moderate the main 
relationship. I will now explain the rationale behind these moderators and advance a 
hypothesis for each.  
4.4.1  Market rivalry 
Market rivalry is a behavioral construct that refers to the frequency and aggression of 
rivalrous actions and reactions between firms in a market (Baum & Korn, 1999; 
Jayachandran et al., 1999; Prince & Simon, 2009). It is distinct from competition, which 
is a structural concept that emphasizes incompatible market positions (Porter, 1980). In 
both positive and negative forms, the effect of market commonality on opportunism is 
expected to be weakened by market rivalry. 
The negative effect of market commonality on opportunism relies on scope for partner 
retaliation, which is less when market rivalry is high and greater when market rivalry is 
low. Scope for partner retaliation is less when market rivalry is high because there is less 
latitude for escalation of rivalry as rivalry is already escalated in common markets (Prince 
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& Simon, 2009). Through intensive sequences of actions, responses, and counter-
responses, market rivalry causes firms to contest away benefits that may otherwise exist 
(MacMillan et al., 1985; Porter, 1980). Consequently, there are less remaining benefits 
that may be achieved through opportunism — and nullified through retaliation to 
opportunism. As a result, scope for partner retaliation is less when market rivalry is high. 
Scope for partner retaliation is greater when market rivalry is low because the 
development and maintenance of low market rivalry incurs costs and takes time (Baum & 
Korn, 1999; van Wegberg & van Witteloostuijn, 2001). It may even suggest that some 
tacit mechanisms are already in place among competitors for limiting rivalry (Chuang et 
al., 2015; Edwards, 1955; Yu & Cannella, 2013). The costs of escalating rivalry with 
regard to damaging these costly mechanisms are significant and escalations are more 
potent because they are experienced more acutely by the firm (Prince & Simon, 2009; 
Wathne & Heide, 2000). Therefore, the scope for partner retaliation is greater when 
market rivalry is low.  
When the effect of market commonality on opportunism is positive, the anticipated 
benefits that the firm can achieve from opportunism depends on the level of rivalry already 
present (e.g., Garrette et al., 2009; Lavie, 2007). By increasing the proportion of benefits 
that are contested away (MacMillan et al., 1985; Porter, 1980), market rivalry means that 
remaining benefits to be achieved through opportunism are less. When the benefits are 
less, the attractiveness of opportunism, and therefore firm pursuit of opportunism, is 
expected to be less. Consequently, the positive effect of market commonality on 




4.4.2  Hypothesis 3 
I anticipate that market rivalry negatively moderates the effect of market commonality on 
opportunism: 
Hypothesis 3. In coopetition, the relationship between market 
commonality and opportunism is negatively moderated by market rivalry. 
Market commonality has a weaker association with opportunism, both 
positive and negative, when market rivalry is high. 
4.4.3  Repeated cooperation 
Repeated cooperation refers to the firm’s history of past cooperative agreements with the 
partner (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Wang & Zajac, 2007; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 
2002). Repeated cooperation is expected to replace the scope for partner retaliation against 
opportunism because it generates a different type of safeguard against opportunism. A 
history of repeated cooperation fosters relational mechanisms through trust, shared norms, 
and social relations, and creates strong disincentives against opportunism (Carson et al., 
2006; Mellewigt, Thomas, Weller, & Zajac, 2017; Muthusamy & White, 2005). Often 
described as ‘relational governance mechanisms’ or ‘relational contracts’, they can be 
employed by the partner to coordinate firm behavior and deter opportunism (Cao & 
Lumineau, 2015; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Macneil, 1980; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008; 
Mellewigt et al., 2017; Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005). Therefore, repeated cooperation 
weakens the negative effect of market commonality on opportunism, while also reducing 
the positive effect of high market commonality on opportunism.  
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There are three means by which repeated cooperation limits opportunism: trust, shared 
norms, and social relations (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Carson et al., 2006; Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Macneil, 1980). First, repeated cooperation is a ‘social institution’ that is capable 
of building trust (Blau, 1964; Gulati 1995a). Trust refers to “an expectancy of positive 
outcomes that one can receive based on the expected action of another party” 
(Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998: 462) and leads to expectations of continuity 
in the relationship (Poppo et al., 2008; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Opportunism jeopardizes 
trust because it erodes the partner’s expectancy of positive outcomes from the firm’s 
actions (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Poppo & Zenger, 1998). Trust is time 
consuming and costly to establish, so costs of opportunism are greater when trust is 
present. 
Second, repeated cooperation generates shared norms between the firm and the partner. 
Shared norms “provide a framework of references to guide firms to act in expected 
ways…” (Cao & Lumineau, 2015:17). They operate like mutual heuristic guidelines for 
the firm, specifying the behaviors that are appropriate versus those that are opportunistic 
(Mellewigt et al., 2017; Nelson & Winter, 1982). By establishing consensus regarding 
behavioral expectations and “a commitment to joint action” (Poppo & Zenger, 2002: 710), 
shared norms deter the firm from deviating from joint action to pursue self-interest 
through opportunism.  
Third, repeated cooperation establishes social relations that motivate partners to venture 
beyond reasonable obligations in their cooperation (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 
2005; Heide & John, 1992). Additional obligations constrain opportunism by creating 
informal, nonlegal penalties for the firm if it behaves opportunistically because a partner 
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may also cease its additional obligations (Macauley, 1963). Social relations also facilitate 
problem solving and preserve communication between the firm and the partner, even in 
the face of adversity (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Therefore, social relations increase the 
firms opportunities to focus on joint interests and creates disincentives against 
opportunism (Carson et al., 2006). 
To the extent that both constructs limit opportunism, repeated cooperation is functionally 
equivalent to the effect of low and moderate levels of market commonality. This creates 
redundancy when they are concurrently present: one well-developed mechanism for 
limiting opportunism makes the other unnecessary and may even undermine its 
effectiveness (Gulati, 1995a; Huber et al., 2013; Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 2010). When 
market commonality (repeated cooperation) fulfills a safeguarding role against 
opportunism, repeated cooperation (market commonality) becomes a less important 
safeguard. For example, the same ‘live and let live’ norms of reciprocity available from 
market commonality (Edwards, 1955) are also available through repeated cooperation 
(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In addition, market commonality undermines the strength of the 
deterrent from repeated cooperation and vice versa.  For example, repeated cooperation 
may encourage a partner to be less strict in enforcing the market commonality retaliation 
mechanism to avoid ruining the cooperative base of relational mechanisms (e.g., Wang, 
Yeung, & Zhang, 2011). Therefore, repeated cooperation is expected to weaken the 
negative effect of low and moderate market commonality on opportunism. 
A noteworthy contradictory argument would be that repeated cooperation could 
strengthen the negative effect of market commonality on opportunism; perhaps by 
promoting knowledge transfer or augmenting communication channels (e.g., Zhang & 
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Zhou, 2013). This type of complementary relationship is sometimes observed between 
repeated cooperation and another important safeguard of opportunism, formal contracts 
(Argyres, Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007; Connelly, Miller, & Devers, 2012; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002), but this a rather different context. When repeated cooperation interacts with formal 
contracts, repeated cooperation can instill confidence that enables partners to enter long-
term, more detailed contracts (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ryall & Sampson, 2009). It is 
improbable that a similar effect would be observed between market commonality and 
repeated cooperation because, although firms have discretion regarding their formal 
contract specifications, there is less possibility of adjusting market commonality in this 
fashion. Market commonality is a structural characteristic that takes time to emerge and 
is molded by a much broader suite of strategic decisions (Chen, 1996). Additionally, the 
complementary potential between repeated cooperation and market commonality is less 
evident – both are informal, ambiguous, not enforceable by law, and rely on similar 
sociological norms (e.g., reciprocity). The complementary potential between repeated 
cooperation and formal contracts is much clearer – formal contracts (repeated 
cooperation) are a formal (informal) deterrent against opportunism that is transparent 
(ambiguous), and legally enforceable (not legally enforceable) (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). 
The strength of one is the weakness of the other (Huber et al., 2013), so the potential for 
one mechanism to address the limitations of the other is evident. Although the potential 
for a complementary effect was considered, substitution is a more appropriate prediction. 
Having analyzed the negative effect of low and moderate levels of market commonality, 
I now turn to the influence of repeated cooperation on the positive effect of high market 
commonality on opportunism. Where high market commonality has a positive effect on 
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opportunism, repeated cooperation assumes a compensating role (Cao & Lumineau, 2015) 
that addresses the limitations of market commonality and constrains the positive effect. 
At high levels, market commonality no longer safeguards against opportunism, so 
repeated cooperation has unique advantages for limiting opportunism (e.g., Huber et al., 
2013). Instead of scope for partner retaliation, repeated cooperation safeguards against 
opportunism by generating relational mechanisms which rely on trust, shared norm and 
social relations. Thus, the positive effect of high market commonality is expected to be 
weakened by repeated cooperation. 
4.4.4  Hypothesis 4 
As a result, I anticipate that repeated cooperation negatively moderates the effect of 
market commonality on opportunism:  
Hypothesis 4. In coopetition, the relationship between market 
commonality and opportunism is negatively moderated by repeated 
cooperation. Market commonality has a weaker association with 
opportunism, both positive and negative, when repeated cooperation is 
high. 
4.5  Conceptual model 
The conceptual model is laid out in Figure 4.3. Hypothesis 1 proposes a curvilinear, 
inverted U-shaped relationship between market commonality firm value creation. This 
occurs through a U-shaped effect of market commonality on opportunism (where low and 
moderate levels of market commonality reduce opportunism and high market 
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commonality increases opportunism) (Hypothesis 2a), and a negative hypothesized effect 
of opportunism on value creation (Hypothesis 2b). The effect of market commonality on 
opportunism is predicted to be negatively moderated by market rivalry (Hypothesis 3) and 
repeated cooperation (Hypothesis 4). 
Figure 4.3: Conceptual model 
 
4.6  Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I have addressed the objectives and research questions from Chapter 3 by 
advancing a conceptual model with five hypotheses. Drawing from the logic of 
competitive action and response (Baum & Korn, 1999; Caves, 1984; Chen & MacMillan, 
1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, 1996), I demonstrated how likelihood of response 
reduces the attractiveness of a competitive action. Extending this logic to coopetition, I 
argue that opportunism depends on scope for partner retaliation, which itself depends on 
partner awareness of opportunism, motivation to retaliate and capability to retaliate (Chen, 
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1996; Chen & Miller, 1994). Through its effect on each of these properties, I propose that 
market commonality increases scope for partner retaliation, which reduces opportunism 
in coopetition.  
While this suggests a negative effect, I explained why it is appropriate to specify a 
curvilinear U-shaped relationship because the effect on opportunism turns positive at high 
levels of market commonality. Building on the RBV (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 2006), I 
explained how high market commonality reduces the rarity of jointly developed resources, 
which increases rewards from behaving opportunistically. Consequently, I hypothesized 
that low and moderate levels of market commonality are negatively associated with firm 
opportunism but this reverses at higher levels of market commonality.  
I proceeded to consider the effect on value creation where I hypothesized that opportunism 
has a negative effect on value creation. In combination, the U-shaped effect of market 
commonality on opportunism and the negative hypothesized effect of opportunism on 
value creation led me to propose an inverted U-shaped effect of market commonality on 
value creation. The nuance of the conceptual model is augmented by illuminating two key 
moderators, market rivalry and repeated cooperation.  
In the next chapter I begin the move from theory to data in order to test the conceptual 
model. I first consider research methodology, which constitutes the procedure I will adopt 




Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
5.1  Chapter introduction 
In previous chapters, I have explained how the field of strategic management has evolved 
to the present-day study of coopetition. Two important gaps are identified in the literature: 
(1) the failure of extant research to explain coopetition dynamics and (2) constrained 
theoretical development regarding value creation in coopetition. These gaps have 
informed the objectives for this research which, in turn, map onto two research questions.  
In Chapter 4, to address these research questions, I extended literature on competitive 
dynamics (Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen et al., 1992) and the resource-based view (Barney, 
1991; Lavie, 2006) to advance five hypotheses. Chapters 6 and 7 operationalize and test 
these hypotheses. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research methodology that 
underlies the empirical inquiry. 
Any claim to develop and test theory places a responsibility on the researcher to adopt 
and express their stance in relation to their ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
and their approach to reasoning. The outcome of these methodological decisions 
cumulatively expresses the researcher’s philosophy or worldview. This chapter deals with 
these issues, setting out why I decided to underpin this research with a critical rationalist 
research philosophy, consisting of a realist ontology, falsificationist epistemology, and 
deductive approach to reasoning. 
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This chapter is organized in six sections. I begin by explaining why philosophy is an 
important consideration (Section 5.2). This is followed by a discussion of ontology, which 
outlines the prominent standpoints of objectivism and subjectivism in the literature, before 
explaining the suitability of a cautious realist ontological position for the current research 
(Section 5.3). I proceed to outline of epistemological considerations (Section 5.4), where 
prominent assumptions associated with positivism and interpretivism are discussed, and 
the suitability of a falsificationist position is explained. The final methodological decision 
is the approach to reasoning, where I outline traditional deductive and inductive 
approaches, and explain why deductivism is aligned with my ontological and 
epistemological choices (Section 5.5). A cautious realist ontology, falsificationsist 
epistemology, and a deductive reasoning approach underpin a ‘critical rationalist’ 
worldview, the central assumptions of which are then discussed (Section 5.6). Chapter 5 
concludes by reflecting on the implications of this research methodology for the 
subsequent choice of method (Section 5.7). 
5.2  Research methodology 
Research requires “a procedure, a logic, for generating new knowledge” (Blaikie, 2007: 
8), to which the choice of method is subservient (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 
2012). It is therefore necessary to understand and challenge core assumptions about the 
way the world works and what knowledge is (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009).  
My research is heavily influenced by economic theory, where deep questioning of 
philosophical assumptions is rather uncommon. Instead, a stance of positivism is 
frequently assumed, often implicitly. Nonetheless, it remains important to reflect on 
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methodological choices — both explicit and implicit — and evaluate their suitability 
relative to alternatives (Johnson & Clark, 2006). 
Rather than reflecting personal biases, a methodology is chosen because it is most suitable 
for tackling the current research problem (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). There are 
ontologically different views of knowledge and particular research problems may require 
that certain assumptions are either consolidated or relaxed (Creswell, 1994). There is no 
neutral observation point from which conflicting positions can be evaluated (Kuhn, 1962), 
so the purpose of this chapter is not to accept or reject ontological standpoints, but to 
explain the suitability of the position I have adopted for this particular research. Three 
important philosophical assumptions are now discussed: ontology, epistemology, and 
reasoning. 
5.3  Ontology 
Ontology refers to the nature of reality and existence, or what constitutes social reality 
(Blaikie, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). The ontological extremes of objectivism and 
subjectivism stem from Classical Greek times with Plato and Aristotle (positivists) on one 
side and the Sophists (anti-positivists) on the other. Objectivism, also known as a 
positivist or realist ontology, depicts social entities within an objective and concrete 
reality that is external to researchers (Saunders et al., 2009). “Both natural and social 
phenomena are assumed to have an existence that is independent of the activities of the 
human observer” (Blaikie, 2007: 13). Subjectivism posits that social phenomena exist in 
multiple context-driven realities. A subjectivist view perceives that scientific laws are not 
simply external to the researcher but are created from social actors’ perceptions and 
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actions. The researcher is influenced by the phenomenon, but may also influence the 
phenomenon (Blaikie, 2007). Therefore, “what counts for the truth can vary from place to 
place and from time to time” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012: 20). For instance, an objective 
view of firm culture perceives it as something that the firm controls, but a subjectivist 
view acknowledges that culture may be continually recreated through individual 
interpretations of social and physical factors (Saunders et al., 2009). 
5.3.1  Cautious realism 
This research adopts a type of objectivist ontology that is popularly termed ‘cautious 
realism’ (Blaikie, 2007). An objectivist ontology enables development of knowledge that 
is relevant across a variety of research settings. It assumes that there is a single reality, 
which facilitates emphasis on concrete and external truths. Therefore, knowledge can be 
meaningful beyond the context in which it is derived, which is more conducive to 
generalizable insights. An objectivist ontology is appropriate for the objectives of this 
dissertation because, in order to clarify the nature of opportunism in coopetition and the 
implications for value creation, insights with some generalizability will be most valuable. 
Cautious realism views human perception as flawed, so the discovery of external truths 
remains open to confirmation and disconfirmation. Though cautious realism 
acknowledges that an external, concrete reality does exist (Guba, 1990), it asserts that 
“our ability to know it directly is impeded by the limitations of the human senses and the 
interpretative nature of observation” (Blaikie, 2007: 179). This is an important dimension 
of my ontological choice as it recognizes the difficulties associated with accessing 
complex firm constructs, such as opportunism, where it is often necessary to employ 
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indirect measures (e.g., Park & Russo, 1996; Ryu & Reuer, 2016; Shipilov, 2009). For 
these reasons, a cautious realist ontology, is selected as most appropriate for achieving the 
aims of this research. 
5.4  Epistemology 
Epistemology refers to assumptions about what constitutes acceptable knowledge and 
how one should come to know that knowledge (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997). It is concerned 
with the approach to accessing knowledge and with the degree of engagement between 
the researcher and the phenomenon under observation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
Positivism and interpretivism are prominent epistemological positions that are popularly 
treated as opposing extremes.  
Interpretivism advocates that the researcher is inseparable from the phenomenon and that 
subjective approaches can generate an interpretive understanding (Collis & Hussey, 
2003). Interpretivism is an umbrella term for multiple paradigms, approaches to data, and 
methods of data analysis (Punch, 1998), which are all concerned with understanding the 
subjective nature of the social world (Burrell & Morgan, 1982). Interpretivism facilitates 
the incorporation of multiple data sources but inconsistencies are not easily resolved, 
which inhibits generalizability (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). An interpretivist position 
perceives knowledge as socially constructed and human interaction as fundamental to 
reality creation. Subjective interpretations are required to interpret the context where 
human action occurs, so they become a part of the research (Schwandt, 2001). Thus, the 




In contrast, positivism assumes that knowledge is accessed through sensing regularities 
between observed events from which generalizable predictions can be deduced (Comte, 
1853). Positivist epistemologies are closely aligned with objectivist ontologies and are 
sometimes assumed to be a required pair. Positivism is widely applied in social research 
to generate objective and quantifiable data (Burrell & Morgan, 1982). A pure positivistic 
perspective (e.g., empiricism) assumes that sensual experiences portray the world 
accurately and that any deficit between our perceptions and reality is accounted for by 
incomplete information; perhaps because the necessary technology to eliminate the 
deficiency does not yet exist. Knowledge comes from independent observations of an 
external reality and the researcher seeks to neither influence by nor be influenced by the 
world that they investigate. Valid knowledge is achieved “by generalizing from observed 
regularities between events” and “anything that we know about the world is true only if it 
can be put to the test of experience. Any scientific idea that cannot be confirmed by 
observation is meaningless and has no role in science” (Blaikie, 2007: 20). A purely 
positivistic epistemology perceives social research, where the researcher is not wholly 
external to the research, as “prone to employ warped logic and improper treatment of 
empirical data in order to support views they held prior to the investigation” (Gordon, 
1991: 664). From a positivist perspective, the world is relatively unchanging and different 
levels of analysis can be understood independently (Saunders et al., 2009). 
5.4.1  Falsificationism 
I employ a falsificationist approach for the current research (Popper, 1959:1961), which 
is aligned with positivism, insofar as it shares the view that natural science methods can 
be applied in the social sciences. Similarly, a theory should be considered scientific if, 
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and only if, it is falsifiable (Popper, 1959). Theories that do not lend themselves to 
falsification are excluded as unscientific (Blaikie, 2007). However, despite many similar 
assumptions to positivism, falsificationism asserts that theories are invented to explain 
observations; not derived from them. Asserting that ‘proof’ or ‘truth’ is unachievable, 
falsificationism thus seeks to challenge and falsify hypotheses where possible. The object 
of science from a falsificationist perspective is to arrive at a point where theories are less 
bad (Popper, 1959). 
Falsificationism is appropriate because it enables me to clarify opportunism in coopetition 
and address the current gaps in the literature. Falsificationism asserts that it is never 
possible to establish truth, so the closest one can get to truth is disproving false theories. 
Sensory experience is rejected as a secure basis for science because observations are 
always made within a pre-existing frame of reference. Therefore, I diverge from the 
positivistic assumption of phenomenalism, which asserts that what counts as knowledge 
is only what an observer can perceive by his or her senses (Blaikie, 2007). By 
acknowledging the limitations of human senses for observing opportunism, a 
falsificationist epistemology enables me to challenge bad theory, while at the same time 
accepting that social researchers may be impeded in pursuit of truth and that whole truth 
may be inaccessible (Lakatos, 1970; Popper, 1959). 
Falsificationism also has high utility for resolving conflicting findings in the coopetition 
literature (Salovaara & Merikivi, 2015). By accepting non-disproved truths only 
temporarily, falsificationism accepts that researchers are in some ways active agents 
reaching beyond sensual experiences rather than passive observers. Partially complete 
theories may be temporarily accepted where they represent a better explanation for the 
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phenomenon under scrutiny. As opposed to waiting to observe regularities, a 
falsificationist “must impose regularities on the world” (Blaikie, 2007: 21). Tentative 
theories surviving rigorous tests without being disproved are temporarily accepted as 
knowledge. These tentative theories, once falsified, are replaced with the next best 
explanation. 
A falsificationist epistemology can help to refine fundamental flaws regarding 
opportunism in coopetition before the literature evolves further and they become more 
widely adopted (Salovaara & Merikivi, 2015). With an opportunity to develop better 
explanations at this relatively early stage, it is possible to avoid a fate where “… much of 
the scientific literature, perhaps half may simply be untrue.” (Editor-in-Chief at The 
Lancet; quoted by Horton, 2015). To solidify the foundations of coopetition research and 
enable deeper understanding of value creation in coopetition, falsification enables my 
research to resolve disparities and contradictions at quite an early stage in the literature’s 
development. 
Falsificationism asserts that, although theoretical verification is never possible, a single 
counterexample is logically conclusive because it establishes that a theory is false in 
universal form. Therefore, it is argued that falsificationism can provide definitive support 
for a falsity, but positivism can only offer partial support for a truth via observation. The 
black swan metaphor is popularly employed to distinguish between falsificationism and 
verificationism (i.e., positivism). Verificationism sets out to establish that ‘all swans are 
white’ by making inferences from observational data generated from a sample of swans. 
However, falsificationism argues that this is not aligned with deductive logic and amounts 
to inferring a universal law from a number of individual cases. Falsificationism might 
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accept ‘all swans are white’ as a tentative theory, up until a single non-white swan is 
identified. At this point, deductive logic requires that the theory ‘all swans are white’ is 
false. In its ‘naïve’ form, falsificationism asserts that this single piece of falsifying 
evidence is definitive. 
A popular criticism of falsificationism centers on this ‘naïve application’, where although 
theoretical verification is never possible, conclusive falsity can be established by a single 
counterexample. Falsificationism assumes that “the so-called objectivity of science lies in 
the objectivity of the critical method… that no theory is beyond attack by criticism” 
(Blaikie, 2007: 115). Yet, because all observations require interpretation into theories, 
under falsificationist logic, the critical method itself cannot be objective. The process of 
operationalization is automatically interpretative (Hindess, 1977), making it logically 
impossible to definitively classify a theory as false based on a single piece of evidence. 
Falsifying evidence — as verifying evidence — can also be fallible (Salovaara & 
Merikivi, 2015).  
A resolution to this popular criticism, and a more sophisticated application, is that while 
the logic of falsificationism may be incoherent for individual theories, broader groups of 
theories or ‘research programs’ mature over time (Lakatos, 1970). In the course of their 
development, research programs may incorporate some falsifying evidence. However, 
due to dynamism and interdependencies within these programs, an entire research 
program cannot be falsified by a single piece of evidence. Rather, only an entire program 
can falsify another. For this to occur, “it must explain all the content of its’ rival as well 
as predict novel findings that the rival deems improbable or impossible...” (Salovaara & 
Merikivi, 2015: 3). This resolution departs from an abstract discussion and grounds 
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falsification in historical evidence of scientific progress. It extends the remit of a 
falsificationist approach beyond rigorous efforts to generate negative findings, to the 
enhancement and/or clarification of literature. However, the central tenet of 
falsificationism is preserved — “sooner or later all the falsifying evidence must be 
addressed, and the theory must be made compatible with it” (Salovaara & Merikivi, 2015: 
3). 
5.5  Deductive reasoning 
The two most common approaches to reasoning are deductive and inductive. Deductive 
research — theory testing — is closely aligned with a realist ontology and positivist 
epistemology. It begins with a conceptual structure before moving to empirical 
observations (Saunders et al., 2009). Deductive research employs theory to develop 
testable propositions; before operationalizing the proposition, testing the operationalized 
hypothesis, considering the outcome, and modifying theory if necessary. Inductive 
research — theory building — starts with data and then moves to theory. It is popularly 
conceptualized as a qualitative approach. Emphasis is placed on context and the researcher 
may employ a flexible structure that facilitates changes in direction during the research 
process, but it is more challenging to establish the applicability of findings outside of their 
empirical context (Malhotra & Birks, 2003).  
To improve generalizability and align with my epistemological and ontological 
positioning, a deductive approach is most appropriate for this research. From the 
perspective of falsificationism, pure observations are impossible. While “observations 
may furnish evidence of regularities that need to be explained... the process of explanation 
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must begin with a tentative theory” (Blaikie, 2007: 116). Observations must be explained, 
but observations themselves are preceded by “the adoption of a frame of reference: a 
frame of expectations: a frame of theories” (Popper, 1972: 47). By moving from theory to 
data — or from the general to the particular (Hussey & Hussey, 1997) — my research will 
test explanations derived from existing theories rather than construct new ones (Bryman 
& Bell, 2007). 
5.6  Critical rationalism 
In combination, a cautious realist ontology, falsificationist epistemology and deductive 
reasoning approach are known as a ‘critical rationalist’ worldview (Blaikie, 2007). Where 
relevant insights are available from well-established literatures, such as competitive 
dynamics and the resource-based view, the assumptions of critical rationalism (Table 5.1) 
facilitate clarity regarding contradictory evidence and can help to address failure of extant 




Table 5.1: Assumptions of a critical rationalist worldview 
Naturalism: the logics of enquiry of the natural sciences can and should be applied in 
the social sciences. 
Observation: the primary role of observation is theory testing – not theory 
development. 
Independence: the researcher is independent from the researched. 
Value freedom: the choice of what and how to study is determined by objective 
criteria as opposed to the interests of the researcher.  
Hypothesis and deduction: science proceeds through a process of hypothesizing 
fundamental laws and then deducing what kinds of observations can best demonstrate 
the falsity of these hypotheses. 
Causality: the ultimate aim is to derive better causal explanations and fundamental 
laws that explain regularities in firm behavior. 
Generalization: to move from the specific to the general, it is necessary to select 
random samples of sufficient size to justify a modification of existing theory based on 
the outcome of the research. 
Inaccessibility of truth: it is never possible to establish whether scientific theories are 
true. All that we can do is to eliminate false theories through conjecture and refutation. 
Interpretation: observation requires interpretation; “we cannot see and observe our 
objects before we have thought about them” (Popper, 1961: 135). 
Operationalization: concepts need to be defined in ways that enable facts to be 
measured quantitatively. 
Reductionism: problems are better understood as a whole if they are reduced into the 
simplest possible elements.  




5.7  Implications for research method 
The assumptions outlined in Table 5.1 are the basis for subsequent consideration of a 
suitable method. The ideal method for these assumptions is a tightly controlled 
experiment, where all elements of treatment and control groups are identical except for 
the focal variables. Experiments are characterized by their high levels of prescription and 
extensive controls that eliminate as many alternative explanations as possible. In social 
science, true experiments have practical and ethical drawbacks (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012) and, for this research, it was challenging to find firms willing to be experimented 
upon. It is also difficult to establish sufficiently controlled environments so that 
replication is viable. Consequently, quasi-experiments, whereby firms are allocated to 
notional experimental or control groups, usually on the basis of pre-existing groupings, 
are more popular. Quasi-experiments offer similar benefits, including clarity, 
transparency, and repeatability, and facilitate relatively strong inferences where true 
experiments are unavailable (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  
Under quasi-experimental conditions, stringent ontological assumptions regarding what 
constitutes objective data must be relaxed. In the absence of experimental data, I rely 
mainly on third-party archival data. Archival data is widely recognized as the most 
objective alternative for observing firm behavior when experiments are unavailable. By 
using data from multiple archival sources, I can measure a greater number of variables 
over a longer time period than might otherwise be practical, while remaining independent 
from the research setting. This enables me to collect comprehensive data on a large 
number of firms (relatively) quickly, which enhances the generalizability of my results 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Archival databases are “a valuable and generally reliable 
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(if not exhaustive) resource for the study of interorganizational relationships” (Schilling, 
2009: 259). Archival data also limits risks of common methods bias, where observed 
‘effects’ may be driven by the data collection process itself.  
5.8  Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined the critical rationalist worldview and the key assumptions 
underpinning this inquiry. I explained the need to consider research philosophy, before 
outlining the opposing ontological positions of objectivism and subjectivism. I then 
explained why a cautious realist ontology is appropriate for establishing generalizable 
knowledge and addressing the challenges faced by the current literature. I discussed 
epistemology and outlined the prominent assumptions of positivism and interpretivism. I 
then explained why a falsificationist position is chosen to balance the limitations of human 
senses against the existence of an objective reality. I proceeded to discuss why cautious 
realism and falsificationism are aligned with deductive reasoning. In combination, these 
choices underpin a philosophy known as ‘critical rationalism’ and I laid out the central 
assumptions of this perspective. Lastly, I explained that, although experimental data is 
most appropriate for this type of positivistic worldview, practical and ethical conditions 
lead me to rely on a quasi-experimental design employing third-party archival data. In the 




Chapter 6: Research Method 
 
6.1  Chapter introduction 
This chapter continues the process of moving from theory to data. In Chapter 4, I advanced 
five hypotheses to address the research questions arising from a critical review of the 
literature. In light of the ontological and epistemological decisions discussed in Chapter 
5, a quasi-experimental research design employing third-party archival data was deemed 
an appropriate method. Chapter 6 sets out the nuances of this approach including empirical 
context, data sources, and empirical measures. 
The chapter begins with justification of why the global semiconductor industry, 
characterized by dynamic inter-firm competition and cooperation, is a suitable setting 
(Section 6.2). I then outline the data sources and decisions made during the collection 
process (Section 6.3), which generated a final sample of 464 firm observations. I proceed 
to explain the empirical measures that are derived to measure the core constructs: Value 
Creation, Market Commonality, Opportunism, Market Rivalry, and Repeated 
Cooperation (Section 6.4). I then highlight the importance of control variables and discuss 
those relevant for opportunism and value creation (Section 6.5). The chapter concludes 
with reflection on the improvements arising from the pilot study (Section 6.6). 
6.2  Empirical background 
The empirical setting for this study was the global semiconductor industry (SIC 3674). 
Semiconductor devices, ‘semiconductors’, or ‘semiconductor chips’, or are a set of 
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electronic circuits on a chip of semiconductor material, normally silicon. Anything that is 
computerized or uses radio waves relies on semiconductors, which makes them 
fundamental to almost all modern technologies. Acceleration in the pace of technological 
development means that demand for semiconductors has exploded in recent decades, with 
global sales growing from $26 billion in 1987 to $409 billion in 2017 (Statista, 2018). Six 
product segments can be identified in the semiconductor industry: discrete devices, analog 
integrated circuits, memory chips, microprocessors, microcontrollers, and application 
specific integrated circuits. An outline of each segment is provided in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: Semiconductor product segments 
Segment Description Important 
segment 
participants 
Discrete devices Semiconductors that can perform a basic 
function but cannot be divided into separate 
functional components. Individual 
components connected on a circuit board 







Less dense in circuitry than digital integrated 
circuits. Used in the design of linear 




Memory chips Electronic data storage devices implemented 
on a semiconductor-based integrated circuit. 
DRAMs, SRAMs, Flash Memory and 




Microprocessors A minicomputer on a chip. Contains all 






Microcontrollers Commodity integrated circuits – a small 
computer on a single integrated circuit. 
Designed for embedded applications (in 
contrast to microprocessors used in PCs). 









Complex ‘System on a Chip’ (SoC). SoC 
integrates microcontrollers (or 
microprocessors) with advanced peripherals 
such as graphics or WiFi for a particular use. 
Can include entire microprocessors, memory 





Three reasons were central to my decision to choose the global semiconductor industry as 
a suitable empirical context. One was that the semiconductor industry is a highly 
innovative setting with a relentless pressure for smaller, faster, and cheaper devices. This 
generates extensive and dynamic cooperative activity (Oxley, Sampson, & Silverman, 
2009; Stuart, 2000), especially for R&D, as firms must work together to meet objectives 
that they cannot achieve alone. Such agreements frequently cross-border or global in 
nature. For example, Sun Microsystems Inc. and Fujitsu Ltd. worked together closely 
across more than two decades to advance chips for network workstations (e.g., Scalable 
Processor ARChitecture; SPARC).  
A second reason for my choice was that the industry’s idiosyncrasies creates a context 
where opportunism is a pressing concern. The global semiconductor industry is highly 
dynamic and competitive (Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011), which increases both aspects of 
uncertainty: volatility and ambiguity. In addition, firms frequently rely on tacit knowledge 
to generate new value. Tacit knowledge is difficult to define, which renders formal 
safeguards less effective, while competitors with overlapping knowledge bases are 
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disproportionately well-equipped to identify, assimilate, and apply tacit knowledge (e.g., 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), more so than other resources. 
Consequently, formal protections against opportunism may be less effective, while capability 
to behave opportunistically may be greater in the semiconductor industry. 
A third reason for choosing the global semiconductor industry was that the underlying 
capabilities of semiconductor firms facilitate their participation in many other markets 
(e.g., electronics components, display, communications hardware etc.).This offers the 
opportunity to observe how opportunism is affected at a variety of levels of market 
commonality, ranging from extremely high (where a firm shares almost all its markets 
with the partner) to really low (where a firm shares very few of its markets with the 
partner). Technological giants active in the semiconductor industry (e.g., Toshiba) 
participate in an extensive variety of markets, including household audio and video 
equipment (SIC 3651), photographic equipment and supplies (SIC 3861), and electrical 
industrial apparatus (SIC 3629). In contrast, other firms concentrate exclusively on the 
semiconductor industry, such as Advanced Micro Devices or Advanced Risc Machines. 
6.3  Sample and data 
Data was collected from firms involved in dyadic cooperative R&D agreements from 
1995-2010 where there was market commonality between partners and at least one partner 
was active in the global semiconductor industry. Preliminary alliance data was collected 
from SDC Platinum. In all cases, cooperative agreements (also referred to as alliances) 
were verified by multiple sources (e.g., Lavie, 2007) to confirm that those reported were 
actually formed (Phelps, 2003; Rahman & Korn, 2014). Market data was extracted from 
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the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database while financial indicators for 
all firms and global stock data was culled from Compustat. Verification of SDC data (e.g., 
alliance announcements), as well as data concerning future cooperation between partners 
and firm types was achieved through extensive search and analysis of SEC filings, as well 
as publications from the Factiva and Lexis Nexis databases, and direct contact with 
company contacts listed on alliance press releases.  
The sample and time period were chosen because they increase the likelihood of electronic 
reporting of records and facilitate tracking of market performance for a global sample. 
SDC Platinum records alliance-level data and an initial search revealed 556 dyadic R&D 
agreements among public firms from 1995-2010, where at least one side of the dyad was 
active in SIC 3674. Alliances with pre-defined end points may produce abnormal behavior 
and unique contractual arrangements (Rahman & Korn, 2014; Reuer & Ariño, 2007) and 
therefore, along with duplicates in the SDC database, these were initially excluded; 
leaving 533 alliances. Dyads involving partners who filed for bankruptcy, merged with 
another firm, or were acquired during the period of interest were then excluded. In 
addition, alliances involving cross-ownership at any point during the research period (e.g., 
Intel and Micron Technology) were excluded. Firms reporting a name change but 
remaining otherwise the same during the research period were maintained (e.g., 
Matsushita became Panasonic and SGS-Thomson became STMicroelectronics). In some 
databases, it was necessary to manually correct the search procedure but, in others (e.g., 
LexisNexis), company search tools automatically accounted for name changes.   
There was substantial sample attrition in the process of verifying firm information 
provided by SDC. The main issues occurred where (1) SDC had mistakenly labelled the 
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firm as publicly traded when they were not (e.g., Digital Projection Ltd, Head Invest Oy, 
MOSAID Technologies), (2) where the firm was not publicly traded on major exchanges 
(e.g., NASDAQ) but rather via over-the-counter stocks (pink sheets) and the requisite data 
was not accessible (e.g., Flexpoint Sensor Systems Inc., Triant Holdings Inc), (3) where 
additional searches revealed that the ‘firm’ was a joint venture rather than a sole entity, or 
(4) where new agreements reported by SDC were actually continuations of existing 
alliances. After excluding firms based on one or more of these issues and omitting 
observations without any market commonality between partners (markets are defined at 
the 4-digit SIC code level), 464 firm-level observations were captured in the final sample.  
6.4  Measures 
I now describe the measures developed for the five central constructs from the conceptual 
model: value creation, market commonality, opportunism, market rivalry, and repeated 
cooperation.  
6.4.1  Value creation 
An event study method (Fama, 1970; Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969) was employed 
to measure value creation, which refers to the generation of additional benefits for the 
firm (Lavie, 2006; Rai, 2016; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukanen, 2009). This approach was 
chosen because it enabled me to pinpoint value creation that is attributable to a particular 
alliance. Broad performance measures (e.g., ROA) are frequently used to measure value 
creation in strategic alliances (Ariño, 2003) but they ultimately measure value creation 
across all of a firm’s alliances, as well as other activities, and therefore exhibit significant 
validity concerns (Rai, 2016). An event study analysis isolates the stock price bump 
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associated with a specific alliance announcement. This stock price bump is interpreted as 
a reflection of the additional value that the market anticipates the firm will generate 
through the alliance. This effectiveness in measuring value creation that may be directly 
attributed to the alliance is an important advantage of the event study method (Amicia, 
Fiordelisib, Masalaa & Riccip, 2013; Anand & Khanna, 2000; Corrado, 2011; Kale, Dyer 
& Singh, 2002; Lavie, 2007; Oxley et al, 2009) and was a key determinant of my decision. 
Prior to drawing inferences about value creation from an event study, it is worth noting 
two important points. Although risks of contamination from unrelated events are less than 
those of accounting measures, confounding threats cannot be entirely eliminated 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; Oxley et al., 2009). In addition, an event study reports 
expected value creation rather than actual value creation (Lane & Jacobsen, 1995; Rai, 
2016). Therefore, it assumes that the market has sufficient information to accurately assess 
the impact of an alliance (Kale et al., 2002). Specifically: 
 “… since accurate data on value created in JVs are onerous if not impossible to collect, 
scholars have looked at investors’ expectation of whether and how much the new JV will 
create value for the parent firms. Investors are a distinctive group of people who hold rich 
information about firms. Their judgement on whether a JV is expected to create value for 
parent firms and how the created value will be divided between partners is considered to 
have incorporated all available information.”       
 – (Gulati and Wang, 2003: 210) 
The event study method enables me to isolate a fine-grained measure of alliance-specific 
value creation. Another important advantage is that this approach allows me to hold 
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constant many firm-specific characteristics (e.g., behavioral repertoires, internal 
capabilities), which are already incorporated in the firm’s stock price. In addition, stock 
price measures are correlated with managerial assessments of alliance success, leading 
scholars to argue that the market does a good job of predicting value creation in 
cooperative agreements (Kale et al., 2002).  
Of critical importance to a valid event study is determining the date when the alliance was 
announced. Anand & Khanna (2000) find that alliance announcement dates provided by 
SDC are often inaccurate. This was confirmed by my pilot analysis and a protocol was 
subsequently developed for identifying accurate announcement dates. The term ‘alliance 
announcement date’ refers to the date upon which an agreement to do a specified task was 
first communicated publicly to shareholders. Having identified alliance announcement 
reports from SEC filings (8-Ks, 10-Ks and 20-Fs), Lexis Nexis, and Factiva, I analyzed 
these reports to identify a validated announcement date. Where an alliance was announced 
after the day’s trading had ceased, the next trading day was designated as the 
announcement day. In order of accuracy, I found that alliance announcement dates were 
effectively identified by news and wire reports, SEC filings, newspapers, trade magazines, 
and other publications (similar outcomes are reported by Anand & Khanna; 2000). In all 
cases, alliance announcement dates were cross-validated by at least two independent 
sources (e.g., Anand & Khanna, 2000; Lavie, 2007). 
To estimate the abnormal stock price returns arising from the alliance, I modelled the 
‘normal’ returns across an estimation period of 150 days (t-170 to t-21) (Oxley et al., 
2009) and extracted the residuals when these estimates were applied during the test period. 
The test period is ultimately the period of interest: the timeframe where the abnormal 
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returns arising from the alliance can be observed. I measured two-day (t-1 to t), three-day 
(t-1 to t+1), and seven-day (t-3 to t+3) test periods (e.g., Amicia et al., 2013; Oxley et al., 
2009). Capturing stock returns in the day(s) before the alliance announcement accounts 
for pre-announcement leakage of information (Anand & Khanna, 2000). I chose not to 
consider any test period greater than seven days (c.f., Anand & Khanna, 2000) because I 
could not identify any theoretical or methodological justification for doing so and it would 
increase the likelihood of confounding effects (Han, Oh, Im, Oh, Pinsonneault, & Chang, 
2012; Oxley et al., 2009; Yang, Zheng, & Zaheer, 2015). To further limit potential 
confounding influences, I dropped observations where two alliance announcements for 
the same firm had overlapping test periods, where the firm reported earnings during the 
test period, or where significant exogenous market shocks occurred during the test period. 
Two significant exogenous shocks were identified: the 2001 dotcom crash (17th Sept 
2001), and the 2008 subprime crash (29th Sept 2008).  
The normal returns were estimated using a market model (Fama, 1976). A market model 
is preferable because, in contrast to a market-adjusted return or a mean-adjusted return, it 
accounts for both risk and market movement. The market model is derived from a simple 
linear regression for the estimation period where R1 (return for firm 1 on a given day) is 
the dependent variable and RM (return for the market on a given day) is the independent 
variable. For a global sample, the most suitable market returns are daily returns from the 
value-weighted S&P 1200 Global. (From 1995-2010, I found a correlation of 0.81 
between the S&P Global 1200 and the S&P 500.) 
To calculate the abnormal return for each t in the test period where R1t denotes the return 
for firm 1 on day t and RMt denotes the return for the market on day t: 
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Equation 6.1:  Event study abnormal return = R1t – (𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ RMt) 
6.4.2  Market commonality 
Market commonality is a firm level-measure that considers the proportion of the firm’s 
markets in which it encounters a given competitor (e.g., Baum & Korn, 1999; Chen, 
1996). To maximize the objectivity of the measure and afford similar emphasis to 
equivalent business overlaps, markets were defined at the 4-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code level. Each additional SIC digit offers additional insight 
regarding a business area where a firm is active. For instance, SIC code ‘3’ refers to 
manufacturing, ‘36’ to electronics, ‘367’ to computers, and ‘3674’ to semiconductors. 
Self-reported 4-digit SIC codes, available through Compustat, are a widely utilized tool 
for setting market boundaries (e.g., Oxley et al., 2009; Wang & Zajac, 2007; Young et al., 
2000).  
Where 𝑰𝒋 is an indicator variable that takes a value of ‘1’ if partner j is active in the firm’s 
market m and ‘0’ otherwise; 




6.4.3  Opportunism 
Firm opportunism is measured as the inverse of future cooperation between the firm and 
the partner. Future cooperation reflects the partner’s willingness to work with the firm 
again, where the partner must allow its fate to again be determined by the firm’s behavior 
(Gulati, 1995b; Zaheer & Harris, 2006).  A partner will not allow its fate to be determined 
by a firm it knows to be opportunistic (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). The partner’s decisions 
125 
 
to cooperate with the firm again in the future are driven their experience in the focal 
alliance because the firm’s current behavior represents the best information that the 
partner has regarding the firm’s future opportunistic tendencies (Gulati, 1995a). 
Therefore, where a partner has experienced opportunism in the focal alliance, future 
cooperation will be less (Hill, 1990). Firm opportunism reduces future cooperative 
opportunities with a partner “by either eliciting a response in kind or by necessitating that 
actors bear monitoring and bonding costs during future exchanges” (Hill, 1990: 507). 
Opportunism fuels a “lack of trust and hostility” towards the firm that manifests in reduced 
future cooperation between the firm and the partner (Hill, 1990: 508-510).  
Future cooperation was measured by the cumulative duration of all alliances, in completed 
months, between the firm and its partner during the four years after the alliance 
announcement date (Pangarkar, 2003; Rahman & Korn, 2014). This is a more fine-grained 
measurement approach than a count-based approach to the number of alliances 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), which required extensive search and analysis. First, to 
identify all other alliances between the firm and its partner in the period of interest, I 
searched SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and SEC filings. Second, I searched for 
termination/dissolution dates for all these alliances, including the focal alliance. This 
information is rarely provided by SDC, so extensive searching of SEC filings, LexisNexis, 
and Factiva were necessary. To supplement or confirm this data where possible, I made 
direct contact with the firm officer listed on the original alliance announcement.  
For most alliances, termination/dissolution could not be satisfactorily determined. 
Therefore, I sought evidence that alliances were still operational more than four years 
following the announcement of the focal alliance (i.e., at some point beyond the window 
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of interest). This approach was far more effective and there were several cases where an 
alliance would re-appear in a firm’s 10-K report after not being mentioned for several 
years. In those cases where it was not possible to identify either (1) the 
termination/dissolution of the alliance or (2) it’s survival for more than four years after 
the announcement date of the focal alliance, I followed Ahuja’s (2000) assumption that 
alliances were operational for six months after alliance activity was last documented, or 
eighteen months after alliance announcement – whichever was later: “The assumption of 
a short life cycle for such agreements… is consistent with the very specific and short term 
nature of their objectives in most cases” (Ahuja, 2000: 326). The measure for opportunism 
was derived as the inverse of the score for future cooperation between the firm and its 
partner. 
6.4.4  Market rivalry 
The first moderating variable, market rivalry, refers to the frequency and aggression of 
rivalrous actions and reactions between firms in common markets in a market (Baum & 
Korn, 1999; Jayachandran et al., 1999; Prince & Simon, 2009). It is measured by the level 
of firm turnover in common markets (Barnett, 1993; Boeker et al., 1997; Haveman & 
Nonnemaker, 2000). Market rivalry is popularly operationalized by price and 
performance measures (Gimeno & Woo, 1996a:1999; Jans & Rosenbaum, 1997; Parker 
& Röller, 1997), but these are outcomes of rivalry. Firm turnover chosen because it 
represents a more direct measure of the rivalry process (Baum & Korn, 1999). 
Turnover is established through a count of entries and exits by U.S. public firms in the 4-
digit SIC codes that the firm shares with its partner. An entry (exit) was defined to occur 
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in the first year that the firm (no longer) reports a presence in that product area (Baum & 
Korn, 1999). This ‘churn’ of firms in a market will be high where market rivalry is high 
and low when it is low (Barnett, 1993; Boeker et al., 1997; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 
2000). The total number of entries and exits in common markets was divided by the 
number of common markets, (e.g., Baum & Korn, 1996:1999), thereby offering an 
average level of market rivalry across all the markets that were common between the firm 
and the partner. 
6.4.5  Repeated cooperation 
The second moderator, repeated cooperation, refers to the firm’s history of past 
cooperative agreements with the partner (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Wang & Zajac, 
2007; Zollo et al., 2002). It is measured by a count of the number of agreements that the 
firm entered with the partner in the four years preceding announcement of the focal 
agreement (Argyres et al., 2007; Carson et al., 2006; Lumineau & Quélin, 2012; 
Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Wang & Zajac, 2007; Zollo et al., 2002).  
6.5 Controls 
Acknowledging idiosyncrasies that may influence opportunism or value creation across 
multiple levels, I attempted to monitor their effect on the focal relationships by employing 
control variables (Whetten, 2009). Control variables refer to other recognized predictors 
of opportunism and value creation that are not part of the conceptual model. 
I controlled for firm size (ln(total assets)) and age (ln(age)) because firms with smaller 
resource sets (Young et al., 2000) or mature firms (Yu & Cannella, 2013) may be less 
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inclined toward aggression. To measure total assets, financial data for all non-U.S. firms 
was converted to constant U.S. dollars at 1995 rates (January 1st; Ahuja, 2000). I also 
included total alliances over the preceding four years for both the firm and the partner 
(Gnyawali et al., 2006) as well as the presence of equity governance (Ryu & Reuer, 2016). 
I controlled for three types of competitive similarity – size similarity, age similarity, and 
strategic similarity (Gimeno & Woo, 1996a). Where i and j are partners in the focal 
alliance and k and l are the two firms with the maximum size difference in my sample: 






Where i and j are partners in the focal alliance and k and l are the two firms with the 
maximum age difference in my sample: 






Strategic similarity was measured as a binary variable that assumes a value of “1” if two 
firms were the same type of semiconductor firm and “0” otherwise. There were six types 
of firms in my sample (1) integrated device manufacturers – firms that design, develop, 
and manufacture chips; (2) fabless firms – firms that design chips but do not manufacture; 
(3) foundries – firms that manufacture chips designed by other firms; (4) packaging and 
testing providers; (5) equipment providers, and (6) firms not active in the semiconductor 
industry (Park et al., 2014b). According to a pre-specified protocol of firm type 
definitions, I analyzed data from SEC filings, Lexis Nexis, and Factiva to identify firm 
types for all observations. Prior to analysis of the full sample, a subsample of 30 firm 
types were independently classified by both myself and a second coder with 10+ years’ 
129 
 
experience in electronics. The initial correlation between our classifications was 0.93 with 
consensus achieved on the remaining observations following discussion. The protocol was 
then updated accordingly. I also included measures for the partner’s market commonality, 
partner’s size (ln(total assets)), and the level of similarity between the firm and the 
partner’s market commonality. Lastly, market importance was a binary measure of 
whether the firm met the partner in its most important market (i.e., primary 4-digit SIC 
code) (e.g., Gimeno, 1999). This was subsequently employed as an instrument to test for 
endogenous bias. All variables, including controls, are summarized in Table 6.2. 







The residuals from a market model estimate of each firm’s stock 
prices for a two-day test period (t-1 to t) surrounding the alliance 
announcement. Data on three-day (t-1 to t+1), and seven-day (t-3 





The proportion of the firm’s markets in which it encounters a given 
competitor. 𝑰𝒋 is an indicator variable that takes a value of ‘1’ if 
partner j is active in the firm’s market m and ‘0’ otherwise: 








The inverse of future cooperation. Future cooperation is the 
cumulative duration, in completed months, of all agreements 
between the firm and its partner in the four years following the date 
of the focal alliance announcement. 
Market Rivalry 
(Moderator) 
The mean number of entries and exits in common 4-digit SIC 






A count-based measure of the number of past cooperative 
agreements between the firm and the partner in the four years 




Natural log of total assets in USD (converted at 1/1/1995 rates as 
necessary). 
Firm Age Logged value of the completed years between when each firm was 
first incorporated and the beginning of the observation year. 
Firm Total 
Alliances 
Total number of dyadic alliances for each firm in the four years 
preceding the announcement of the focal alliance. 
Equity 
Governance 
A categorical measure of the alliance governance structure (‘0’ = 
non-equity; ‘1’ = equity). 
Strategic 
Similarity 
Binary variable that assumes a value of “1” if the firm and its 
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where i and j are partners in the focal alliance and k and l are the 
two firms with the maximum size difference in the sample. 
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where i and j are partners in the focal alliance and k and l are the 





Binary variable that assumes a value of “1” if the firm overlaps 
with the partner in its primary 4-digit SIC code and “0” otherwise. 
 
6.6  Pilot study 
Before undertaking full-study data collection and analysis, a pilot study was carried out 
with a sample of 30 dyadic R&D agreements from 1995. This helped me to isolate any 
procedural issues with the research design, identify any issues in the data collection and 
capture process, and test the analysis process (Saunders et al., 2009). The pilot study led 
to several improvements in my research design: 
− It rapidly became apparent during the pilot study that the alliance 
announcement dates provided by SDC were often inaccurate. Therefore, a 
protocol was developed for identifying accurate alliance announcement dates. I 
ensured that all dates were cross-validated by at least two independent sources 
(e.g., Anand & Khanna, 2000; Lavie, 2007). (The steps I took to verify the 
alliance announcement dates are laid out in Section 6.3.)  
− This phase motivated me to shorten the test period for the event study. For 
the pilot study, I employed a longer test period (Anand & Khanna, 2000) but the 
results suggested that abnormal returns could be observed within a much narrower 
time window (Amicia et al., 2013; Oxley et al, 2009). 
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− While the sample was too small to provide meaningful results, it allowed 
me to evaluate issues with the data analysis process. Specifically, the pilot study 
helped me to refine an Excel workbook capable of generating the firm-level event 
study estimates and deriving the cross-sectional outputs. This approach was quite 
onerous, but it allowed me to monitor the estimation procedure more closely and 
customize certain aspects to suit specific needs of this research. 
−  It also led me to amend the measure and definitions associated with market 
commonality. For the pilot study, I attempted a far more fine-grained measure for 
market commonality, incorporating both SIC codes and product segment 
overlaps. However, it became clear that it was highly impractical to segment all 
the markets in which overlaps occurred and not doing so would bias the measure, 
so I moved to the more balanced approach of defining markets at the four-digit 
SIC code level (e.g., Oxley et al., 2009; Wang & Zajac, 2007; Young et al., 2000). 
6.7  Chapter summary 
In this chapter I have outlined the research method. I began by explaining how the 
dynamic and innovative nature of the global semiconductor industry leads to intensive 
inter-firm competition and cooperation, which makes it a highly suitable empirical 
context. I next outlined the data sources and explained the decisions made during the data 
collection process, which led to a final sample of 464 firm-level observations. I proceeded 
to explain how the core constructs are measured: Value Creation, Market Commonality, 
Opportunism, Market Rivalry, and Repeated Cooperation. The chapter concluded by 
outlining relevant control variables, explaining why they are necessary to account for 
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idiosyncratic influences on opportunism and value creation, and discussing improvements 




Chapter 7: Results 
 
7.1  Chapter introduction 
In previous chapters, the conceptual model for my research has been developed and the 
decisions behind my research methodology and method have been explained. These have 
generated two empirical models, a Value Creation model and an Opportunism model. 
This chapter sets out the process of testing these models. 
I begin by reporting descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (Section 7.2), before 
discussing the results of the event study method to measure value creation (Section 7.3). 
I proceed to evaluate the five hypotheses proposed. Beginning with the Value Creation 
model, I find insufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2b (Section 
7.4). Moving to the Opportunism model, I find evidence to support Hypothesis 2a, 
Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 4 (Section 7.5). This upholds that market commonality is 
related in a curvilinear U-shape to opportunism, but the association is made weaker by 
market rivalry and repeated cooperation. Through a variety of postestimation procedures, 
I find that these results are resistant to endogenous and exogenous biases (Section 7.6).  
7.2  Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
Table 7.1 reports mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values for all 
variables in the analysis. Pairwise correlations are also reported. The independent 
variable, market commonality, was mean centered at zero to (somewhat) reduce 
collinearity with its quadratic term (Dawson, 2014).  
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
  Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) Market 
Commonality 
-0.0052 0.2463 -0.3186 0.6528 1                    
(2) Opportunism 
 
0.3831 0.2243 0.0840 2.5000 -.01 1                   
(3) Value Creation (2-
Day CAR) 
0.0088 0.0955 -0.1408 1.7335 .07 .03 1                  
(4) Market Rivalry 
 
1.4059 1.3496 0 6.0000 .04 -.08 -.01 1                 
(5) Repeated 
Cooperation 
0.3254 0.9815 0 6.0000 .05 -.17 -.05 .03 1                
(6) Market Importance 
 
0.4761 0.5000 0 1 .47 .02 -.01 -.03 -.00 1               
(7) Firm Sizeα 
 
1.1043 0.6657 0.0023 2.1783 -.48 -.20 -.14 -.04 .17 -.28 1              
(8) Firm Ageα 
 
1.6344 0.4092 0 2.3201 -.42 -.04 -.12 -.10 .04 -.19 .57 1             
(9) Firm Total Alliances 41.2967 51.8066 0 291 -.25 -.25 -.07 .09 .38 -.23 .53 .29 1            
(10) Equity Governance 0.1507 0.3582 0 1 -.05 -.01 -.03 -.00 -.09 -.04 .06 .12 -.08 1           
(11) Strategic Similarity 0.4115 0.4927 0 1 .06 -.09 -.04 .02 .08 .03 .23 .11 .07 .00 1          
(12) Size Similarity 
 
0.9650 0.0370 0.8292 1 -.11 .21 .01 .05 -.13 -.06 -.15 -.02 -.11 .01 -.26 1         
(13) Age Similarity 
 
0.7742 0.1793 0 1 .09 .08 -.02 -.06 .03 .15 -.02 .16 -.03 -.08 .18 -.07 1        
(14) Partner’s Market 
Commonality 
0.3522 0.2512 0.0286 1 -.02 -.03 -.03 .02 .03 .02 .08 .12 .08 -.04 .06 .41 .00 1       
(15) Similarity of Market 
Commonality 
0.7367 0.2580 0 1 -.35 .06 -.01 -.03 .10 -.17 .13 .07 .08 -.01 .04 -.12 .19 -.43 1      
(16) Partner’s Total 
Alliances 
42.6220 53.6109 0 291 .08 -.23 -.01 .13 .37 -.06 .08 -.06 .19 -.10 .04 -.46 .03 -.27 .11 1     
(17) Opportunism (3-
Year Window) 
0.4123 0.2108 0.1099 2.5 -.02 .98 .02 -.08 -.17 .02 -.18 -.03 -.25 .01 -.10 .19 .10 -.05 .07 -.21 1    
(18) Opportunism (5-
Year Window) 
0.3652 0.2333 0.0699 2.5 -.00 .99 .03 -.07 -.18 .02 -.22 -.05 -.26 -.02 -.10 .22 .06 -.02 .05 -.24 .95 1   
(19) Value Creation (3-
Day CAR) 
0.0130 0.1410 -0.2150 2.6416 .04 .04 .97 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.14 -.10 -.07 -.05 -.05 .02 -.01 -.04 .01 -.02 .03 .04 1  
(20) Value Creation (7-
Day CAR) 
0.0102 0.1379 -0.3257 2.0672 .04 .04 .81 .01 -.05 -.07 -.15 -.10 -.06 -.05 -.06 .04 -.02 -.05 .01 -.01 .04 .04 .87 1 
n=427 (casewise deletion) 
Coefficients greater than .098 are significant at p<0.05. 




Some of the variables are purely of statistical relevance (i.e., they do not relate to any 
meaningful value) but others are worth noting. Two-day abnormal stock returns arising 
from the announcement of coopetition agreements range from negative returns of -14.1% 
to positive returns of 173%. The mean level of entries and exits in common markets per 
calendar year is 1.41. The mean number of historic cooperative agreements between the 
firm and the partner in the four years preceding the focal agreement was 0.33 with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 6. On average, firms had a total of 41.3 cooperative 
agreements over the same period with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 291. 47.6% 
of firms overlapped with the partner in their primary 4-digit SIC code and 41% of firms 
were the same firm type as the partner. 
7.3  Event study results 
To establish an initial value creation effect for sampled alliances and compare it to value 
creation reported in other samples, cross-sectional abnormal returns for each test day were 
calculated.  Where 𝜀̂𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return for a given event on event day t, Equation 
7.1 specifies daily abnormal returns (𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ) for z events. 










Table 7.2: Cross-sectional abnormal returns 








As outlined in Chapter 6, I examined abnormal returns across two-day (t-1 to t), three-day 
(t-1 to t+1), and seven-day (t-3 to t+3) test periods. Referred to as cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs), these are calculated by aggregating the abnormal returns for each day in 
the relevant test period (Equation 7.2-7.4). 
Equation 7.2:  Value Creation (2-Day CAR) = 𝜀̂𝑖𝑡−1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡 
Equation 7.3:  Value Creation (3-Day CAR) = 𝜀̂𝑖𝑡−1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡+1 
Equation 7.4:  Value Creation (7-Day CAR) = 𝜀̂𝑖𝑡−3 𝑡𝑜 𝑡+3 
The initial value creation effect and the basis for comparison with other research are made 
possible through cross sectional cumulative abnormal returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). Cross-sectional 
CARs represent the average CAR in the sample, which is equivalent to aggregating the 
relevant daily cross-sectional abnormal returns (𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ) in Table 7.2. 
Equation 7.5:  Cross-sectional abnormal returns: 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅  for each day in 
the relevant test period. 
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Cross sectional cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are outlined in Table 7.3. As the 
variance of the test period is subject to additional volatility induced by the alliance 
announcement (Brown & Warner, 1985), time series standard errors are derived from the 
estimation period (Campbell, Lo, & McInlay, 1997). This process is explained in 
Appendix II.  
Table 7.3: Cross-sectional cumulative abnormal returns 
 
I find that firms in the sample experience positive and significant value creation across 
the three test periods estimated (p<0.001). Previous research has reported abnormal 
returns ranging from 0.01% (Das & Sengupta, 1998) to 1.78% (Anand & Khanna, 2000). 
Value creation in my sample is between these extremes. Cross sectional CARs were 0.9%, 
1.2% and 1.3% for the two-day, three-day, and seven-day test periods respectively. 
Similar levels of cross-sectional value creation are reported by Kale and colleagues 
(2002), Oxley and colleagues (2009), and Reuer and Koza (2000), among others.  
 













For each firm in the sample, their 2-Day CAR (t-1 to t) is employed to measure value 
creation. The two-day test period is chosen because it augments my previous efforts to 
limit confounding influences.  
The next section discusses the outcomes of hypothesis testing using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression analysis to analyze the sample and measures I have outlined. The five 
hypotheses from Chapter 4 are laid out in Table 7.4. I begin by addressing the model 
where Value Creation is the dependent variable to evaluate Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 
2b, before proceeding to the Opportunism model for Hypothesis 2a, Hypothesis 3, and 
Hypothesis 4.  
Table 7.4: Conceptual model 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. In coopetition, market commonality is curvilinearly related (taking an 
inverted U-shape) to firm value creation. Low and moderate levels of market commonality 
are positively associated with value creation and high market commonality is negatively 
associated with value creation.  
Hypothesis 2a. In coopetition, market commonality is curvilinearly related (taking a U-
shape) to opportunism. Low and moderate levels of market commonality are negatively 
associated with opportunism and high market commonality is positively associated with 
opportunism. 
Hypothesis 2b. Opportunism is negatively associated with value creation. 
Hypothesis 3. In coopetition, the relationship between market commonality and 
opportunism is negatively moderated by market rivalry. Market commonality has a weaker 
association with opportunism, both positive and negative, when market rivalry is high. 
Hypothesis 4. In coopetition, the relationship between market commonality and opportunism is 
negatively moderated by repeated cooperation. Market commonality has a weaker association with 
opportunism, both positive and negative, when repeated cooperation is high. 
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7.4  Value Creation 
The process of operationalizing the conceptual model led to the following empirical model 
for value creation:  
Equation 7.6:  Value Creation = β1 + β2Market Commonality + β3Market 
Commonality2 + β4Opportunism + β5Market Rivalry + β6Repeated Cooperation + β7Firm 
Size + β8Firm Age +β9Firm Total Alliances + β10Equity Alliance + β11Strategic Similarity 
+ β12Size Similarity + β13Age Similarity + β14Partner's Market Commonality + 
β15Partner's Total Alliances + β16Similarity of Market Commonality + β17Market 
Importance + ε 
In social and behavioral research, the relatively blunt measurement instruments available 
mean that a quadratic term is most suitable to model curvilinear effects (e.g., Baum & 
Korn, 1999; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006). This contrasts with the natural sciences where 
more precise data may be available and more sophisticated transformations are 
appropriate. A natural logarithmic transformation, for example, compresses higher value 
to estimate a curvilinear effect that is similar to a quadratic term but does not change 
direction; while a cubic transformation specifies an S-shaped relationship, where the 
direction of the relationship is expected to change twice. A quadratic term can test for a 
variety of effect types in social research, including U-shapes and inverted U-shapes, as 
well as relationships where the effect of the predictor is stronger or weaker at higher or 
lower values. 
Based on the conceptual development, Equation 7.6 specifies the anticipated predictors of 
Value Creation. This includes the independent variable, Market Commonality, and the 
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quadratic transformation necessary to evaluate the proposed curvilinear effect, as well as 
the mediating variable, Opportunism, and relevant controls.  
It is noteworthy that, in the case of both empirical models, the mathematical 
transformations cause structural multicollinearity in the data. This is explained in more 
detail in Appendix III. As collinearities are contained within sets of variables intended for 
joint interpretation, it does not create difficulties for evaluating the hypotheses.  
7.4.1  Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2b 
Table 7.5 reports OLS estimates for the Value Creation model. This model estimates the 
relationships between market commonality and value creation (Hypothesis 1), and 
opportunism and value creation (Hypothesis 2b). Two sets of estimates are presented: 
columns 1-4 where homoscedasticity was assumed, and columns 5-8 where robust 
standard errors (White, 1980) were estimated to correct for heteroskedasticity (Breusch-
Pagan: chi-sq = 453.23; p<0.001). Heteroskedasticity refers to correlations between the 
predictors and the variance of the residuals, which violates the Gauss-Markov assumption 
of homoskedasticity (zero correlations between the predictors and the residuals). Where 
homoskedasticity is violated, the OLS estimators remain unbiased but the estimate is no 
longer efficient as the variance, and thus the standard errors, are biased. I correct for this 
bias by employing robust standard error estimates (Column 8) for hypothesis testing. 
To evaluate the linear and nonlinear associations between market commonality and value 
creation, as well as the potential intermediary (mediating) influence of opportunism, 
estimation proceeded in four steps. First, Column 5(1) estimates the model with only 
relevant controls. As suggested in Chapter 6, I tested a broader suite of potential controls 
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than those reported. When control variables did not generate improved model fit, a more 
parsimonious model was preferred. Column 6(2) examines a linear relationship between 
market commonality and value creation by introducing the market commonality variable. 
Column 7(3) introduces the quadratic term necessary to test the curvilinear main effect 
outlined in Hypothesis 1. Column 8(4) introduces the opportunism variable to test the 
mediating effect (Hypothesis 2b). While these steps are illuminating because they 
illustrate changes in model fit as variables are introduced, I rely on estimates from the 
fully specified model (Column 8) for hypothesis testing. 
Table 7.5: OLS regression results for Value Creation 
 
Hypothesis 1 posited that market commonality is associated with value creation in an 
inverted-U shape, where it initially increases value creation but this effect reverses as 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     Robust Robust Robust Robust 
Constant .032*** .032*** .032** .032* .032* .032 .032 .032 
 (.009) (.010) (.010) (.014) (.016) (.019) (.020) (.017) 
Firm Sizeα -.021** -.021** -.021** -.021** -.021 -.021 -.021 -.021 
 (.007) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.011) (.014) (.014) (.013) 
H1: Market 
Commonality 
-.001 -.005 -.005  -.001 -.005 -.005 
  (.021) (.049) (.050)  (.056) (.173) (.189) 
H1: Market Commonality2 .007 .008   .007 .008 
   (.096) (.097)   (.060) (.062) 
H2b: Opportunism   -.001    -.001 
    (.021)    (.011) 
R-squared .021 .021 .021 .021 .021 .021 .021 .021 
 p=.002 p=.001 p=.027 p=.056 p=.053 p=.025 p=.058 p=.010 
n=431 
Control variables not resulting in improved fit are omitted.  
Two-tailed tests; one-tailed when hypothesized. 
* p<0.05  




market commonality rises. In Column 7, the negative market commonality coefficient 
(p>0.05) and the positive quadratic term (p>0.05) are directionally opposed to the 
hypothesized relationship and neither are significant. Thus, there is insufficient evidence 
to support Hypothesis 1.  
The causal steps approach to mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) requires that the 
effect of market commonality on value creation becomes weaker or insignificant (“partial 
mediation” or “full mediation”) when the opportunism variable is included. At the same 
time, the opportunism variable itself is expected to become a significant predictor. Under 
the causal steps approach, the outcome of Hypothesis 1 alone would be considered 
insufficient to reject the null because the overall relationship is not significant. 
Nonetheless, the individual dimensions (i.e., Hypothesis 2a and 2b) of the overall effect 
can support mediation through a total indirect effect (Hayes, 2013). Hypothesis 2b 
predicted a negative effect of opportunism on value creation where, as opportunism rises, 
value creation is reduced. In Column 8, however, the opportunism coefficient is negative 
and non-significant (p>0.05), which does not support Hypothesis 2b. Holding market 
commonality constant, opportunism is not a significant predictor of value creation in 
alliances. In certain cases, it may be that quantifying the total indirect effect can still offer 
support for mediation (Hayes, 2013) but in this case the negative estimate for the market 
commonality coefficient is conclusive.  
Thus, analysis of the data offers no evidence to suggest that market commonality or 
opportunism influence value creation. It is noteworthy that the Wald statistic for the 
overall Value Creation model is not significant with an extremely low reported R-squared. 
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This suggests that the variables in the model are not particularly useful predictors of value 
creation. I will now return to the Opportunism model to evaluate Hypothesis 2a, 
Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 4. 
7.5  Opportunism 
The hypothesized effects on opportunism produce the empirical model specified in 
Equation 7.7. This includes the independent variable Market Commonality and the 
quadratic transformation necessary to evaluate the proposed curvilinear effect. It also 
incorporates the necessary transformations to evaluate both moderators, Market Rivalry 
and Repeated Cooperation, and relevant control variables.  
Equation 7.7:  Opportunism = β1 + β2Market Commonality + β3Market 
Commonality2 + β4Market Commonality*Market Rivalry + β5Market 
Commonality2*Market Rivalry + β6Market Commonality*Repeated Cooperation + 
β7Market Commonality
2*Repeated Cooperation + β8Repeated Cooperation + β9Market 
Rivalry + β10Repeated Cooperation + β11Firm Size + β12Firm Age +β13Firm Total 
Alliances + β14Equity Alliance + β15Strategic Similarity + β16Size Similarity + β17Age 
Similarity + β18Partner's Market Commonality + β19Partner's Total Alliances + 
β20Similarity of Market Commonality + β21Market Importance + ε 
7.5.1  Hypothesis 2a 
Table 7.6 reports OLS estimates for the analysis of the effect of market commonality on 
opportunism. I present three sets of estimates; columns 1-4, which assumed 
homoscedasticity, columns 5-8 where robust standard errors are estimated to correct for 
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heteroskedasticity in the model (Breusch-Pagan: chi-sq = 66.68; p<0.001), and columns 
9-12 where clustered robust standard errors (e.g., Cameron & Miller, 2015) are estimated 
to address positive autocorrelation at the level of the dyad (Durbin-Watson: d = 1.02). 
Autocorrelation refers to correlation among the residuals of observations that are assumed 
to be independent. This violates the Gauss-Markov assumption of random drawings. 
Standard errors are biased depending on the nature of the correlation: (positive correlation 
deflates standard errors; negative correlation inflates standard errors). Having derived 
Durbin Watson statistics and identified autocorrelation at the dyad level, the appropriate 
correction is to cluster the observations before estimating robust standard errors (Cameron 
& Miller, 2015). 
In Table 7.6, Column 9(1, 5) presents a basic model with just relevant control variables. 
Column 10(2, 6) illuminates a linear relationship between market commonality and 
opportunism through the introduction of the market commonality variable. Column 11(3, 
7) introduces the quadratic term necessary to test the curviliinear effect outlined in 
Hypothesis 2a. Column 12(4, 8) introduces the interaction terms necessary to test 
Hypothesis 3-4. To address both the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the model, 
the hypotheses are evaluated with clustered robust standard errors (columns 9-12). 
The Wald statistic for the basic model (column 9) is significant (p<.001), indicating the 
relevance of the control variables to the model. Hypothesis 2a posited a nonlinear effect 
of market commonality on opportunism, whereby market commonality initially has a 
negative effect on opportunism but this effect is reversed at higher levels of market 
commonality. The coefficient for market commonality in Column 12 is negative and 
significant (p<0.05) while the coefficient for the quadratic term is positive and significant 
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(p<0.05). This supports Hypothesis 2a, that low and moderate levels of market 
commonality reduce opportunism but this is reversed at higher values of market 
commonality where there is a positive effect on opportunism. Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
curvilinear trajectory of the relationship. 
7.5.2  Hypothesis 3 
To detect the moderating effect of market rivalry on the nonlinear relationship between 
market commonality and opportunism, I derived interaction terms with both the linear and 
the quadratic terms for market commonality (Dawson, 2014). Both coefficients were then 
jointly tested to assess improved model fit when the interaction is included (i.e., H0: β4 
Market Commonality*Market Rivalry=0, β5 Market Commonality
2*Market Rivalry=0). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the association between market commonality and 
opportunism will be weaker when market rivalry is high. In Column 12, the interaction 
terms for market rivalry are both negatively related to the main effect. The coefficient for 
Market Commonality*Market Rivalry is positive, suggesting that the negative effect of 
market commonality on opportunism is less where market rivalry is high. The coefficient 
for Market Commonality2*Market Rivalry is negative, suggesting that the positive effect 
of higher values of market commonality on opportunism is less where market rivalry is 
high. A Wald Statistic to evaluate the joint significance of the coefficients confirms 
support for Hypothesis 3 (F = 4.57, p<0.05). 
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Table 7.6: OLS regression results for Opportunism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
     Robust Robust Robust Robust Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered 
Constant -.286 -.201 -.179 -.142 -.286 -.201 -.179 -.142 -.286 -.201 -.180 -.142 
 (.294) (.300) (.301) (.303) (.283) (.281) (.279) (.280) (.280) (.257) (.252) (.250) 
Market Rivalry -.002 -.002 -.001 .002 -.002 -.002 -.002 .002 -.002 -.002 -.001 .002 
 (.007) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
Firm Sizeα -.037* -.049* -.051** -.048* -.037* -.049** -.050** -.048** -.037** -.049*** -.050*** -.048*** 
 (.018) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.013) (.013) (.014) (.014) 
Firm Total Alliances -.001* -.001* -.001* -.001* -.001** -.001** -.001** -.001** -.001** -.001** -.001** -.001** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Repeated Cooperation -.011 -.008 -.007 -.008 -.011* -.008 -.007 -.008 -.011 -.008 -.007 -.007 
 (.011) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.007) 
Size Similarity .676* .615* .576 .540 .676* .615* .576* .540 .676* .615* .576* .540* 
 (.302) (.304) (.307) (.310) (.291) (.287) (.285) (.286) (.293) (.274) (.265) (.264) 
Age Similarity .096 .109 .106* .108* .096* .109** .107** .108** .096 .109 .106 .108 
 (.053) (.053) (.054) (.054) (.039) (.040) (.040) (.040) (.055) (.056) (.055) (.056) 
Similarity of Market Commonality .076 .047 .062 .051 .076* .047 .062 .051 .076 .047 .062 .051 
 (.044) (.048) (.050) (.051) (.034) (.034) (.037) (.037) (.046) (.048) (.051) (.050) 
Partner's Total Alliances -.001** -.001** -.001** -.001** -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
H2a: Market Commonality -.074 -.168 -.251  -.074* -.168 -.251*  -.074 -.168 -.251* 
  (.050) (.111) (.160)  (.040) (.106) (.137)  (.049) (.124) (.147) 
H2a: Market Commonality2 .209 .473   .209 .473*   .209 .473* 
   (.221) (.312)   (.185) (.240)   (.211) (.255) 
H3: Market Commonality*Market Rivalry 0.43    0.43    0.43 
    (.074)    (.062)    (.060) 
H3: Market Commonality2*Market Rivalry -.165    -.165    -.165 
    (.155)    (.110)    (.107) 
H4: Market Commonality*Repeated Cooperation .100    .100    .100 
    (.118)    (.061)    (.074) 
H4: Market Commonality2*Repeated Cooperation -.231    -.231*    -.231* 
    (.270)    (.100)    (.117) 
R-squared .136 .140 .142 .149 .136 .140 .142 .149 .136 .140 .142 .149 
 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
n=464 
Control variables not resulting in improved fit are omitted.  
Two-tailed tests; one-tailed when hypothesized. 
* p<0.05  
** p<0.01  
*** p<0.001  
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Figure 7.1:  Relationship between market commonality and opportunism 
 
7.5.3  Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 posited that repeated cooperation also weakens the effect of market 
commonality on opportunism. In Column 12, the coefficient for Market 
Commonality*Repeated Cooperation is positive, suggesting that the negative effect of 
market commonality on opportunism is less where repeated cooperation is present. The 
coefficient for Market Commonality2*Repeated Cooperation is negative, suggesting that 
positive effects of higher values of market commonality on opportunism are less where 
repeated cooperation is present. Both of these coefficients are negatively related to the 
main relationship, suggesting that repeated cooperation indeed weakens the main 




7.6  Postestimation  
In this section, I discuss additional procedures to establish consistency of the estimates 
and to eliminate sources of potential bias insofar as I could. Having established and 
addressed autocorrelation in the Opportunism model at the dyad level, I also tested for 
autocorrelation in both models arising from firm or temporal sources. In Table 7.7, 
Durbin-Watson statistics are provided for first-order autocorrelations. In all other cases, I 
fail to reject the null hypotheses of no positive autocorrelation and no negative 
autocorrelation at a 95% significance level (Slavin & White, 1977). In the absence of first 
order correlations, there was no reason to anticipate autocorrelation at other orders. 
Table 7.7: Durbin-Watson statistics 
 Opportunism Value Creation 
Firm d = 1.88 d = 2.07 
Dyad d = 1.02 d = 2.01 
Time d = 1.90 d = 1.90 
To address endogeneity concerns and assess the consistency of my results, I employed a 
two-stage selection model. Endogeneity bias refers to systematic but unobserved 
differences (e.g., dyad level characteristics) that could be driving the regression 
coefficients. Endogeneity occurs where a broader system of strategic factors that I cannot 
measure, and perhaps are not yet understood, influence both independent and dependent 
variables. The inclusion of an extensive set of control variables helps to account for many 
theoretically evident sources of heterogeneity, but it is impossible to be exhaustive and 
therefore endogeneity remains a concern. 
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A two-stage selection model involves introducing a valid instrument that predicts the 
independent variable in the ‘selection model’ but does not influence the dependent 
variable in the ‘performance model’ (Martinez, Oxley, & Silverman, 2017). To fulfil this 
purpose, I chose a dichotomous measure of whether the firm overlaps with the partner in 
its primary SIC code. It has been shown that firms who encounter each other in their most 
important markets increase their market commonality to establish forbearance through 
footholds in each other’s markets (Baum & Korn, 1999; Gimeno, 1999). Thus, this 
measure of market importance was correlated with my focal predictor, was not a predictor 
itself, was uncorrelated with the error term, and was therefore a valid instrument (Murray, 
2006). The estimation results for the two-stage regression were consistent with the OLS 
results – there are no systematic differences in direction or significance of the coefficients 
in the performance model versus those reported in the OLS model (Hausman chi-sq = 
0.16; p>0.99) (see Appendix IV for more information). As a result, while I acknowledge 
that it is impossible to rule out all endogenous bias, to the extent that I have been able to 
address endogeneity, there does not appear to be any notable evidence of bias in my 
results. 
Further robustness checks were undertaken with measures of opportunism using three and 
five-year windows for future cooperation. Pairwise correlations are r=0.98, r=0.95, and 
r=0.99, for three and four, three and five, and four and five-year windows respectively. 
There were no changes in the direction or significance of the Opportunism model 
coefficients when it was re-estimated with the three or five-year measure as the dependent 
variable. For the Value Creation model, I also examined three and seven-day CARs, in 
addition to the two-day CARs employed for the main analysis. Pairwise correlations are 
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r=0.97, r=0.81, and r=0.87, for two and three, two and seven, and three and seven-day 
CARs measures respectively. Again, the direction and significance of model coefficients 
were consistent when it was re-estimated with the three or seven-day CARs as the 
dependent variable. 
7.7  Chapter summary 
In Chapter 7, I have described the analysis procedures and results from the empirical data. 
I began by reporting the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. This was followed 
by analysis of the event study measure for value creation where I find cross-sectional 
cumulative abnormal returns of 0.9% (two-day test period), 1.2% (three-day test period) 
and 1.3% (seven-day test period). I proceeded to evaluate the five hypotheses proposed in 
the conceptual model. Beginning with the Value Creation model, I find insufficient 
evidence to reject the null in the case of Hypotheses 1 and 2b. In the Opportunism model 
I find evidence to support Hypothesis 2a, 3, and 4. Postestimation analysis affirmed the 
consistency of these results and ruled out several sources of potential bias. Table 7.8 and 




Table 7.8: Summary of results 
Hypotheses Supported? 
Hypothesis 1. In coopetition, market commonality is curvilinearly 
related (taking an inverted U-shape) to firm value creation. Low 
and moderate levels of market commonality are positively 
associated with value creation and high market commonality is 
negatively associated with value creation.  
No 
Hypothesis 2a. In coopetition, market commonality is 
curvilinearly related (taking a U-shape) to opportunism. Low and 
moderate levels of market commonality are negatively associated 
with opportunism and high market commonality is positively 
associated with opportunism. 
Yes; 
p<0.05 
Hypothesis 2b. Opportunism is negatively associated with value 
creation. 
No 
Hypothesis 3. In coopetition, the relationship between market 
commonality and opportunism is negatively moderated by market 
rivalry. Market commonality has a weaker association with 




Hypothesis 4. In coopetition, the relationship between market 
commonality and opportunism is negatively moderated by repeated 
cooperation. Market commonality has a weaker association with 








Figure 7.2: Relationships supported by the data 
 
In the next chapter, I discuss these findings in terms of extant research and offer 





Chapter 8: Discussion and Contributions 
 
8.1  Chapter introduction  
In this chapter, the results from the empirical analysis are considered in light of existing 
theory. I first summarize the findings with respect to the research questions (Section 8.2). 
Beginning with value creation, the hypothesized effects of market commonality 
(Hypothesis 1) and opportunism (Hypothesis 2b) on value creation are not supported. I 
then turn to the effects on opportunism (Hypothesis 2a, 3, and 4), which are all supported. 
This upholds a curvilinear U-shaped influence of market commonality on opportunism in 
coopetition, which is weakened by market rivalry and repeated cooperation.  
This leads to three core contributions (Section 8.3): (1) identifying and testing informal-
market based safeguards against opportunism, (2) providing theoretical resolution for 
conflicting findings in the literature, and (3) clarifying key moderating effects. In addition, 
my research advances the wider coopetition literature by establishing conceptual 
boundaries for coopetition, identifying limitations of the event study method for 
measuring value creation, and unpacking of how value creation occurs in coopetition 
(Section 8.4). My research also offers promising extensions for both theories at the heart 
of coopetition, competitive dynamics and the resource-based view (Section 8.5).  
With regard to practical implications (Section 8.6), my findings move beyond simplistic 
perceptions that have emphasized heightened opportunism and the resultant need for 
formal safeguards in coopetition. Instead, informal market-based safeguards may be a less 
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costly and more effective alternative for constraining opportunism. By highlighting firm, 
dyad, and market-level characteristics affecting opportunism, my research offers a 
nuanced analysis of where firms may or may not encounter opportunism in coopetition. 
8.2  Summary of findings 
I now summarize the findings of the empirical analysis. I begin with value creation and 
the associated empirical model, and then move to the effects on opportunism.  
8.2.1 Value creation 
With respect to value creation, the research question I set out to answer was: What 
influence does the effect of market commonality on opportunism have on firm value 
creation from coopetition? 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that market commonality has a curvilinear inverted-U shaped 
influence on value creation. This occurs through opportunism, which Hypothesis 2b 
predicted is negatively related to value creation. The Value Creation regression model did 
not support either of these hypotheses.  
Despite lack of support for the hypothesized effects, the event study established a positive 
and significant effect of coopetition on value creation across the sample. A cross-sectional 
stock price ‘bump’ of 0.9% was observed for the two-day test period, 1.2% for the three-
day test period, and 1.3% for the seven-day test period. This suggests that, all else being 
equal, coopetition relationships lead to increased value creation. It endorses the 
conceptual development in Chapter 2, where moderately strong and balanced competition 
and cooperation may lead to synergies that enable value creation in coopetition. 
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8.2.2  Opportunism 
With respect to opportunism, my research question was: What is the effect of market 
commonality on opportunism in coopetition? 
My findings support Hypothesis 2a, which predicted a curvilinear U-shaped effect of 
market commonality on opportunism. At low and moderate levels, market commonality 
increases scope for partner retaliation, which generates a negative effect opportunism in 
coopetition. When market commonality is high firms must appropriate value from many 
of the same markets, which reduces the rarity of jointly developed resources. This 
increases rewards from behaving opportunistically and reverses the initial negative effect.  
There was also support for the hypothesized moderating effects of market rivalry 
(Hypothesis 3) and repeated cooperation (Hypothesis 4). I find that the curvilinear U-
shaped relationship between market commonality and opportunism is weaker in the 
presence of market rivalry and/or repeated cooperation. Market rivalry dampens scope for 
partner retaliation against opportunism, which reduces the main effect. Repeated 
cooperation generates relational mechanisms which replace the market-based safeguard 
provided by market commonality, thereby also reducing the main effect. 
8.3  Contributions 
The central objective for this research was to develop better theory regarding opportunism 
in coopetition. My findings suggest that important modifications are necessary regarding 
how opportunism in coopetition is understood. They challenge the dominant assumption 
that opportunism is heightened in coopetition, affirm the presence of informal market-
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based safeguards against opportunism in coopetition, and resolve conflicting findings in 
the literature. I now discuss the three contributions arising from my research. 
8.3.1  Identifying and testing informal market-based safeguards against opportunism 
First, my research advances knowledge of opportunism in coopetition by clarifying when 
opportunism may be reduced. This challenges a widespread assumption in the coopetition 
literature that opportunism is heightened in coopetition (Belderbos et al., 2004; Dussauge 
et al., 2000; Fernandez et al., 2014; Garrette et al., 2009; Gnyawali & Park, 2009: 2011; 
Lavie, 2007; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 2001; Park et al., 2014b). To date, 
researchers have emphasized the increased transaction costs from formal safeguards 
which are perceived to be necessary to safeguard against opportunism (Mitchell et al., 
2002; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 2001), or attempted to reconcile how value 
creation may be achieved despite opportunism (Ansari et al., 2016; Gnyawali & Park, 
2011). Through systematic analysis of opportunism in coopetition, my research 
challenges a dominant assumption at the heart of both these approaches.  
In contrast to the widespread view, I demonstrate that opportunism depends on market 
commonality and, up to a point, may be reduced in coopetition. This clarifies that, in some 
cases, opportunism is not as severe as the literature assumes and that widespread emphasis 
on heightened opportunism in coopetition may be premature. There are important 
ramifications for how extant coopetition research is interpreted and how future research 
might proceed, both in terms of transaction costs and value creation. 
Reduced opportunism in coopetition occurs at low and moderate levels of market 
commonality through informal market-based safeguards that deter opportunism. Building 
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on the action and response literature of competitive dynamics (Baum & Korn, 1999; 
Caves, 1984; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, 1996), I explain how 
market commonality increases scope for partner retaliation which, up to a point, generates 
safeguards against opportunism in coopetition. Market-based safeguards against 
opportunism are a type of informal safeguard that, to my knowledge, have not previously 
been isolated and tested in the literature.  
The identification and testing of informal market-based safeguards has important 
ramifications for how the transaction costs of coopetition are theorized. Critically, 
informal market-based safeguards incur less transaction costs than formal contracts 
because they are self-enforcing (in contrast to formal contracts which require third party 
enforcement). Therefore, violations may be redressed speedily and informally, and do not 
need to be documented to the satisfaction of a third party (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Bounded 
rationality reduces the effectiveness of formal contracts for fully safeguarding 
opportunism (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Cavusgil et al., 2004; Deakin & Wilkinson,1998; 
Hart, 1988; Williamson, 1979), but informal safeguards offer more holistic protection 
because they rely on post-event determinations of acceptable behaviors. Transaction costs 
are less because partners are not required to spend resources anticipating all possible 
eventualities, nor writing, coordinating, monitoring, and enforcing a formal safeguard 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998; Telser, 1980).  
In several ways, informal market-based safeguards are also more effective for enabling 
value creation. One is that cost reductions from informal market-based safeguards free up 
more resources for value creation (Luo, 2006a: 2006b: 2007). A second is that partners 
have flexibility to adjust agreements “on the fly” (Uzzi, 1997: 48) because eventualities 
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do not require ex ante specification (Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Luo, 2002). A third 
is that informal safeguards protect against breaches of the ‘spirit’ of an agreement in 
addition to breaches of the formalized terms (Lumineau & Quélin, 2012; Luo 
2006a:2006b). Consequently, a broader spectrum of opportunistic behaviors are 
safeguarded and partners experience greater freedom and confidence to share resources 
(Dyer, 1997; Luo, 2006a: 2006b: 2007). A fourth way is that informal market-based 
safeguards are difficult to imitate because they require time and costs to develop. In 
contrast to formal contracts which may be easily imitated by others (who also have access 
to lawyers and third-party enforcers), the superiority and inimitability of market-based 
safeguards may represent a standalone source of value (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998). A fifth 
is that self-enforcing agreements roll over from one period to the next. While formal 
contracts are generally fixed length and therefore depreciate, informal safeguards may 
appreciate over time as firms become more aware of interdependencies between their 
behaviors (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
The identification of informal market-based safeguards in coopetition constitutes 
important theoretical progression. Existing theory, dominated by the assumption of 
heightened opportunism, is not equipped to explain rising pursuit of coopetition in 
practice (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Harbison & Pekar, 1998), which is frequently occurring 
without formal safeguards to constrain opportunism (Ryu & Reuer, 2016). Through 
development of a new explanation for reduced transaction costs and increased value 
creation in coopetition, I offer better theory about the dynamics of coopetition and why 




8.3.2 Resolution of conflicting findings in the literature 
Second, my research reconciles the conflicting findings reported by the few empirical 
studies examining opportunism in coopetition. On one hand, some research finds market 
commonality between partners leads to higher joint venture failure rates (Park & Russo, 
1996) with the authors drawing from TCE to argue that such failure occurs through 
heightened opportunism in coopetition. On the other hand, studies have drawn from 
multipoint competition logic, which incorporates some aspects of competitive dynamics, 
to explain empirical findings that suggest reduced opportunism in coopetition (Ryu & 
Reuer, 2016; Shipilov, 2009). Thus far, these conflicting findings have not been explained 
and most researchers have tended to focus on the TCE view that opportunism is 
heightened in coopetition.  
By conceptualizing and testing a nonlinear effect of market commonality on opportunism, 
I provide theoretical resolution for this conflict. At low and moderate levels of market 
commonality, informal market-based safeguards reduce opportunism in coopetition (e.g., 
Shipilov, 2009) and limit the requirement for formal safeguards against opportunism (e.g., 
Ryu & Reuer, 2016). However, when market commonality is high, this effect reverses 
and opportunism increases, which may lead to more instances of joint venture failure 
(Park & Russo, 1996). 
The conceptualization of both negative and positive effects of market commonality 
illustrates how these findings may not actually be conflicting. Instead, they may simply 
reflect varying levels of market commonality in different samples. The identification of a 
nonlinear effect offers a holistic conceptualization of opportunism in coopetition. Instead 
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of focusing on an incomplete negative or positive effect, my research provides an 
explanation that enables researchers to harness both perspectives within a rounded 
theoretical analysis.  
8.3.3  Clarification of key moderating effects 
Third, my analysis of key moderators provides a more nuanced understanding of 
opportunism in coopetition and highlights important dyad and market level characteristics 
which weaken the main effect. 
Specifically, the main relationship between market commonality and opportunism (Ryu 
& Reuer, 2016; Shipilov, 2009) is negatively moderated by market rivalry and repeated 
cooperation. Market rivalry constrains the scope for partner retaliation by decreasing the 
latitude for competitive escalation. Therefore, the potency of partner retaliation, and the 
extent to which market commonality reduces opportunism, is less when market rivalry is 
high. Meanwhile, repeated cooperation creates disincentives against opportunism though 
relational safeguards arising from trust, shared norms, and social relations. These make 
market-based safeguards somewhat redundant but, when market commonality is a driver 
of opportunism, they provide a compensatory safeguarding mechanism.  
Analysis of market rivalry and repeated cooperation affirms the underlying logic whereby 
increased scope for partner retaliation is the basis for informal market-based safeguards. 
Negative moderation was supported both cases, which suggests that market rivalry 
dampens scope for partner retaliation, whereas repeated cooperation replaces the effect 
on opportunism. Support for multiple factors affecting the same mechanism (i.e., scope 
for partner retaliation) provides validation for underlying safeguarding mechanism. The 
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logic that scope for partner retaliation reduces opportunism may be extended to unpack 
other important contingencies (e.g., network positioning; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; 
Stuart, 2003) that may also affect this mechanism.  
8.4 Advancement of the coopetition literature 
I now discuss important advancements of the coopetition literature. My research offers 
new insights for coopetition by (1) establishing conceptual boundaries for coopetition, (2) 
identifying limitations of the event study method for measuring value creation, and (3) 
enhancing understanding of how value creation occurs in coopetition. 
8.4.1  Conceptual boundaries of coopetition 
The defining characteristics of coopetition I develop offer much needed clarity concerning 
the phenomenon’s conceptual boundaries and definition. Ambiguity regarding the 
phenomenon’s boundaries has emerged in the literature because the term has been used 
quite broadly to describe phenomena are fundamentally different to the dyadic view of 
coopetition (simultaneous competition and cooperation between firms; Bengtsson & 
Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2011). The extant literature does not offer a suitable toolset 
to effectively distinguish between these different phenomena.  
I explain how three defining characteristics delineate coopetition and distinguish it from 
related phenomena. The first defining characteristic, simultaneity of competition and 
cooperation between firms, makes coopetition a unique phenomenon that requires 
reaching beyond conventional literatures of competition and cooperation. By emphasizing 
the role of intensity and balance within simultaneity, I add further depth to the analysis of 
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coopetition. The second characteristic, paradoxical interdependence of competition and 
cooperation, identifies unique challenges and tensions that are at the heart of coopetition. 
The third characteristic, value creation intent in coopetition, clarifies the core purposes of 
the engagement and distinguishes coopetition from collusion. 
I urge coopetition researchers to limit usage of the label ‘coopetition’ for phenomena that 
satisfy all three characteristics and to clearly explain how the phenomenon they are 
studying meets these characteristics. I intend that the defining characteristics can generate 
consensus about what coopetition is and is not, and drive the accumulation of a cohesive 
body of knowledge regarding coopetition. 
8.4.2  Limitations of the event study method 
I also identify important limitations of the event study method for measuring value 
creation in coopetition. Event studies are a popular approach for operationalizing value 
creation from inter-firm relationships (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Kale et al., 2002; Oxley 
et al., 2009; Rai, 2016) because they can pinpoint value creation that is attributable to a 
particular alliance while holding constant many firm-specific characteristics. Event study 
results are correlated with managerial assessments of alliance success, which leads 
scholars to argue that the market does a good job of predicting value creation in 
cooperative agreements (Kale et al., 2002).  Despite these benefits however, I argue that 
the lack of support for hypothesized value creation effects may arise from the 
operationalization of value creation and limitations of the event study method, rather than 
the underlying theory. 
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My findings raise concerns the event study as a general measure of value creation. The 
proposed effect of market commonality on value creation was comprised of two mediating 
effects: the effect of market commonality on opportunism and the effect of opportunism 
on value creation. I find support for the former effect but not for the latter. Yet the latter 
effect is established in the literature through extensive scrutiny that employs a range of 
operationalized measures (Barthélemy, 2008; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Lado, Dant, & 
Tekleab, 2008). Failure to replicate this effect with the event study method suggests that 
it may be limited as a general measure of value creation.  
Specifically, I argue that the event study has particular limitations for measuring longer-
term value creation. An event study relies on shareholder judgements to measure value 
creation, but shareholders are primarily short-term focused (Bebchuk & Stole, 1993; 
Vilanova, 2007). This suggests that an event study may accentuate short-term value 
creation at the expense of longer-term outcomes. In contrast, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 
2b emphasized long-term value creation in coopetition, arising when partners have 
freedom to share resources and confidence to tackle ambitious and complex projects 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Garrette et al., 2009; Gnyawali & Park, 2011). An event study 
is currently popular as an overall measure of value creation, but this potential short-term 
focus has implications for how the method is employed in strategic management going 
forward. 
8.4.3  Value creation in coopetition 
In Chapter 2, I develop new insights to explain how value creation may occur in 
coopetition. Despite widely observed outcomes of value creation in coopetition, including 
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technological development (Gnyawali & Park, 2011), disruption (Ansari et al., 2016), and 
expansion (Garrette et al., 2009), there has been limited theorizing about the unique 
properties of coopetition that enable these outcomes to occur. By unpacking intensity and 
balance within simultaneity, and juxtaposing individual implications of competition and 
cooperation, I provide finer-grained analysis regarding how value creation my occur in 
coopetition. 
Where inter-firm competition and cooperation are strong and moderately balanced in 
coopetition, I isolate synergies emerging from interplay of their individual implications: 
pursuit of excellence and resource potential (competition) and relational mechanisms and 
resource commitment (cooperation). This enables both mutual value creation and firm-
specific value creation. By developing these implications, conceptualizing their interplay, 
and connecting them to value creation, I augment the core contributions regarding 
coopetition dynamics and the potential for value creation in coopetition. This adds further 
nuance to how value creation is conceptualized in coopetition and provides a basis for 
deeper examination in future research.  
8.5  Extending underpinning theories 
Two theories, competitive dynamics (Chen et al., 1992; Baum & Korn, 1996; Smith et al., 
1992) and the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 2006), are central to how inter-
firm competition and cooperation are understood, but have been largely overlooked in the 





8.5.1  Competitive dynamics 
By employing competitive dynamics to shed new light on coopetition, I illustrate the 
theory’s strengths and limitations in an important yet underexplored context (Prince & 
Simon, 2009; van Reeven & Pennings, 2016; Yu & Cannella, 2013). Specifically, I extend 
the logic of action-response dyads to a setting where they have not previously been 
considered. As the building blocks of inter-firm rivalry, actions and responses are studied 
extensively in the competitive dynamics literature (Baum & Korn, 1999; Caves, 1984; 
Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, 1996), but almost exclusively in 
a market setting. My research illuminates the utility of studying actions and responses to 
understand rivalrous behavior in a non-market setting: opportunism in coopetition dyads. 
Moreover, I demonstrate how the three key drivers of competitive market response, 
awareness, motivation, and capability (Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994), are also 
relevant for retaliation in coopetition. 
My research highlights the relevance of competitive dynamics for explaining of inter-firm 
relationships occurring beyond traditional market confines where the original theory was 
developed. Firms are embedded in complex webs of interactions, of which market actions 
and responses represent a mere fraction (Gimeno & Woo, 1996b; Shipilov, 2012; van 
Wegberg & van Witteloosiujn, 2001). The novel application of competitive dynamics in 
this research should give encouragement to other scholars seeking to explain diverse 
forms of rivalrous behavior, including buyer-supplier dyads (e.g., Cox, 2004), units of 




Such encouragement, however, is balanced against an important caveat which I noted in 
Chapter 4. Despite important strengths for explaining these types of interactions, 
competitive dynamics is characterized an underlying zero-sum logic, where gains for one 
firm occur at the expense of another and inter-firm engagements are not perceived as a 
source of value creation. The logic of competitive dynamics overlooks unique interaction 
properties arising from value creation, which I demonstrate are particularly important in 
coopetition, and are likely to also be relevant in other types of relationships. Thus, to 
adequately analyze rivalrous behavior in these settings, it is necessary to introduce 
additional theoretical insights, such as the RBV, to enable systematic analysis of the value 
creation dimension.  
Ultimately, the practical significance of competitive dynamics may be greater in 
engagements, such as coopetition, that involve new value creation. While competitive 
dynamics is most commonly employed to explain how aggression may be constrained in 
market interactions (Prince & Simon, 2009; Yu & Cannella, 2013), this behavior equates 
to little more than tacit collusion. Collusion is damaging to consumers and society, and 
therefore illegal in developed economies. In contrast, extending competitive dynamics to 
study safeguards against opportunism in coopetition can identify sources of additional 
value creation, such as limiting wasteful investments in formal contracts and freeing 
resources to pursue innovation and R&D (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Jorde & Teece, 1990). 
By demonstrating the importance of competitive dynamics in non-market interactions, my 
research opens a promising avenue for revitalization of this literature and generates 




8.5.2  The resource-based view 
I also extend the RBV to explain both competitive and cooperative elements of the same 
relationship. Thus far, scholars have mostly applied the RBV to explain either inter-firm 
cooperation or inter-firm cooperation. The traditional RBV emphasizes inter-firm 
competition (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984), where firms 
achieve superiority through valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources that 
are heterogeneously distributed and not easily tradeable. Meanwhile, the external RBV is 
more closely aligned with inter-firm cooperation and how firms may rely on each other to 
access critical resources and capabilities that they cannot satisfy alone (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Lavie, 2006).  
My research extends these perspectives by drawing from resource-based logic for both 
competition and cooperation, affirming its relevance for both constituent elements of 
coopetition. It is widely acknowledged that cooperation is motived by synergies between 
competitors’ resources and capabilities which emerge because they are targeting similar 
customers and confronting similar challenges (Dussauge et al., 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 
2009: 2011; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Yet the competitive element is 
largely overlooked: resource-based concerns also motivate opportunism when market 
commonality is high. My research extends the theoretical foundations for coopetition by 





8.6  Practical implications 
 This research has five important practical implications. First, in Chapter 2, I make clear 
what coopetition is and is not, and, through the defining characteristics, provide a 
framework for managers to understand and delineate insights from the literature. At 
present, the term ‘coopetition’ is used broadly and narrowly to offer managerial insights 
regarding phenomena that are inherently different. For example, Afuah (2000) studies 
relationships with buyers, suppliers, and competitors and labels all of these phenomena as 
‘coopetition’, whereas Gnyawali & Park (2011) view coopetition as cooperation among 
direct competitors who are horizontally adjacent on the industry value chain. This creates 
challenges for managers seeking insights for their dyadic coopetition relationships 
because it is likely that broader usages of the coopetition term may be less relevant. I 
explain how three defining characteristics, simultaneity of competition and cooperation 
between firms, paradoxical interdependence of competition and cooperation, and value 
creation intent, make dyadic coopetition a unique and distinct phenomenon. This is an 
important clarification for managers, who may employ these characteristics as a basis for 
distinguishing among the various phenomena that are labelled ‘coopetition’ in the 
literature. 
Second, I illuminate the value creation potential of coopetition, offer novel explanations 
about when value creation may occur, and explicate critical factors that may enhance or 
diminish value creation in coopetition. Despite widely observed outcomes of value 
creation, the literature is silent on how value occurs, or how managers may improve value 
creation in their coopetition relationships. Through the event study method, my research 
affirms that coopetition has an overall positive impact on value creation. This supports 
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insights from extant qualitative (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 2011) and 
quantitative (Park et al., 2014a; Ritala, 2012) studies. Critically, however, my research 
isolates complementarities from the interplay of individual competitive and cooperative 
implications that enable value creation in coopetition: pursuit of excellence and resource 
potential (competition), and relational mechanisms and resource commitment 
(cooperation). Such complementarities enable both mutual value creation and firm-
specific value creation. In addition, I highlight key factors, such as intensity and balance 
within simultaneity, that determine the level of value creation (if any) that emerges. It is 
intended that managers may draw from these insights to understand how value creation 
can be cultivated, sustained, and enhanced in coopetition.  
Third, my findings indicate an overall positive message for managers interested in 
coopetition. I challenge simplistic perceptions and offer evidence that opportunism in 
coopetition may not be as severe as the literature assumes. In the face of complex, 
uncertain, and potentially long-term rewards from coopetition (e.g., Fernandez et al., 
2014; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Hamel, 1991), scholarly assumptions regarding heightened 
opportunism and costly safeguards may unnecessarily deter managers who must preserve 
short-term performance (e.g., Lages, Jap & Griffiths, 2008; Rappaport, 2005). However, 
my research clarifies that, when market commonality is low and moderate, market-based 
safeguards can reduce opportunism in coopetition. Given the benefits of coopetition for 
firms (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Garrette et al, 2009) and society (Gnyawali & Park, 
2011; Jorde & Teece, 1990), this addition to managerial knowledge can spur increased 
adoption and fuel firm and economy-level development.  
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Fourth, the identification of informal market-based safeguards, which may replace formal 
safeguards in some cases, supports more informed managerial decision making regarding 
coopetition governance. Formal safeguards are accompanied by significant costs which 
are heavily front loaded (Williamson, 1985) and can never fully safeguard against 
opportunism. However, informal market-based safeguards incur fewer transaction costs 
and offer more holistic protection because they rely on post-event determinations of 
acceptable behaviors. Thus, firms may participate in coopetition with less up-front costs 
from formal safeguards and where resources may be shared more freely and with less fear 
of opportunism. As governance decisions are central to the success of inter-firm 
relationships (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Caniëls, Gelderman, & Vermeulen, 2012; Faems, 
Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008), the new insights I offer regarding when informal 
market-based or relational safeguards may be relied upon, vis-à-vis when formal 
safeguards are required, can help managers to achieve whatever they consider ‘success’ 
in coopetition. 
Fifth, this extensive analysis of opportunism in coopetition, spanning firm, dyad, and 
market-level characteristics, provides a fine-grained understanding of where firms are 
more or less likely to encounter opportunism in their coopetition relationships. I highlight 
how the development and realization of benefits in coopetition will be influenced by the 
level of market commonality and repeated cooperation with a given partner, as well as the 
degree of rivalry in common markets. My research can therefore fuel better managerial 
decision-making with regard to partner selection. My research suggests that it will be more 
challenging to safeguard opportunism in coopetition relationships where a firm shares 
almost all of its markets with a partner. In addition, firms initiating new coopetition 
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relationships should be prepared to rely less on informal market-based safeguards where 
repeated cooperation with a partner is high, or where the extent of rivalry in common 
markets is high. 
8.7  Limitations 
There are a number of limitations emerging from my research. First, future cooperation is 
a rather blunt measure that only captures instances of opportunism which are sufficiently 
egregious to alter the partner’s likelihood of working with the firm again. There are subtler 
opportunistic behaviors that may be routinely pursued by coopetition partners, but which 
are not measured in my research. Vigilant interpretation should not extrapolate these 
findings to predict effects on milder opportunistic behaviors. Despite limitations however, 
this measure may represent steps forward regarding how opportunism is operationalized 
in the literature. Previous efforts have struggled to measure opportunism, relying on 
measures such performance outcomes (Park & Russo, 1996; Shipilov, 2009) or 
governance decisions (Ryu & Reuer, 2016). These measures invite confounding biases 
because they are quite far removed from where opportunistic behavior actually occurs. By 
focusing on partner reactions to firm opportunism, the future cooperation measure may 
be closer to the actual behavior, while capturing variety in the intensity of opportunistic 
behavior (reflected by the extent to which the partner chose to curtail its cooperation).  
Second, the broadly positive effect of coopetition on firm value creation is subject to an 
important caveat. In addition to the limitations discussed, the event study method 
introduces the possibility of reverse causality. Abnormal stock returns reflect investors’ 
initial expectations for the alliance, but initial high expectations, if shared with managers, 
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may reduce conflict with the partner and/or enhance motivation or productivity (Olk, 
2006). In such cases, shareholders’ expectations may influence value creation; rather than 
value creation determining shareholders’ expectations. 
Third, my findings are based on firms involved in dyadic cooperative R&D agreements 
where at least one partner was active in the global semiconductor industry. This could 
limit the generalizability of my results in other settings. In high tech industries like 
semiconductors, tacit knowledge is often an important source of value creation (von 
Hippel, 1988). Tacit knowledge may be particularly susceptible to opportunism (e.g., 
Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). It might also be more difficult to protect with formal 
contracts, so the relevance of market-based safeguards could be greater. Further tests with 
multi-industry samples can address these concerns. 
Fourth, while I have argued that constraining aggression in coopetition is beneficial to 
society in the specific setting of the coopetition agreement, there may be other aggregate 
effects that are damaging. For example, scope for partner retaliation in coopetition could 
also be employed as a mechanism for dampening rivalry across a portfolio of competitive 
engagements (e.g., Amir et al., 2017). The development of measures for overall welfare 
implications, focusing on “the state of competition with, as compared to without, the 
relevant [coopetition] agreement” (Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2000: 4), is a logical advancement of this research. 
8.8  Future research 
By shedding new light on opportunism in coopetition, my research highlights informal 
market-based safeguards and establishes a basis for deeper understanding of opportunism 
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and associated benefits and costs. Four important extensions arising from my 
contributions are now discussed. 
First, I find that informal market-based safeguards are an effective deterrent against 
opportunism to a point, but it is improbable that all types of opportunism are deterred in 
equal measure. To enable more nuanced understanding, it will be valuable to identify 
types of opportunism that are more or less likely to be safeguarded. Promising avenues 
could include the visibility of opportunism within common markets, consequences for the 
partner’s most important markets (e.g., Gimeno, 1999), implications for the partner’s 
resource-based advantages (e.g., Markman et al., 2009), or the proactive or reactive nature 
of the opportunistic behavior (e.g., Luo, 2007). 
Second, I have unpacked scope for partner retaliation against opportunism as the 
underlying mechanism for enabling market-based safeguards but incorporating other firm 
and dyad level determinants will generate a more nuanced understanding. Important future 
research directions could include the firm and partner’s positioning within their wider 
networks, which I expect to be a key antecedent of scope for partner retaliation (e.g., 
Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Gnyawali et al., 2006; Sanou et al., 2016). A partner who 
is a central actor in their network is not dependent on a small number of ties for accessing 
external resources and may draw on greater volume and speed of resource access for 
potential retaliation. Therefore, central actors are less worried about competitive 
escalation with any single partner and may be more likely to respond with competitive 
aggression (Gnyawali et al., 2006; Sanou et al., 2016). Scope for retaliation may also vary 
depending on the degree of symmetry between the network positions of the firm and the 
partner (e.g., Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Simultaneous analysis of market and 
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network-level factors will build further depth regarding how market-based safeguards are 
understood. 
Third, the effect of market rivalry on market-based safeguards represents a starting point 
for analysis of contextual determinants, but I urge further scrutiny here also. Coopetition 
is particularly significant for technological innovation (Ansari et al., 2016; Garrette et al., 
2009; Gnyawali & Park, 2011), so exploring the unique dimensions of these contexts will 
be important. On one hand, firms in these contexts are pushed towards coopetition because 
of short product life-cycles (Gnyawali & Park, 2009), but these could also be a source of 
market rivalry that inhibit market-based safeguards. Similarly, high R&D investments for 
technological innovation may be a functionally equivalent deterrent for firms who are 
worried about destabilizing joint efforts. On the other hand, technological resources may 
require greater protection from opportunism, while market-based safeguards may be more 
relevant among technology firms who are active across many markets. It is clear that 
further unpacking of contextual factors like these will be critical for augmenting this initial 
identification and testing of market-based safeguards. 
Fourth, my research highlights a need to focus on value creation measures that can balance 
short-term value creation with longer-term outcomes. Coopetition research often relies on 
longitudinal case studies (Ansari et al., 2016; Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park, 
2011), which facilitate some evaluation of long-term value creation but have limited 
generalizability. It is therefore necessary to explore longer-term measures that can be 
applied to large samples. Longitudinal analysis of financial measures or stock 
performance might be one approach, but these measures are highly susceptible to 
confounding influences from broader strategic factors. A suitable compromise might be 
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to track patenting activities over a period of time (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Sorensen & 
Stuart 2000; Spencer, 2003; Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011; Stuart, 2000). A new filing in 
a patent class associated with a coopetition relationship represents a unique and externally 
validated element of knowledge (Ahuja, 2000; Ahuja & Katila, 2001) that the firm has 
developed from coopetition (e.g., Park et al., 2014b). Within a single industry setting 
where firms’ patenting propensities are similar, patenting activity may be a suitable 
measure of value creation over time from coopetition (Ahuja, 2000; Rai, 2016). 
8.9  Conclusion 
The phenomenon of coopetition is receiving increasing attention, but the academic 
literature is dominated by a widespread assumption that opportunism is heightened in 
coopetition. This is at odds with industry proceedings, which provide strong evidence that 
the literature is poorly equipped to explain dynamics of coopetition and their implications 
for value creation. My research addresses this important deficit through systematic 
analysis of opportunism in coopetition. I identify and test informal market-based 
safeguards that reduce opportunism in coopetition, thereby challenging the dominant view 
in the literature. By clarifying opportunism in coopetition, I resolve conflicting findings 
and establish a robust basis for examining coopetition benefits and costs in future research. 
For managers, my research explains an efficient and effective safeguard against 
opportunism that is not previously identified. This suggests that firms may participate in 
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Appendix I: Systematic Literature Review Method 
A systematic review proved an appropriate means for identifying key contributions in a 
scientific and transparent manner (Tranfiel, Denyer, & Smart, 2003). The systematic 
literature review method was undertaken to establish implications, value creation 
opportunities, and defining characteristics arising from simultaneous inter-firm 
competition and cooperation.  
I considered relevant conceptual and empirical papers. Following an intensive trial and 
error phase, I adopted a simplistic but effective search string; ‘compet* AND cooper*’ 
OR ‘coopet*’ OR ‘co-opet*’ (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Bouncken, Gast, Kraus, & 
Bogers, 2015). I conducted this search in six databases (Table A.1), limiting returns to 
academic journal articles, books or book chapters published in English. In multi-
disciplinary databases, returns were limited to business, management and economics-
themed papers (in their broadest sense). This was an iterative process and I employed a 
checklist of twenty-one important papers from an initial scoping review to assist in 
determining when saturation was achieved. I also manually searched six special issues on 
coopetition and related themes.  
Table A.1: Databases included in systematic literature review 
Academic Search 
Complete and all related 
EBSCOhost databases 
26 databases hosting management journals including 
Journal of Management, Academy of Management Review 
and British Journal of Management. 463 sources were 
returned, of which 50 were determined broadly relevant to 
the specified criteria. 
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Web of Science Hosting more than 12,000 international and regional 
journals including Industrial Marketing Management and 
Research Policy. Of the 307 returns, 62 were broadly 
relevant to the review question. 
Scopus Comprehensive source of book sources and journals such as 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management. From the 
363 returns, 93 were broadly relevant. 
ScienceDirect A small but select group of sources not also covered by 
Scopus, including Journal of International Management 
and Telecommunications Policy. Of the 60 returned sources, 
27 were broadly relevant.  
Emerald Management Emerald Management hosts 170 business and management 
journals. Of 56 hits, 19 were broadly relevant. 
JSTOR Hosting 2,000 journals including Strategic Management 
Journal. Of 300 returns, 86 were broadly relevant. 
Following the removal of duplicates, 159 broadly relevant sources remained, to which I 
added a further three. Two were found through subject-specific Google Scholar alerts 
(title: coopetition) and the third was an advanced publication from Strategic Management 
Journal. I then applied the 162 remaining sources to the inclusion criteria in Table A.2. 
The analysis focused on implications, value creation opportunities, and defining 
characteristics arising from simultaneous inter-firm competition and cooperation.  
Table A.2: Inclusion criteria for final analysis 
1. Conceptual discussion or empirical findings about the unique 
implications or defining characteristics of simultaneous inter-firm competition 
and cooperation. 
2. Conceptual or empirical insights regarding value creation opportunities 
available from simultaneous inter-firm competition and cooperation. 
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Papers meeting one or both criteria were included for final analysis. Where there was no 
evidence of either criterion following a full read of the paper, sources were omitted. 
Quantitative outcomes of this process are broken down in Table A.3. Bibliographical 
records were maintained for all sources and justifications were recorded for the sources 
that were excluded at this stage. 
Table A.3: Results following the application of the inclusion criteria 
Conceptual discussion or empirical findings about the unique implications or defining 
characteristics of simultaneous inter-firm competition and cooperation. 
29 
Conceptual or empirical insights into value creation opportunities available from 
simultaneous inter-firm competition and cooperation. 
61 
Did not meet the criteria and were excluded from the analysis 72 
I proceeded with analysis of the remaining 90 sources and used MaxQDA to develop a 
coding protocol. I undertook a systematic search of all reference lists for previously 
unidentified research that was potentially important. Including duplicates, this produced 
a further 312 references. An abstract search narrowed this to 98 sources and the 
application of the inclusion criteria (Table A.2) refined it to 70. A further three iterations 
of systematic searching of references yielded 19 more sources. At that point, I did not 
identify any new sources. In total, 179 sources were identified through the systematic 
literature review method.  
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Appendix II: Time Series Standard Errors 
As the variance of the test period is subject to additional volatility induced by the alliance 
announcement (Brown & Warner, 1985), standard errors are derived from the estimation 
period (Campbell et al., 1997).  
The variance for the estimation period is the sum of squared residuals divided by n-k-1 
(where n is the number of days in the estimation period and k is the number of independent 
variables): 




Following Campbell and colleagues (1997), cross-sectional variance for z events may then 
derived as: 








Assuming independence of observations (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Corrado, 2011), cross-
sectional test-statistics for a given day in the test period may then be established: 
Equation A.3:   Cross-sectional test statistics: 𝑇 =
𝐴𝑅
√𝑉𝑎𝑟 [𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ]
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
 
Test statistics for cumulative cross sectional 𝐶𝐴𝑅s follow a time series standard deviation 
model where the standard error is adjusted for number of days (t) in the relevant test period 
(Campbell et al., 1997): 
Equation A.4:  Cumulative cross-sectional test statistics: 𝑇 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡
√𝑡√𝑉𝑎𝑟 [𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ]




Appendix III: Multicollinearity 
There is structural multicollinearity in the sample induced by the mathematical 
transformations necessary for Market Commonality2, as well as the interactions between 
market commonality and market rivalry. This raised multicollinearity concerns regarding 
four variables: Market Commonality, Market Commonality2, Market 
Commonality*Market Rivalry, and Market Commonality2*Market Rivalry. In the 
Opportunism (Value Creation) model, variance inflation factors (VIFs) for these variables 
are 16.97 (7.41), 15.98 (6.82), 13.82, and 13.80 respectively.  
Multicollinearity creates difficulties for inferences because, when highly correlated 
independent variables are included in the same model, the variance of each depends on 
which others are included (Wooldridge, 2013). Conversely, when independent variables 
are perfectly uncorrelated, they have the same variance, regardless of what other 
independent variables are included in the model.  
Multicollinearity is not problematic where collinearity is limited to two variables whose 
effect is intended to be interpreted jointly. Specifically, Hypothesis 2a, examining the 
effect of market commonality on opportunism, involves interpreting two collinear 
variables (Market Commonality, Market Commonality2) as part of the same effect. In such 
cases, multicollinearity does not obstruct inferences.  
An initial appraisal of the interaction terms, Market Commonality*Market Rivalry, and 
Market Commonality2*Market Rivalry, suggest that multicollinearity could be 
problematic in the Opportunism model. There are now four variables with high VIFs to 
be interpreted as two independent effects. Given the instability in the variances of 
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collinear variables, multicollinearity creates difficulties when it comes to identifying 
multiple effects (Wooldridge, 2013). 
However, closer observation reveals that the severe collinearities are contained within 
each independent effect. The source of the high VIFs are pairwise correlations: on one 
hand between Market Commonality and Market Commonality2, and on the other between 
Market Commonality*Market Rivalry and Market Commonality2*Market Rivalry. Both 
pairs are intended for joint interpretation, rather than individual interpretation. The 
pairwise correlations between the independent variables and the interaction terms (Table 
7.1) are significantly below the r=0.8 threshold at which multicollinearity is considered 
severe (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 2013). Therefore, multicollinearity does not 
obstruct the evaluation of the hypotheses. VIFs for all other variables in the models does 




Appendix IV: Two-stage Selection Model  
Table A.4: Two-stage selection model 











Constant .241** -.135 -.142 
 (.088) (.304) (.303) 
Market Importance .026*** -0.009  
 (.006) (.022)  
Market Rivalry .018*** .002 .002 
 (.002) (.008) (.008) 
Firm Sizeα -.021*** -.048* -.048* 
 (.006) (.020) (.020) 
Firm Total Alliances -.000 -.001* -.001* 
 (.000) (.001) (.000) 
Repeated Cooperation .005 -.007 -.008 
 (.003) (.012) (.012) 
Size Similarity -.322*** .537 .540 
 (.089) (.311) (.310) 
Age Similarity .020 .110* .108* 
 (.016) (.054) (.054) 
Partner's Market Commonality .023 -.053 -.053 
 (.015) (.051) (.051) 
Similarity of Market Commonality  .008 .051 .051 
 (.015) (.051) (.051) 
Partner's Total Alliances  .000 -.000** -.001** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Market Commonality2  1.747*** .463 .473 
 (.038) (.313) (.312) 
Market Commonality*Market Rivalry .302*** .043 .043 
 (.016) (.074) (.074) 
Market Commonality2*Market Rivalry -.566*** -.165 -.165 
 (.036) (.155) (.155) 
Market Commonality*Repeated Cooperation .136*** .096 .100 
 (.034) (.119) (.118) 
Market Commonality2*Repeated Cooperation -.201* -.225 -.231 
 (.078) (.270) (.270) 
Market Commonality  -.238 -.251 
  (.163) (.160) 
R-squared .943 .149 .149 
p-value  p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
n=464 
* p<0.05  
** p<0.01  
*** p<0.001 
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic: Hausman chi-sq = 0.16; p>0.99. 
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